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5Feminisms and the study of religion 
in the 21st century
Darlene M. Juschka1
Abstract: This article engages feminisms in the study of religion, speaking to 
past applications, current developments in critical feminist theories, and their 
utilization (or not) in the study of systems of belief and practice. Beginning with 
a brief discussion of past feminist work in the study of systems of belief and 
practice, the article then discusses a number of current feminist critical work that 
has yet to be applied in the study of systems of belief and practice. This gap, the 
author argues, can be related in some measure to the essentialization of systems 
of belief and practice, and an approach using a methodology of supplication — 
an approach that leaves behind the possibility of critical analysis.
Introduction
In the years that have followed the publication of my edited text Femi-nism and the study of religion2 the two areas of study have interacted 
in interesting ways, although both continue to be somewhat suspicious of 
1 Darlene Juschka, PhD Associate Professor Women’s and Gender Studies 
and Religious Studies Juschka’s areas of interest are semiotics, critical the-
ory, feminisms, and posthumanism. Some of her more recent work include: 
Feminist approaches to the study of religion. (2017). In Richard King, (ed.), 
Religion, Theory, Critique: Classic and Contemporary Approaches; Indige-
nous women and reproductive justice - A narrative in Carrie Bourassa, Betty 
McKenna and Darlene Juschka (eds.) Listening to the beat of our drum (2017); 
Feminism and Gender. In Steven Engler and Michael Stausberg (eds.), The 
(Oxford) handbook of the study of religion (2016). She has also published 
Political Bodies, Body Politic: The Semiotics of Gender (2009) (Chinese trans-
lation, 2015) and Feminism in the study of religion: A reader (2001). She is 
currently working on a book entitled Contours of the flesh: The semiotics of 
pain and has completed a case study focused on Intimate Partner violence in 
a northern Saskatchewan community.
2 Darlene M. Juschka, Feminism in the Study of Religion: A Reader (New York 
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each other. Feminists have often taken mainstream systems of belief and 
practice to be entrenched in traditionalism and conservatively oriented 
particularly with regard to their adherence to, and generation of, gender/
sex ideologies that locate, and continue to locate, the group marked as fe-
male/feminine in a subordinate position in relation to the group marked 
as male/masculine. In Christianities, for example, the anthropogonic 
myth (myth of the creation of humans) and demogonic myth (myth of 
creation of social body) in Genesis 1: 26-27, 2:4-3:24, respectively, have 
been, and continue to be, drawn on to mystify and justify gender oppres-
sive social relations. 
Feminisms and systems of belief and practice have often been, then, 
set in a conflictual relationship particularly by fundamentalistic orienta-
tions that adopt a strong gender-binaristic ideology and take as norma-
tive structural hierarchies, for example deity over humans, humans over 
non-human animals, men over women, adults over children, rich over 
poor, etc. The tendency has been to see feminisms as anti-religious when 
indeed this is far from the truth. There are feminists who are atheists, 
but they are few3 and many feminists are themselves strong adherents 
of a system of belief and practice even as they challenge it and seek to 
reshape it in line with their feminist views.4 The idea of a tension be-
tween feminism and systems of belief and practice is, in large part, a 
trope generated often by the status quo and/or adherents of the system 
of belief and practice. Equally, the idea that women of strong faith are 
not feminists or sympathetic to feminisms is equally problematic and 
again a means to cast a shadow on feminisms. Certainly feminists have 
called systems of belief and practice into question with regard to mas-
and London: Continuum Press, 2001).
3 According to the 2015 PEW report 3.1% of the US population identified 
as atheist “America’s Changing Religious Landscape” (2015). A review of 
atheist studies by Arial Keysar and Juhem Navarro-Rivera published in 
2017 indicates that 7% of the world population self-identify as atheists with 
the majority found in China “A World of Atheism: Global Demographics,” 
The Oxford Handbook of Atheism, eds. Stephen Bullivant and Michael Ruse 
(Oxford: Oxford UP, 2017): 553–86. 
4 Judith Plaskow, Standing Again at Sinai: Judaism from a Feminist Perspective 
(New York, NY: HarperSanFrancisco, 1991).
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culine hegemonic structures, but this does (did) not mean they rejected 
them wholesale; rather their efforts are (were) to reshape and revamp 
them with ideologies of gender, race, sexualities, colonialism, and the 
like critically engaged.5 These efforts continue, and indeed evangelical 
and fundamentalistic systems now include professed feminists who are 
seeking to bring about change in their systems of belief and practice.6 
Feminist, critical theorist and gender studies engagements with bibli-
cal texts have challenged and continue to challenge the interpretations of 
these foundational myths by arguing that Genesis 1:27, for example, does 
not locate the female/feminine in a subordinate position and indeed treats 
both genders as equal in creation and before deity. In terms of Genesis 2 
and the story of Adam and Eve, feminists, for example, read against grain 
of normative masculine dominance and preference and instead represent-
ed Eve as inquisitive, thoughtful, and reflective, while Adam silently fad-
ed into the background (see Phyllis Bird,7 Athalya Brenner,8 Carol Myers,9 
Phyllis Trible,10Amy-Jill Levine,11 among others). These kinds of challenges 
by feminist theologians/thealogians over the decades, however, have not 
undercut in any significant way the gender ideologies operative in most 
traditional Christianities. Instead a place was made for humans marked as 
5 Brewster, “Atheism, Gender, and Sexuality,” The Oxford Handbook of Atheism, 
eds. Stephen Bullivant and Michael Ruse (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2013): 516–17.
6 Brink Judy and Joan Mencher, eds., Mixed Blessings: Gender and Religious 
Fundamentalism Cross Culturally (New York and London: Routledge, 2005); 
Pamela Cochran, Evangelical Feminism: A History (New York and London: 
New York UP, 2005).
7 Phyllis Bird, Missing Persons and Mistaken Identities: Women and Gender in 
Ancient Israel (Augsburg: Fortress Press, 1997).
8 Athalya Brenner, A Feminist Companion to Genesis (Sheffield: Sheffield 
Academic Press, 1993).
9 Carol Myers, Discovering Eve: Ancient Israelite Women in Context (Oxford: 
Oxford UP, 1988).
10 Phyllis Trible, God and the Rhetoric of Sexuality, Overtures to Biblical Theology 
(Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1978).
11 Amy-Jill Levine and Marianne Blickenstaff, (eds.), A Feminist Companion to 
Matthew. Feminist Companion to the New Testament and Early Christian Writings 
(Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 2001).
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female/feminine so that gender ideologies of distinct and separate genders 
linked to an assumed heteronormativity remained intact. Even as femi-
nists reversed the interpretation of Eve’s actions to signify her curiosity 
as positive, this reversal continued to uphold and establish the dominant 
gender ideology: to turn something upside-down underscores what right-
side-up looks like. Engagements such as these pull up short leaving the 
status quo in place because the structure has been left in place. Feminist 
efforts in the study of system of belief and practice during the last four 
decades of the 20th century have taken a number of turns and made a 
number of challenges, some productive, some less so. Reversal, although 
momentarily challenging, never successfully altered Christianity’s, or any 
other systems of belief and practice, traditional gender ideology of oppo-
site genders and sexes.12
Gender binaries, something feminist poststructuralists in the study of 
systems of belief and practice discuss, are a significant aspect of the ma-
jority of systems of belief and practice particularly since colonization as 
gender binaries are central to the construction of the conceptualization of 
the biological, the social and the metaphysical, and in this determine the 
ontological, the societal, and the speculative of human systems of organi-
zation.13 In heteronormative masculine hegemony, for example, we learn 
that a proper human is either female or male, feminine or masculine, but 
never both nor neither; that the ethical, moral, and fantastical parameters 
of the social body are located in the hands of masculine deities and nec-
essarily must be upheld and enforced by a heteronormative masculine 
ruling elite that reflects said heteronormative masculine deity(ies). Femi-
nine deities, however, are not quite godly enough precisely because they 
are located as feminine, such as the Virgin Mary in Catholicism, prob-
lematic and threatening such as Kali in what is now called Hinduism, 
or are completely erased such as Asherah, ancient consort of Yahweh. 
Certainly binaries are not fixed and shift depending on the social and his-
torical context, but in all locations binaries function to obscure the soci-
12 Thomas Laqueur, Making Sex: Body and Gender from the Greeks to Freud 
(Cambridge; London: Harvard UP, 1992).
13 Darlene M. Juschka, Political Bodies/Body Politic: The Semiotics of Gender (UK: 
Equinox, 2009).
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ality of constructed categories and their underlying knowledge systems. 
Feminists in all areas of study have noted the deployment of binarism in 
heteronormative masculine hegemonies and called them into question. 
Understanding the centrality of gender and its intersection with other 
social categories of oppression such as colonialism, sexuality, race, so-
cial status, disability, age, and geopolitical location, feminists, along with 
other critical theorists, exposed and analyzed the exercise of power in 
and through gender binarism or what is called gender ideology.
The analysis of gender and accompanying oppressive categories does 
not compose the all of feminist critical work. Feminists have also made 
creative contributions to literature,14 music (Ani DiFranco), art (Faith 
Ringgold or Judy Chicago), film (Mary Harron), philosophy,15 science,16 
sociology,17 psychology,18 history,19 epistemology,20 ontology21 and theal-
14 Octavia E. Butler, Lilith’s Brood (New York: Grand Central Publishing, 2000); 
Ursula K. Le Guin, Left Hand of Darkness (New York: Penguin Random House, 
2000).
15 Patricia Hill Collins, Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness, and 
the Politics of Empowerment, Perspectives on Gender 2 (Boston: Unwin, 1990); 
Patricia Hill Collins and Sirma Bilge, Intersectionality (Cambridge, UK: Polity 
Press, 2016).
16 Donna Haraway, Primate Visions: Gender, Race, and Nature in the World of 
Modern Science (New York: Routledge, 2006); Donna J. Haraway, When Species 
Meet (Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 2008).
17 Barbara Smith, The Truth That Never Hurts: Writings on Race, Gender, and 
Freedom (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers UP, 1998).
18 Julia Kristeva, Desire in Language: A Semiotic Approach to Literature and Art, 
Ed. Leon S. Roudiez, trans. Leon S. Roudiez, Thomas Gora, and Alice Jardine 
(New York: Columbia UP, 1980).
19 Joan W. Scott, “Gender: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis,” Feminism 
and History, ed. Joan W. Scott (Oxford; New York: Oxford UP, 1996): 152–80.
20 Sandra Harding, Is Science Multicultural?: Postcolonialisms, Feminisms, and 
Epistemologies, Race, Gender, and Science (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana UP, 
1998); Sandra Harding and Merrill B. Hintikka, (eds.), Discovering Reality: 
Feminist Perspectives on Epistemology, Metaphysics, Methodology, and Philosophy 
of Science, Synthese Library 161 (Dordrecht, Holland; Boston: D. Reidel; 
Hingham, MA, 1983).
21 Judith Butler, Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of “Sex” (New York: 
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ogy22 much of which has arisen from inter-disciplinary, intra-disciplinary 
and multi-disciplinary contexts.23 These kinds of contexts extend femi-
nist work and often break down barriers that can limit imaginative and 
creative thinking, while foregrounding curiosity.24 My own work is done 
in both the humanities and social sciences, in both the study of religion 
and women’s and gender studies, while it is cross-cultural and cross-his-
torical, and I am not singular in this kind of academic work.
One of the more significant contributions of feminists to the study of 
systems of belief and practice, to my mind, has been the introduction of 
interdisciplinary work, a methodology that has undercut the essential-
ization of “religion” as a thing existent in the world. The essentialization 
of religion is a theological approach to systems of belief and practice, and 
this approach assumes that deity and religion are found in the world and 
they are discoverable. This approach represents systems of belief and 
practices as “things sought” and amounts to a methodology of suppli-
cation: that is, people seek and find (or are found), and what they find 
is not a construction and not a social practice; rather it is the essence of 
existence. The methodology of supplication leaves behind the possibility 
of a critical — that is reflective and analytical — engagement of systems 
of belief and practice. An interdisciplinary methodology does not make 
such an assumption as systems of belief and practice do not hold pride 
of place and they cannot be at the center; rather they count among other 
social and discursive practices. 
Feminists were not the only theorists who engaged in an interdisci-
plinary methodology, but they have been significantly consistent and 
thorough. Drawing on anthropological, sociological, feminist, semiotic, 
philosophical, linguistic, historical, literary, anti-racist, and queer, among 
Routledge, 1993).
22 Plaskow; Judith Plaskow and Donna Berman, (eds.), The Coming of Lilith: 
Essays on Feminism, Judaism, and Sexual Ethics, 1972–2003 (Boston: Beacon, 
2005).
23 Darlene M. Juschka, “Interdisciplinarity in Religious and Women’s Studies,” 
Studies in Religion 35.3–4 (2006): 389–99.
24 Cynthia Enloe, The Curious Feminist: Searching for Women in the New Age of 
Empire (Berkeley; Los Angeles; London: University of California Press, 2004).
11Feminisms and the study of religion in the 21st century
others, theorizing they have extended method, theory, and content in the 
study of systems of belief and practice. Indeed, in many ways feminisms, 
among other critical theories, brought about a paradigm shift in all areas 
of study not the least of which was bringing forward social actors such 
as women who, in the past, had been relegated to the dark corners of 
knowledge systems.
Feminisms in the twenty-first century and the gaps it might fill
The feminist efforts above are not new as they came into play begin-
ning in the mid-twentieth century; however, by the 1990s feminisms in 
multiple locations began to shift their work to account for critical theo-
ry developed in antiracist,25 queer,26 Indigenous,27 Marxist,28 disability,29 
and postcolonial30 studies. This shift has been referred to, by many, as 
“third wave” and reshaped feminist work in all areas of study bring-
ing feminisms into the twenty-first century. The reshaping of feminisms 
in the early twenty-first century has meant an extension of theories and 
practices to include the methodology of intersectionality and attention to 
heteronormativity and sexualities, colonialism and globalization, bodies, 
gender/sex performance, among others. 
25 Kimberlé Crenshaw (ed.), Critical Race Theory: The Key Writings That Formed 
the Movement (New York: New Press, 1995); Sherene Razack, Dark Threats 
and White Knights: The Somalia Affair, Peacekeeping and the New Imperialism 
(Toronto: U of Toronto P, 2004).
26 Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, Epistemology of the Closet (Berkeley; Los Angeles: U 
of California P, 1990).
27 Cheryl Suzack, Shari M. Huhndorf, Jeanne Perreault, and Jean Barman, 
(eds.), Indigenous Women and Feminism: Politics, Activism, Culture (Vancouver 
and Toronto: UBC Press, 2010).
28 Chandra Talpade Mohanty, Feminism Without Borders: Decolonizing Theory, 
Practicing Solidarity (Durham; London: Duke UP, 2003).
29 Linton. Simi, Claiming Disability: Knowledge and Identity (New York: New 
York UP, 1998).
30 Aihwa Ong and Stephen J. Collier, eds., Global Assemblages: Technology, 
Politics, and Ethics as Anthropological Problems (Malden, MA: Blackwell 
Publishing, 2005).
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Globalization
For example, noting increased global suffering in the wake of neoliberal-
ism and the industrial-military complex,31 the reshaping of nationalisms 
along the lines of intolerance and cupidity, civil strife32 , and climates 
shifts that increase aridity, flooding, extreme weather and rising oceans, 
feminists have moved the local to the global and intertwined them in 
order to address current environmental threats facing all life; while fem-
inist post-humanists, such as Donna Haraway,33 question the way val-
ue is given to life and how humans locate themselves at the center of 
creation and therefore see themselves as the only form of life with real 
value. In this frame, humanism and its attendant philosophies are seen to 
be anthropocentric, that is the human is located at the center. Likewise, 
systems of belief and practice locate the human at the center leaving be-
hind all other life having deemed these to exist to serve human needs 
and therefore having no intrinsic value. This view of non-human animals 
was/is significant to the otherfication seen in colonization, Eugenics, 
and Walt W. Rostow’s stages of economic development wherein those 
marked by race, gender, sexuality, geopolitical location are deemed to 
not have properly or fully crossed the boundary between wilderness and 
civilization and between non-human and human animals.34 
The animal-human binary is a root binary that functions in systems 
of belief and practice, monotheism in particular, setting human ani-
mals apart, while the gender binary of female-woman-feminine and 
male-man-masculine as opposites35 operates in tandem with the non-hu-
31 Gilbert Rist, The History of Development: From Western Origins to Global Faith, 
trans. Patrick Camiller (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Zed books, 2002).
32 Cynthia Enloe, Globalization and Militarism: Feminists Make the Link (Lanham, 
Maryland: Roman and Littlefield, 2007); Cynthia Enloe, “Beyond Steve 
Canyon and Rambo: Feminist Histories of Militarized Masculinity,” The 
Militarization of the Western World (New Brunswick; London: Rutgers UP, 
1989): 119–40.
33 Donna J. Haraway.
34 Juschka, Political Bodies/Body Politic: The Semiotics of Gender.
35 Laqueur.
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man/human animal binary with each supporting and legitimating the 
other. Therefore the female/feminine is closer to animality through her 
fleshiness of the “body”, firmly lodged in her reproductive organs, while 
the male/masculine is removed from animality and located closer to de-
ity through his humanness linked to his abstract “mind”. This gender 
play was central to 19th and early 20th century colonization in Canada, 
and the US, as well as globally.
Warfare and civil strife
Another area of feminist concern has been on warfare and civil strife as 
these have had a tremendous impact on all non-combatants, while war-
fare has been declined in the masculine. Naming and critically engaging 
warrior ideologies from different locations around the globe feminists 
have forced global systems to acknowledge rape, mutilation, and mur-
der of humans marked as female/feminine by soldiers or peace keepers 
as crimes of war and not a natural event of war. Laura Shepherd36 and 
Robin Riley,37 among others, have done close studies on warfare asking 
how gender, and its intersections with the other value loaded categories 
of race, status, age, able-bodiedness, and indigeneity play out in differ-
ing contexts where war and/or civil strife are enacted. Warfare is a social 
activity shaped by and within social contexts and therefore is neither nat-
ural nor inevitable. The forms it takes are socially ascribed to, so for ex-
ample, in the ancient Greek world conflict between Greek city-states led 
to the losing state being overrun and subjected to the murder of infants 
and toddlers, enslavement of girls and boys, rape and murder of women, 
and the torturing to death of older men and women for the amusement 
of the soldiers. Goods, food, and any kind of wealth, including those pre-
viously enslaved, were appropriated. Warfare was part of the economy 
36 Laura Shepherd, Gender, UN Peacebuilding, and the Politics of Space: Locating 
Legitimacy (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2017); Laura Shepherd, Gender, Violence and 
Security: Discourse as Practice (London, UK: Zed Books, 2008).
37 Robin Riley, Depicting the Veil: Transnational Sexism and the War on Terror (UK: 
Zed Books, 2013); Robin Riley, Chandra Talpad Mohanty, and Minnie Bruce 
Pratt, eds., Feminism and War: Confronting US Imperialism (UK: Zed Books, 
2008).
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of ancient Greece.38 In ancient Rome the field of war was open in March 
and closed October 15th with the horse sacrifice.39 When agricultural ac-
tivity was complete, warfare for the enrichment of the state and its elite 
was engaged allowing for the acquisition of goods, precious metals, ani-
mals, and slaves. Certainly, discourses of threats and need for protection 
were often the rationale for warfare, but these ideological plays simply 
obfuscated the realities of warfare. For example, in the Third Punic War 
between Rome and Carthage in 146 BCE, the Roman senate had Carthage 
denuded of its wealth and then burned to the ground with all its remain-
ing inhabitants murdered or enslaved. In both ancient Greece and Rome 
war was taken to be natural, and particularly natural to the male/mascu-
line, although certain there were the “monstrous” female/feminine such 
as the legendary Amazons or the infamous “tremblers” of ancient Sparta.
The links between systems of belief and practice and warfare have 
been undertheorized and too often taken to be insignificant40.The typical 
approach is to assume that systems of belief and practice are in them-
selves never the reason for a war; instead they conceal the “real” rea-
sons for civil unrest and warfare. I do not think systems of belief and 
practice merely conceal the “real” reasons, such as economics or political 
ideologies, for warfare. Rather, they are a means by which to: legitimate 
warfare; mark as other those who are deemed the enemy; to construct 
an identity of sameness; to separate, expropriate, imprison, and murder; 
and a means by which to construct and maintain ideologies such as war-
rior ideologies of masculine hegemonies. Warrior ideologies, although 
showing variation in terms of time and location, share mythemes such 
38 Kathy L. Gaca, “Ancient Warfare and the Ravaging Martial Rape of Girls and 
Women: Evidence from Homeric Epic and Greek Drama,” Sex in Antiquity: 
Exploring Gender and Sexuality in the Ancient World, eds. Mark Masterson, 
Nancy Sorkin Rabinowitz, and James Robson (London and New York: 
Routledge, 2015): 278–97.
39 Georges Dumézil, Archaic Roman Religion: With an Appendix on the Religion of 
the Etruscans, forward by Mircea Eliade, trans. Philip Krapp, vol. 1 (Baltimore 
and London: The John Hopkins University Press, 1996).
40 One recent text is War and Religion edited by Jeffrey M. Shaw and Demy 
Timothy J., eds., War and Religion: An Encyclopedia of Faith and Conflict, 3 
(Santa Barbara, California: ABC-CLIO, 2017).
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as the constellation of the warrior, king and priest, natural hierarchies, 
warfare as practice, the suppression and control of the female/feminine 
by the male/masculine, and metaphysical encouragement and sanction 
of all of the above. Warfare (king), masculinity (warrior), and systems of 
belief and practice (priest) are ideologically linked in multiple demogon-
ic (demos41 + creation of) myths such as found in ancient Sumerian and 
Babylonian myth in the figure of Gilgamesh (warrior, king and priest), in 
the Iliad the figures of Achilles (warrior), Agamemnon (king), and Chry-
ses (priest), in Nso mythology the fon, as priest and king, and warriors 
who transform into leopards to protect their community,42 and in the 
Tanakh the figures of David (warrior), Saul (king) and Samuel (priest).43 
Systems of belief and practice, warfare and masculinities intersect to pro-
duce most if not all of humanity’s most horrific stories of brutality, tor-
ture, mass murder, genocidal efforts, and scorched-earth policies such as 
seen in the Holocaust of WWII, the US war on North Vietnam 1955-1975, 
Rwanda in 1994, Abu Ghraib from 2003 until 2006, Myanmar beginning 
in 2016.
From my feminist work on war, warfare and masculinity I have noted 
the reluctance of scholars in the study of systems of belief and practice 
and theological studies to take seriously the intersection of war, warfare 
and masculinity and have wondered about this. Is it because systems of 
41 Demos is an ancient Greek term referring to the common people in a 
democracy and extending from this then, a people as a collective. 
42 Miriam Goheen, Men Own the Fields, Women Own the Crops: Gender and Power 
in the Cameroon Grassfields (Wisconsin: U of Wisconsin P, 1996).
43 Bruce Lincoln Death, War and Sacrifice: Studies in Ideology and Practice 
(Chicago; London: Chicago University Press, 1991) discusses these figures 
and their constellation in ancient Indo-European mythological systems and 
subsequent systems such as Vedic, Roman, or Norse, among others. Roger 
Woodard’s text Indo-European Sacred Space: Vedic and Roman Cult (Urbana and 
Chicago: U of Illinois P, 2006) also discusses the alliances and contestations 
between these figures, while both authors draw on the work of Georges 
Dumézil Archaic Roman Religion: With an Appendix on the Religion of the 
Etruscans and Emile Benveniste Indo-European Language and Society, Miami 
Linguistics Series.12 (Coral Gables, Florida: U of Miami P, 1973), 1969 in their 
discussions.
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belief and practice are distanced from war, warfare and masculinities in 
an effort to remove them from the purely mundane? Is the lack of theo-
rizing by scholars simply an effort to protect their own systems of belief 
and practice? Or has the Eurowestern colonial mythology of Church and 
State separation blinkered scholars so that they take the separation to 
be a fact and in doing so separate systems of belief and practice from 
war and warfare? In the ideology of colonization,44 the mythology of a 
Church and State separation marked and continues to mark nations who 
adhere to it as necessarily rational, while those others who do not ad-
here to the mythology, currently Islamic nations and Islamic populations 
within nations, are represented as irrational as here the Church and State 
separation has yet to be properly brought into play. Whatever the rea-
sons, and I am sure they are multiple, the outcome has been to ignore 
how systems of belief and practice intersect and work with war, warfare 
and, of course, properly masculine warriors.
Intersectionality
Like war, warfare and warriors, gender, sexuality, and other social mark-
ers that inflect power such as indigeneity, race, social status, geopolitical 
location, and age are all taken to be specialized concerns that need not be 
taken into account when studying systems of belief and practice. These 
social categories — intersecting or alone — are central to mythologies, 
sign-symbols and rites, constructing, as they do, identities of the subject, 
the group, the community, the nation, and the notion of being human 
in the world and the metaphysical. Black feminist theory developed the 
methodology of intersectionality grounded in black feminist thought in 
the US and UK. Challenged, white feminisms realized their tendency to 
locate side by side or piled one on top of the other oppressive social cat-
egories, such as race, gender, age, sexuality and so forth. Instead, theo-
44 See, for example, the theory of “take-off” developed by Walt Rostow The 
Stages of Economic Growth, a Non-Communist Manifesto (Cambridge [Eng.]: 
University Press, 1960); a theory that informed, and continues to inform, 
global relations since its development.
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rists such as Kimberlé Crenshaw45 and Patricia Hill-Collins46 argued that 
these categories intersect so that oppression operates in a distinct fash-
ion. For example, in the racialized discourses of North America, includ-
ing Mexico, black female sexuality is shaped by white female sexuality 
with the former, black female sexuality, measured and judged by the 
latter, white female sexuality. When it came to sexuality black women 
were not properly passive and demurring and subsequently marked as 
oversexed. As oversexed they cannot be sexually assaulted with the con-
sequences of this gendered-racial ideology visible in the streets and the 
courts as Crenshaw so astutely argues.47 
However, even as these identity categories are central to systems of 
belief and practice, they are deemed unworthy of analysis and therefore 
too often bracketed or simply ignored. We can see this play in Christian 
narratives of the mythic figure of Jesus Christ whose genitals and anus 
are represented as they signify that he is a male human being, and fur-
thermore signifies those humans who are his proper ritual experts. But 
equally, the penis and anus are erased and replaced by the phallus and 
a seal through abstraction, the latter two of which secure heteronorma-
tive and dominant masculinity since they are linked to the deities of the 
“Father and Son”. The phallus and the seal that mark the proper sub-
ject act as sign-symbols of power in predominately white, Christian or 
Christian-esque, heteronormative masculine hegemonies. In Christiani-
ties it matters that deities are male/masculine even as it matters that the 
leaders of dominant Christianities around the globe are primarily male/
masculine. Significantly, then, part of, or connected to, dominant polit-
ical, social, economic, communication, etc. systems, gender ideologies 
purported and supported by the various systems of belief and practice 
tend to be the basis and measure for the operative gender ideology of the 
larger social body.
45 Kimberlé (ed.) Crenshaw; Kimberlé Crenshaw, “Mapping the Margins: 
Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence against Women of Colour,” 
Stanford Law Review 43.6 (July 1991): 1241–99.
46 Collins and Bilge; Collins.
47 Kimberlé Crenshaw.
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The mytheme of Church and State separation
If gender, sexuality, race, and other significant social categories are 
taken to be and represented as merely of local concern, and if the in-
terplay of systems of belief and practice with the larger social body is 
minimized and/or erased, an outcome is one of distortion and bias, and 
further, marks a refusal  to recognize the play of power. For example, the 
proposition of a Church and State separation is a colonizing mytheme 
that allows(ed) Eurowestern Christian hegemonic countries like the US, 
Canada, the UK, France, Germany, Norway, Sweden, etc. to locate their 
governments and their actions as rational and legitimate. This kind of 
honour is not awarded to countries seen not to have separated Church 
and State, such as many Middle Eastern and Islamic countries, countries 
of Sub-Saharan Africa, the Sudans, Haiti, and so forth. Signified on the 
global stage as lacking so-called rationality, a cognitive state based on 
the binary of Church and State wherein the first is taken to be linked to 
emotions (and superstition) and the second to thought (also reason), the 
latter of which must overcome the former, interference in these coun-
tries is presented as necessary and helpful. However, in light of what 
has actually occurred in these locations such interference indeed was (is) 
not needful, necessary or helpful. This is only one, although significant, 
aspect of how systems of belief and practice shape and intersect with the 
hegemonic ideologies. There are a multitude of other locations such as 
media, education or legal systems wherein systems of belief and practice 
shape, support, provide the logic and justification for all that we practice 
and deem to be the “ways things are and ought to be”. Following Louis 
Althusser then: 
...the existence of the ideas of his [their] belief is material in 
that his [their] ideas are his [their] material actions inserted 
into material practices governed by material rituals which are 
themselves defined by the material ideological apparatus from 
which derive the ideas of that subject. Naturally, the four in-
scriptions of the adjective ‘material’ in my proposition must 
be affected by different modalities: the materialities of a dis-
placement for going to mass, of kneeling down, of the gesture 
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of the sign of the cross, or of the mea culpa, of a sentence, of 
a prayer, of an act of contrition, of a penitence, of a gaze, of 
a hand-shake, of an external verbal discourse or an ‘internal’ 
verbal discourse (consciousness), are not one and the same 
materiality.48  
 For Althusser, like Blaise Pascal whom he references, systems of belief 
and practice are ideal institutions and practices to develop, uphold and 
deploy ideology.
Systemic oppressive practices in systems of belief and practices 
A critical engagement with systems of belief and practice for their of-
ten oppressive practices, which can and do reduce the quality of life for 
those humans who practice or are accosted by them, and for non-human 
animals and all life forms affected by them, does not mean dismissal or 
adoption of a position of non-belief; but it does require cognizance of, 
and a reflection on power. Challenging our social systems, integral to 
which are systems of belief and practice, requires honesty, forthright-
ness, and always an eye to power and its circulation. Following Michel 
Foucault’s understanding of power, a critical engagement with systems 
of belief and practice does not assume power is lodged in one place or 
another, but that it shifts — shifts between and in relation to our social 
institutions of which systems of belief and practice are integral:
Now, the study of micro-physics presupposes that the power 
exercised on the body is conceived not as a property, but as a 
strategy, the effects of domination are attributed not to ‘appro-
priation’, but to dispositions, manoeuvres, tactics, techniques, 
functionings; that one should decipher in it a network of rela-
tions constantly in tension, in activity, rather than a privilege 
that one might possess; that one should take as its model a 
perpetual battle rather than a contract regulating a transaction 
48 Louis Althusser, “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes toward 
an Investigation),” Mapping Ideology, ed. Slavoj Žižek (London and New 
York: Verso, 1995) 127.
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or the conquest of a territory. In short this power is exercised 
rather than possessed; it is not the ‘privilege’, acquired or pre-
served, of the dominant class, but the overall effect of its stra-
tegic position.49
Feminisms in the study of systems of belief and practice have taken the 
position that power is integral to social organization and therefore have 
worked, and worked hard and diligently to challenge heteronormative 
masculine hegemonies and their attendant systems of belief and prac-
tice. We have worked in numerous ways to ask when, where, and how 
power is deployed. We ask, what are the outcomes of its deployment? 
And where do systems of belief and practice fit in the deployment of 
power? For example, the institution of the Catholic Church has for cen-
turies ignored the abuse the religious — nuns, priests, bishops, cardinals, 
and even popes — have enacted on laypersons, particularly children. In 
the last few decades under pressure from many social justice advocacy 
groups, including feminist groups, the Catholic Church has been forced 
to look at and take responsibility for this abuse. The 2018 Philadelphia 
case is just such an example wherein hundreds of priests abused more 
than one thousand children over a seventy year period; something the 
Catholic Church neither stopped nor punished its priests for. Instead, the 
sexual assault was condoned in the act of its concealment.50 In a second re-
cent example, the Sisters of Providence, who ran St. Joseph’s Orphanage 
in Burlington Vermont before its closure in 1974, have been questioned as 
to allegations of sexual abuse, torture and the murder of children in their 
care from 1930 until its closure.51 Because feminisms in a multitude of lo-
cations demanded that sexual abuse and assault be criminalized (see for 
49 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punishment: The Birth of the Prison, trans. Alan 
Sheridan (New York: Vintage-Random House, 1979): 26.
50 Jeremy Roebuck, Julia Terruso, and William Bender, “Failure at the Top,” The 
Inquirer Daily News 2003, Nov 2018.
51 Laura Ly and Chuck Johnston, “Accusations of Decades of Child Abuse at 
Vermont Orphanage Lead to Investigation,” CNN 2011, Sept 2018.
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example the work of Catharine MacKinnon52 and Kimberlé Crenshaw 53) 
these acts of injustice are no longer accepted and concealed. Instead, with 
feminist pressure concerning taking sexual assault seriously such injus-
tices have come under social and legal censure. 
Interrogating conceptualizations of knowledge, the flesh, desire, emo-
tion and pain, and troubling certainties such as normative domination 
by humans marked as white heteronormative male/masculine and/or 
Eurowestern, feminists have ensured gross misconceptualizations of hu-
man existence have been removed from our systems of knowing and un-
derstanding. Challenged, for example, was the belief held until recently 
of the inability of humans marked as female/feminine, and those consid-
ered “other” through their association with the feminine, to engage in 
abstract thinking; thinking required in the sciences, philosophy and of 
course theology. Consider, for example, Lawrence Summers’, president 
of Harvard University in 2005, statement that women’s cognitive capaci-
ties were insufficient to allow them to succeed in the sciences.54 His views 
were soundly contested, as were his views on race, and he subsequently 
grudgingly stepped down from his position as president in 2006. This 
view of gender/sex, and all other categories of social oppression, has been 
developed and deployed through our knowledge systems and central to 
this play of epistemological power are systems of belief and practice. The 
intersection of knowledge, systems of belief and practice and socio-lin-
guistic being are of central concern to both feminisms and to the study of 
systems of belief and practice bringing together these two areas of study 
and thought. Such a joining can only benefit both particularly since they 
continue to maintain a critical distance from each other.   
52 Catharine A. MacKinnon and Reva B. Siegel (eds.), Directions in Sexual 
Harassment Law (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale UP, 2012).
53 Kimberlé Crenshaw.
54 Suzanne Goldenberg, “Why Women Are Poor at Science, by Harvard 
President,” The Guardian 2018, Jan 2005.
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Neoliberalism, the Rise of New Media Folklore 
and the Emergence of New Nationalisms1
Jan Kajfosz2
Abstract: The aim of the paper is to define the difference between nationalisms of 
the modern era and contemporary nationalisms. The proposition is methodolog-
ically based on the phenomenological and semiotic analysis of texts represent-
ing genres of new media folklore shared within digital communicative networks 
as well as on the analysis of conditions of their production, consumption, and 
reproduction. The author claims that the social reproduction of new national-
isms takes place beyond traditional (modern) social structures and hierarchies of 
knowledge credibility. He attempts to prove that new nationalisms are based on 
magical-mythical perception and thinking.
The aim of the paper is to answer the question what conditions shape the contemporary social production and reproduction of national-
ism compared to the era of modernity. During the 1960s, Peter L. Berg-
er and Thomas Luckmann describe the social mechanisms of produc-
tion of collectively relevant meanings in their classical work, The Social 
Construction of Reality3. According to these authors the legitimization of 
knowledge and of social institutions happens on four layers: 1) every-
day vocabulary (habitual connotations of every understandable word 
1 This paper has been financially supported by University of Ostrava, Insti-
tutional Development Project (IRP) No. 201819 Social and Cultural Mecha-
nisms of In- and Exclusion: a Comparative Perspective.
2 Jan Kajfosz is Associate Professor at the Institute of Ethnology and Cultur-
al Anthropology, University of Silesia in Katowice (Poland) and at the De-
partment of Sociology, University of Ostrava (Czech Republic). His research 
interests concern the cognitive prerequisites of reification, social constructiv-
ism and pragmatic aspects of communication. Among his numerous publi-
cations, the most recent are, Return to the beginnings, or how culture masks 
its changes? (2015) and Presuppositions within the analysis of popular mem-
ory discourses (2018).
3 Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The social construction of reality: A 
treatise in the sociology of knowledge (New York and London: Doubleday, 1989)
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reproduce a value system and implicate an instruction on how to act to-
wards designated phenomena and what to expect from them), 2) simple 
explanatory patterns in the form of generalizing judgments and popular 
narratives (proverbs, legends, rumors, gossips, etc.), 3) expert knowledge 
and argumentation, which is sometimes not accessible outside of expert 
systems;  the reproduction of such knowledge requires special initiating 
techniques and rituals, 4) a symbolical universe consisting of signs able 
to unify disparate phenomena into one perceived “order of things.” – The 
authors claim that when expert knowledge is not immediately accessible 
for non-experts, popular representations of such knowledge in the form 
of suitable hierarchies of symbols and narratives can make them legiti-
mate. By means of reduced and aestheticized representations of expert 
knowledge members of different societies can also understand incom-
prehensible phenomena in such a way that they feel their grandeur and 
usefulness for the society or even mankind, even if they cannot always 
justify their feelings4. – This all relates to the era of modernity.
Within the contemporary social production of collectively relevant 
sense, the importance of layer 3 and 4 decreases in favor of layer 2. The re-
production of credibility of modern knowledge institutions is disturbed 
to a large extent due to new communication technologies (the emergence 
of new media and social media), due to neoliberal patterns of trading in-
formation (the emergence of infotainment) and due to social media folk-
lore as a sphere of everyday collective prosumption (production as well 
as consumption) beyond modern social hierarchies, and also beyond the 
constraints of long-time authorities. The production of contemporary 
nationalism happens to a large extent beyond the classical ideological 
4 Roland Barthes demonstrates this type of magical-mythical legitimization 
with the example of Einstein´s equations. Even non-physicists can under-
stand E=mc2 in such a way that they perceive it as an „esoteric image of a sci-
ence entirely contained in a few letters“. The equation can be spontaneously 
seen as a sign of a „secret of the world“. I can be seen as a sign of an inacces-
sible knowledge and in this sense it can be perfectly understandable. Roland 
Barthes, Mythologies, trans. Jonathan Cape (New York: The Noonday Press, 
1972), 69-70.
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state apparatuses, if we are to use the notion of Louis Althusser5. The 
essential feature of new nationalisms consists in the fact that they are not 
embedded in former, modern hierarchies of knowledge credibility any-
more. Nowadays it is hardly possible to legitimize institutions of knowl-
edge and knowledge as such only by means of consensual acknowledged 
symbols and rituals or by means of symbiotic or mutual “consecration” 
of cooperating authorities (established information sources) in the sense 
proposed by Pierre Bourdieu6.
The contemporary world under the aspect of 
knowledge credibility hierarchies
Within the former modern society, if somebody acknowledges a publisher 
as a credible knowledge institution, he will presumably acknowledge a 
different publisher due to the fact a word (a name) having specific conno-
tations – implicating specific images and values – transfering them onto 
every entity to which it indexically relates. Designation means i.a. using 
generalizing maps which make invisible various changes, discontinuities 
and all specifics of territories to which such maps relate7. Within modern 
society, even if somebody distinguishes between more and less credible 
publishers he will apparently tend to believe that what is published is 
more credible than what is said, except anomic circumstances when credi-
bility hierarchies change. In the world of modernity, a recognized cooper-
ation between a credible publisher and an author who has been unknown 
so far can make the author credible – or vice versa, if a credible author has 
something in common with a new publisher, he/she can make the pub-
5 Louis Althusser, ‘Ideology and ideological state apparatusses (notes towards an 
investigation)’, in Lenin and Other Essays, trans. Ben Brewster (New York and 
London: Monthly Review Press, 1971), 86-127.
6 Pierre Bourdieu, Kunst und Kultur: Zur Ökonomie der symbolischen Güter, 
trans. Hella Beister (Berlin: Suhrkamp, 2014), 98-117.
7 Alfred Korzybski, Science and sanity: An introduction to the non-Aristotelian sys-
tems and general semantics (New York: Institute of General Semantics, 2000), 
58; compare Jean Baudrillard, Simulacra and simulation, trans. Sheila F. Glaser 
(Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2006).
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lisher trustworthy and prominent. Within spontaneous perception index-
icalities (perceived contiguities) between two institutions can change in 
their similarity or even identity under some aspects: one institution makes 
other institutions credible if it has something in common with them. Our 
credible companionship makes us credible and our noncredible compan-
ionship makes us not credible. This way, an institution, which has a good 
reputation can transfer this reputation to other institutions due to their co-
operation. If third parties perceive such cooperation as not accidental, they 
easily assume that both institutions enjoy similar prestige. In this way, au-
thors can make their publishers, broadcasters or even the universities cred-
ible, where they had studied, where they had taught etc. – and vice versa8.
In the same way, not only credible  hierarchies of knowledge institu-
tions but also credible  hierarchies of narratives are produced in modern 
society. Within a pre-reflexive, spontaneous perception, the value is trans-
ferred from the source of a narrative onto the narrative, and this occurs 
again on the basis of an indexical relation, on the basis of the perceived 
contiguity of one and the other. Let us look at the matter from the per-
spective of pupils at school: the teacher, who is telling them a story is for 
them a metonymic representative of the school; the school is a metonym-
ic representative of education, and as it follows, of objective knowledge. 
One and the other are, in turn, metonymically related to initiation rituals 
(entrance examinations, graduations), which provide the pupil with lofty 
– “sacred” – experiences, etc. Most importantly, the value-bearing con-
notations connected with one link of the metonymic chain can be trans-
ferred to another link and vice versa. The loftiness or authority (and other 
axiologically characterized connotations) metonymically connected with 
the institution of the school are ‘transferred’ to the teacher, and from him 
back to the school, and so on. They are also transferred to the stories the 
teacher presents to his/her students, and vice versa. In this precise man-
ner, narratives can be legitimized by themselves; they can also legitimize 
social institutions, including those by which they were produced9.
8 Bourdieu, 2014, 98-117.
9 Compare Jan Kajfosz, ‚Magic in the social construction of the past: The case 
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The teacher, whose authority is transferred to the narrative he trans-
mits, can be replaced by a museum guide, or by a grandfather, parents, 
other family members and friends (significant others) who constitute 
authority for the recipient and to whom the recipient is emotionally at-
tached. Other similar sources which are able to make their messages cred-
ible are acknowledged newspapers, broadcasters etc. The value-bearing 
connotation connected with any object can be transferred onto the story 
that is associated with it and the opposite. To repeat: an axiological val-
uation – positive or negative – associated with the sources of narratives 
can be transferred to those narratives (making them credible or noncred-
ible) and from them back again to their sources. In this way, every society 
produces and reproduces its picture of the world.
Within relatively stable hierarchies of credibility, expert knowledge 
– not accessible from the outside of expert systems – can be quite easily 
legitimized by symbolical universes. Within neoliberal postmodernity, 
this does not seem possible anymore. Neoliberal knowledge institutions 
can reproduce their symbolic capitals and survive on the free market 
only in the way of permanent “fighting” for wide audiences – in the 
way of entertaining, surprising, astonishing, amazing them. If they do 
not offer any visible technologies generally regarded as useful, the only 
way a knowledge institution can establish reasons for its own existence 
is to make spectators wonder. In such circumstances only evoking “emo-
tional” astonishment has the power to persuade. Rhetorical strategies 
– communication styles of marketing and PR – overwhelm the Aristo-
telian syllogism within the public discourses. This can be regarded as 
a consequence of the fact that modern hierarchies of knowledge have 
collapsed. Long-term authorities have been to a large extent replaced by 
short-term authorities (movie stars and other celebrities as experts, blog-
gers, YouTubers etc.), who are characterized by the lack of need to avoid 
contradictions and to maintain consistencies of knowledge. Moreover, 
the virtual significant others (mediated people we are emotionally at-
tached to) can change very quickly: the valuable authority of today can 
of Teschen Silesia,’ Polish Sociological Review, 2013, 183: 357-358.
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be quickly removed and replaced by another one. Credible hierarchies of 
knowledge institutions are in so far unstable, that they probably do not 
exist anymore if they are defined through their stability.
Within the sphere of neoliberal media, the credibility of broadcasters 
is not necessarily a condition of their popularity, of their symbolic capital 
and of their profits. This can be demonstrated in many examples:
2012 Animal Planet and Discovery Channel – which are globally con-
sidered recognized educational broadcasters – aired the mockumentary 
entitled Mermaids: The Body Found (2011, director: Sid Bennett). The nar-
rative about allegedly concealed, but really existent mermaids (reported 
as aquatic apes occasionally observed by navy members and scientists) 
was inscribed into the narrative about Darwin’s evolution. This was the 
essential discursive figure of the message. This way, value and credibility 
associated with the theory about the origin of species were transferred to 
the story about mermaids, making them possibly real. In other words: 
contiguity (connection) between these two narratives made them similar 
under the aspect of their modality. The truthfulness of one story was 
transferred to the other one, making the existence of mermaids plausi-
ble. Also, the credibility of the broadcasters was transferred to the story, 
making “filmed” mermaids real. Reactions posted on the discussion fo-
rum of the broadcasters showed that many recipients were truly fooled, 
others got very angry:10
 (…) I find your cavalier attitude and disregard for those of us of 
whom may have been longtime fans, to be egregious. Some people in 
this crazy world still seek the truth. You are every bit as irresponsible 
as those fools who aired WAR OF WORLDS. I am no longer a sub-
scriber. You idiots. Good Bye Animal Planet.
Very disappointed in The Discovery Channel with this “documen-
tary”. Really, really bad decision to air garbage. Not what I would 
expect from this network.
10 Accessed: http://animal.discovery.com/tv-shows/other/videos/mermaids.
htm (26-09-2012)
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Shame on you Discovery Channel. I am about to completely turn my 
back on Discovery and never watch your channel again. (…) Shame 
on you for treating your viewers like idiots!!!
Really sad.... In my opinion, the only FEW television channels you 
COULD TRUST TO BE TRUE, were the Discovery Channel, His-
tory Chnl., and Ntl. Geo. Now, I hesitate to trust any of them. This 
was a huge mistake, not stating it was FICTION!! 
Can we get back to science and stop injecting sci-fi into, what should 
be educational (?)
We can find similar discursive figures (manipulation techniques) in many 
other programs of broadcasters associated with educational and scientif-
ic discourses, e.g. Ancient X-files, aired by the National Geographic Channel, 
Lost Tapes, aired by Animal Planet etc. The attempts to make documenta-
ries or docudramas attractive through mysteries can be demonstrated on 
the series Mayday (or: Air Crash Investigation)  from the Canadian compa-
ny Cineflix. In Episode 8 (titled Fatal Distraction), Season 5, there appears 
an undeclared urban legend regarding ghosts protecting planes11 as a 
component narrative. The docudrama contains the following story: in 
the disaster of flight 401 in the Everglades Swamp two pilots were killed. 
Parts of the plane that crashed were reused in other aircrafts. Whenever 
they are in the air and face possible danger, the ghosts of these two dead 
pilots allegedly appear on board to warn the crew and in this way keep 
everyone safe. Reconstructed scientific investigations of the airplane 
crash made the story about ghosts credible in the eyes of some recipients. 
Without trying to decide in any way, what was real and what was not, 
we can say that the boundless struggle for  public attention undermined 
to a large extent consensual differences between probability and improb-
ability. It undermined the stability of socially shared background pieces 
of knowledge.
11 Compare John G. Fuller, The Ghost of Flight 401 (North Hobart: Hear a Book, 
1987)
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The dominating infotainment discourses are as astonishing as well as 
mystifying (“fooling”). Considering the War of the Worlds, a radio drama 
from 1938 about an invasion from Mars12, which was due to its rhetoric 
figures perceived by many listeners as a message reporting real events, 
we cannot precisely determine, when the credibility of free mass infor-
mation institutions started to collapse. It is a question of frequency of 
comparable hybrid genres in media. Only in the world of relatively sta-
ble background knowledge, can mockumentaries encourage their con-
sumers to think critically and to learn how to detect rhetoric strategies. 
The frequent occurrence of such genres everywhere makes such back-
ground knowledge including the hierarchies of sources credibility very 
unstable. Mockumentaries produce the assumption any message could 
be true or fake and there are no criteria of its reliability. Mockumentaries, 
as well as all other fake news, generate profits because popularity by 
itself generates profit (e.g. on Youtube). There is no crucial difference be-
tween contemporary media as such and social media under this aspect.
Early modern society also knew hoaxes, mercantile legends as well 
as trolling in the sense of intended manipulation and mystifying for dif-
ferent purposes13. However, nowadays there is one phenomenon which 
is new: the difference between consensually recognized credible and 
non  credible information sources has almost disappeared. Supremacy of 
rhetoric strategies in contemporary new media seems to be the answer to 
the question why neoliberal society does not reproduce the early modern 
difference between “noble” and “ignoble” media and styles of communi-
cation anymore. Fooling and being fooled, disseminating ignorance and 
being ignorant do not seem to discredit anybody anymore. The slogan 
anything goes! as a wish of 20th-century postmodernists has become re-
ality. This way the culture of mystification and of shared hysteria is the 
essential circumstance of the emergence of new nationalisms.
12 It was an adaptation of a science fiction novel with the same title written by 
Herbert G. Wells.
13 Compare Francis Wheen, How mumbo-jumbo conquered the world: A short histo-
ry of modern delusions (London: Fourth Estate, 2004); Francis Wheen, Strange 
days indeed: The golden age of paranoia (London: Fourth Estate, 2010)
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If we are to consider notions like “alternative facts” (a famous expres-
sion of Kellyanne Conway, counselor to the president in the administra-
tion of U.S.) or “fake media” (Donald Trump labels by this term any un-
comfortable broadcasters) as legitimate rhetoric tools of neoliberal state 
institutions, another new phenomenon appears: Western political insti-
tutions have started to use fake information (unproven, fabricated and 
easily falsifiable knowledge), as well as mystifying accusations of dis-
seminating fake information, as legitimate tools of political competition. 
In this manner, the neoliberal Western state has given up the attempt 
to reproduce credibility of its own institutions as well as the attempt to 
reproduce symbolical universes, which would be able to unify different 
phenomena in integral and credible orders. This is another symptom of 
progressive destruction (not deconstruction!) of knowledge credibili-
ty hierarchies. Generalizing, confusing, mystifying, accusing acknowl-
edged fact-finding institutions of deception, these have all started to be 
considered legitimate. Crossing red lines without any social consequenc-
es encourages other comparable subjects to do so.
If one acknowledged institution argues there is no global warming 
caused by man and another one argues there is such warming, why 
should Eastern Europeans and others not believe the attractive folklore 
narratives that refugees from Syria or Iraq are a perfectly organised 
body – controlled and encouraged from a hidden center – with one con-
sequent long-time mission: to make, step by step all of Europe Islamic. 
Not only due to a credibility crisis but also due to folklorization of the 
public sphere, conspiracy theories start to work as a legitimate tool of 
political competition. Within conspiracy theories in Eastern Europe, we 
can observe an interesting assumption: the hostile Other is not necessary 
somewhere “there” (behind the state border), it is among us, pretending 
to be the Own and trying to destroy the Own from inside, such as hidden 
or apparent Jews (e.g. Georg Soros considered by some Hungarians to be 
the enemy of the state) or hidden or apparent Moslems (e.g. Barack Hus-
sein Obama who, according to some inhabitants of Eastern Europe, was 
not even born in the USA). The popularity of conspiracy theories within 
Berlin Journal of Critical Theory  |  Vol. 3, No. 2 (April, 2019)36
the social media folklore creation reveal something deeply true: firstly, 
modern hierarchies of knowledge credibility have crumbled, secondly, 
the culture of uncertainty, mistrust, and vulnerability against mystifica-
tion is at least partially the result of marketing of fear, which is based on 
the principle that naivety, fear, and superstition can generate significant 
political and economic profits14.
Folklorized nationalisms are products of the so-called post-truth era 
(postfaktisches Zeitalter). Crucial for their emergence is the culture of un-
certainty, of collective hysteria production and its instrumentalization 
for short-time political and economic purposes. Neoliberal ideology – as 
a sphere of cognitive and acting habitus – means i.a. broad social accep-
tance for economically as well as politically motivated instrumentaliza-
tion of people’s feelings (e.g. fears, collectively shared hysterias), beliefs, 
collective memories, values, symbols. The management of long-term 
consequences of such instrumentalizations, the responsibility for long-
term damages is very often delegated to “others”.
New nationalisms can be defined at least by three interrelated features:
1. They are “folklorized” in such a way that their production is to a 
large extent interactive, spontaneous and aestheticized.
2. They are dominated by magic-mythical perception and thinking.
3. The spontaneity of nationalism production and reproduction within 
the folklore creation can be manipulated by accidental or profes-
sional trolling.
Folklorization of contemporary nationalisms
Social media are at least partially responsible for the disappearance of 
the modern difference between “noble” and “ignoble”. Posting highly ir-
rational and irresponsible tweets (irresponsible due to their consequenc-
es for the integrity of the society) by people recognized as celebrities re-
veal the fact that no statement can make somebody socially ostracized 
for a long time. Here, again, the slogan “anything goes!” can be applied. 
14 Compare Umberto Eco, Turning back the clock: Hot wars and media populism 
(London: Vintage Digital, 2014)
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Within the social media, a new communication convention emerged, 
where no statement can make its sender scandalous, disgraceful or dis-
gusting for a longer period of time. Emotions break out and expire, what 
stays is the shift of red lines. This makes everything socially acceptable 
as long as it does not interfere with the law. The law applies here as the 
only criterion of social regulation. Within some milieus of Polish social 
media, breaking rules of consensual rationality starts to work as a kind 
of protest against political correctness and as a mean of defining oneself 
against liberal and leftist “elites” associated with the Other – e.g. with 
Jews and Germans from abroad or alleged “hidden” Jews and Germans 
from the home country. Here we can detect a significant shift between 
the Own and the Other. Who does not identify himself with a set of ideas 
standing for “national culture” can be in contemporary Polish right-wing 
milieu recognized as a “foreigner”, although not yet proven “foreigner”. 
Thus, national belonging starts to be defined through one’s political con-
victions.
Concerning the notion of folklore, we can draw on Peter G. Bogatyrev 
and R. Jakobson. These scholars define folklore as a poetical text aimed at 
la langue15. Such texts are popular. They are broadly reproduced, or their 
semantic structures are broadly reproduced, within a larger or smaller 
communicative society, within a special social group or – what seems to 
be the most decisive point for the rise of new nationalisms – within a dig-
ital communication network. If we claim that folklore texts (all folklore 
genres) fulfill a poetical function, it means they are aestheticized in such 
a manner that they can arouse intense feelings among its bearers, they 
are attractive. Folklore creation is always a sphere of spontaneous so-
cial prosumption as well as a sphere of infotainment. Shared statements 
must be always attractive in some aspects. 
Folklore works as an instrument of maintaining shared beliefs, val-
ue systems, stereotypes, conceptual scenarios, expectations or attitudes. 
As stated by Antonio Gramsci, folklore is an instrument of hegemony, a 
15 Peter G. Bogatyrev and Roman Jakobson, ‘Folklore as a special form of creation,’ 
in R. Jakobson: Selected Writings, vol. IV (The Hague: Mouton, 1966), 1-15.
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means of ideology reproduction16. Folklore is responsible for the obvi-
ousness of the life-world. Drawing on Bogatyrev and Jakobson, folklore 
has evolutionary character, it changes according to changing social, cul-
tural and political needs. It adapts to changing circumstances. Every era 
and every environment has its own folklore.
According to Bogatyrev and Jakobson, folklore creation is character-
ized by the so-called preventive censorship. If a statement does not meet 
the conceptual capacities of the receiver, he will not reproduce (not share) 
it. A message which does not meet mental images, semantic structures, 
needs and expectations of members of a communication network, will 
not stay in circulation. Within the social circulation, an original message 
can unnoticeably change according to actual social demands. Something 
gets forgotten, concealed or exaggerated. In this manner, communication 
society can make a mountain out of a molehill – and vice versa. Concern-
ing the folklore creation, the output message must always „make sense”, 
however, it can considerably differ from the input message. Some mean-
ings are disappearing, some others are being borrowed from collective 
mythologies17. If the sender wants to be sure to reach his recipients, he 
must use the style of slogans, catchwords, watchwords, sayings, short 
expressions. Within the folklore creation which engages its bearers, the 
need for easily accessible sense is always stronger than for any critical 
reflection.
To take verbal jokes as an example, they can be humorous only for 
people sharing some obvious or background knowledge, e.g.: An Arab 
sits in a plane to New York. A stewardess asks him: „Something to drink?” 
– „No, I will drive in a while.” – This joke could be considered not very 
consistent (Moslems usually do not drink alcohol) and not suitable at 
least in some circumstances of face-to-face communication. As soon as it 
transforms into an internet joke, e.g. into a visual joke functioning as an 
internet meme (demotivator), it can spread more easily and reproduce 
16 Antonio Gramsci, Gefängnishefte. Kritische Gesamtausgabe. vol. 6. Philosophie 
der Praxis. Hefte 10 und 11 (Hamburg: Argument, 1994), 1375.
17 Compare Barthes, 1972.
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the associative link (or: implicit conceptual action scenario) between Arab 
and terrorism more effectively. In another situation, this associative link 
strengthened in this fashion will determine the reading of other texts. 
This way, even jokes can support beliefs. One belief makes possible an-
other one in such a way that it functions as an assumption making sim-
ilar assumptions passable and plausible. A believed and never falsified 
hoax makes people vulnerable against similar hoaxes and other genres 
of collective hysteria. People easily believe something if it corresponds 
to collectively shared images. If we believe others believe something, it 
seems there must be at least some truth about it. Let us be reminded of 
the sentence of William I. Thomas and Dorothy S. Thomas: „If men define 
situations as real, they are real in their consequences”18. – If folklore unites 
heterogeneous groups of people under one notion (one sign) associated 
with danger and hostility, our attitudes towards everybody recognized 
by means of this notion will be violent and will provoke violence. In this 
manner, folklore genres can function as a kind of self-fulfilling prophecy. 
Collective phantasies have performative (perlocutive) power in the sense 
that they can become reality, they can create real facts.
Back to the point. Folklore created beliefs in pre-modern and modern 
society as well, although within relatively stable hierarchies of knowledge 
credibility. In a neoliberal society determined by contemporary social 
media, its ability to create facts seems to be almost limitless19. Convergent 
folklore genres (contemporary myths, conspiracy theories, etc.), as well 
as parafolklore hybrid genres, have dominated social media. Folklore 
texts must be always comprehensible and fulfill poetic functions. They 
entertain, amaze, frighten, they make people laugh. New nationalisms 
reproduced by means of social media folklore are highly aestheticized – 
they arouse intense feelings – and reproduce in a very spontaneous way.
18 William I. Thomas and Dorothy S. Thomas, The child in America: Behavior 
problems and programs (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1928), 571-572.
19 Even some young Wahabi fanatics in the West can be regarded as „victims” 
of religious folklore which aestheticizes violence and functions outside of 
hierarchies of knowledge credibility – outside of the system of Islamic theo-
logical institutions.
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Zygmunt Bauman claims social media (Facebook etc.) enable their 
participant to “filter out” all subjects and their messages, which are 
incompatible with his/her own opinions and expectations. He/she can 
choose what people and what ideas he/she wants to face too. However 
there is a need for one short addendum: it is rather impossible to assume 
opinions and expectations of such participants to be consistent, without 
any discrepancies, paradoxes or antinomies. Production and reproduc-
tion of sense within social media – also in form of folklore genres – re-
sembles acting in everyday situations off-line. Here applies the utterance 
of Alfred Schütz: “The actor within the social world, however, experiences it 
primarily as a field of his actual and possible acts and only secondarily as an 
object of his thinking. In so far as he is interested in knowledge of his social 
world, he organizes this knowledge not in terms of a scientific system but in 
terms of relevance to his actions.”20 One conspiracy theory can support the 
other one even if the first contradicts the other one. In different contexts, 
different things are believed.
Magical-mythical thinking within contemporary nationalisms
Due to the need for defining notions and their binding use as well as 
to the need for the precision of concluding, it is possible to distinguish 
between two discourse models: an analytical (Aristotelian) and a mag-
ical-mythical one. The latter type of the discourse is based on connota-
tions and free associations able to lead from any idea to another one. Let 
us demonstrate it on the Internet users’ discussions to the article „Zyg-
munt Bauman w „El País”: mamy do czynienia z kryzysem demokracji [Zyg-
munt Bauman in “El País”: We face democracy crisis]”21. It was published 
on 26 January 2016 by a popular Polish information portal Onet.pl. The 
text deals with Zygmunt Bauman’s opinions concerning the condition 
of democracy in the world dominated by social media. I followed the 
20 Alfred Schuetz, ‘The stranger: An essay in social psychology,’ American Jour-
nal of Sociology, 1944, 49.6: 499-507.
21 Accessed: http://wiadomosci.onet.pl/swiat/zygmunt-bauman-w-el-pais-ma-
my-do-czynienia-z-kryzysem-demokacji/p6vbe4 (01-02-2016)
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statements of  internet users posted in the discussion forum related to the 
article during the first days after its release.
If we examine the messages posted immediately after the article had 
been published, only a few posts address the sociologist’s claims, even if 
very generally (likes and dislikes). The overwhelming majority of posts 
deals with the author’s Jewishness and his communist past. They should 
be not considered as usual argumenta ad hominem known from every text-
book of rhetoric. It is something more: a manifestation of habitus devel-
oped within the social media communication and related to folklorized 
nationalism.
The aforementioned internet article for many of its interactive read-
ers is only a point of departure for the reproduction of a shared set of 
mythical narratives and their shortened representations. They need to be 
recalled and confirmed again and again, in a somehow obsessive way. 
The narratives reproduce the same structure: the hostile Others (Jews, 
communists, leftists, etc.) have been always harming the Own in the same 
way from the beginning and will do the same to the very end. The Other 
was never the Own and cannot be the Own in any way – this distinction 
is eternal and absolute. Even if somebody sharply disagrees with such 
ideas, for them they are the very topic of the discussion. It is not even 
a discussion consisting of syllogisms. The arguing is based on connota-
tions22. They allow “jumping” from one point to another as well as blend-
ing everything with everything. Discussions within such a discourse al-
ways lead to the same set of topics and images regardless of their points 
22 Roland Barthes calls connotation a myth. The imperceptible connotation can 
‘blend’ with the phenomenon accompanying it. Connotation makes it possi-
ble that different phenomena blend in one magical unity of meaning, just as 
in the spontaneous experience the de Saussuresque signifier merges with the 
signified (the signifiant with the signifié), or the word merges with its object 
for as long as a person, in abstracting from his experiences, does not distin-
guish one from the other and does not notice that a word (sign) can help 
form or even produce its object. Barthes considers the invisible connotation 
to be a figure of myth on account of its ability to create a clear, easily legible, 
obvious world. In this context, what is particularly important is that the con-
notation, employed instrumentally, is able to legitimize literally everything 
(Barthes, 1972, 110-113).
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of departure. They induce the confirmation of the difference between Us 
and Them, which functions as a kind of collective obsession. It reminds 
us somehow of free associations as a psychoanalytical category where 
random starting means leading someone, sooner or later, to the same 
repertoire of obsessional images – to the same repertoire of idées fixes. If 
such a discourse dominates the forum, it devastates any debate.
As stated, the “discussion” I followed was completely irrelevant re-
garding the content of the article. Acquaintance with Zygmunt Bau-
man’s propositions contained in the message was not a prerequisite for 
posting opinions. Regarding the analysed posts of internet users, the 
appearance of such an article functioned as a kind of “starter” of collec-
tive imagination by means of a chain of habitual metonymies (based on 
perceived contiguities) and metaphors (based on perceived similarities). 
Such imagination always leads to the same result: to the confirmation of 
a highly emotional and obsessive set of ideas.
Considering many posts, Bauman represents Jews as well as Russians 
and Germans under the aspect of their alleged hostility against Poles. At 
the same time, he represents communists, leftists, and even Nazis. Within 
the magical-mythical discourse, such thinking cannot be recognized as 
inconsistent. This kind of associative concluding is a symptom of sym-
pathetic magic: different phenomena, connected in any kind of way, are 
similar, and thus at least under some aspects identical23. The crucial fea-
ture of magical-mythical thinking is an assumption of the permanence 
of signs and of the reality they are related to – in the sense of the saying 
“there’s nothing new under the sun”. There is no room for any expi-
rations (e.g. “Czerwone zawsze będzie czerwone, nawet jak będzie przema-
lowane. Stary komuch.” [“Red will be forever red, even if painted over. 
An old communist.”]. A former member of the Stalinist organization – 
any biographical details or circumstances are for people posting such 
statements completely irrelevant – represents not only the organization 
as such but also everything that is linked to it through chains of habit-
23 James G. Frazer, The golden bough: A study in magic and religion (New York: 
Simon & Schuster, 1996)
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ual associations. One enemy supports the other one: “Kto pokazuje tego 
żydowskiego zbrodniarza, który zabijał Polaków, tylko niemiecko faszystowski 
ŁONET” [“Who shows the Jewish criminal, who killed Poles? - Only 
German-fascist Onet”]. No red lines apply. Some posts are extremely 
disgusting and are a result of trolling due to the fact they are repeated 
noticeably often in not comparable contexts. Nevertheless, within mag-
ical thinking, it is possible to reason as follows: If an information portal 
owned by Germans (associated with Nazis) “promotes” Jews, they con-
spire against Poland together – as two reified communities, as two col-
lective subjects. Even those who disagree can assume Poland has some 
“hidden” enemies: “Wrogiem Polski nie Żydzi są… tylko organizacja Opus 
Dei!” [“Poland’s enemies are not the Jews… it is solely the organization 
Opus Dei!”]. Associative thinking makes possible “jumps” from one top-
ic to another if we remind that in the addressed article the word Polish or 
any of its derivates were not even mentioned.
Such thinking can be regarded as a collective habitus reproduced in 
some right-wing social networks. It is a learned manner of perceiving 
and thinking and it is a result of “hot”, highly aestheticized (i.a. iconized) 
and rhetorized social media discourses which inhibit analytical (“cold”) 
perception and thinking. It can be considered as a symptom of folkloriza-
tion of the public sphere.
Within magical-mythical perception and thinking, due to chains of 
associative links, everything can have something in common with ev-
erything, no binding distinctions occur. The difference between good and 
bad, the Own and the Other is here a question of situational context. Our 
enemies can threaten at the same time our ethnicity, our national cul-
ture, European culture, Christianity, Western civilisation or the civilised 
world. Folklorized nationalism in Central and Eastern Europe can be 
at the same time related to everything. The situational context decides, 
who is our companion and who our enemy. The criteria of the difference 
between the Own and the Other can vary significantly. Sometimes blood 
and soil function as a crucial distinctive criterion, sometimes it is “our 
culture”, “our values”, “European values” or “Christian values”.
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In the frame of magical indistinctiveness, there is no need for consis-
tency. Folklorized nationalism discourses are not a sphere where incon-
sistencies, contradictions or other paradoxes could be visible or prob-
lematized. They are a part of everyday knowledge. A shared nebulae 
of connotations (of vague interconnected images) enabled to avoid any 
clear definitions and any clarifications of obvious notions.
Roland Barthes shows in his essay The African grammar that especially 
words functioning as empty signifiers can affect peoples’ emotions24. In 
a similar way, Ernesto Laclau, Noam Chomsky or Edward S. Herman 
claim a notion can undisturbedly function as a rhetoric tool if it is vacu-
ous, if it has no clear meaning. The meaning of such a notion is always 
actualized by the context25. The famous slogan Make America great again! 
has enormous persuasive power because it means nothing specific, it 
has no specific denotation. It only matches and activates connotations 
relating to splendid and desirable things. The slogan reminds Americans 
of prosperity, power, the founding fathers of the country and their ide-
als – of everything valuable. That is why notions like “national values”, 
“Christian values”, “European values” etc. are so popular within folk-
lorized nationalism. They can function as instruments of manipulation 
and persuasion only as long as they are not defined – as long as they 
function as empty signifiers. Only under such conditions, it is possible to 
protect “Christian values” or pretend to do so while ignoring at the same 
time New Testament ethics. (Christianity without New Testament ethics 
could even remind of Slavoj Žižek´s examples of products deprived of 
their difficult property: coffee without caffeine, cream without fat, beer 
without alcohol etc.). Magic-mythical perception makes paradoxes invis-
ible – it creates a unity of phenomena.
24 Roland Barthes, The Eiffel Tower and other mythologies (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1997), 103-109. 
25 Ernesto Laclau, ‘Why do empty signifiers matter to politics?’ in Emancipation(s), 
(London: Verso Books, 1996), 36-46; Noam Chomsky, Media control: The spec-
tacular achievments of propaganda (New York. Stories, 1997), 20-23; Edward S. 
Herman and Noam Chomsky, Manufacturing consent: The political economy of 
the mass media (New York: Pantheon Books, 1988), 30-35.
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In summary, new nationalism as folklorized nationalism is a symp-
tom of the culture of trolling. Such a culture is characterized by the 
hypertrophy of rhetoric strategies. It is characterized by unscrupulous 
manipulation techniques regardless of any long-term consequences for 
society. New nationalisms can be defined as a result of the decline of 
the hierarchies of knowledge credibility. Trolling means mystifying our 
interlocutors by sowing discord among them, provoking quarrels by 
sending inflammatory messages, manipulating discussed topics, mak-
ing any consensus impossible to achieve, distracting them, etc. Trolling 
inflames people’s emotions and thus destroys formally correct conclud-
ing. It promotes magical-mythical perceiving and thinking. Trolls wake 
strong emotions among their interlocutors, make them think “too quick-
ly” under the influence of developed effects. They make them focus not 
on primary topics but on secondary inflammable matters associated with 
these topics. Trolls are able to divert peoples´ attention from a significant 
topic to another, not a significant one. They disrupt constructive, on-top-
ic discussions and induce effective or even irrational reactions of their 
interlocutors. What is crucial, trolling presumes practically the same dis-
cursive strategies, persuasion, and manipulation techniques which are 
present elsewhere in the frame of contemporary neoliberal public dis-
courses.
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Adorno’s Arcades Orthodoxy1
Luis A. Recoder2
Abstract: Theodor W. Adorno’s letter correspondence with Walter Benjamin 
throughout the decade of the 1930’s entertains the central question concerning 
the possibility of philosophy in their intellectual milieu. The fate of this possibil-
ity for Adorno hinges on Benjamin’s work-in-progress Das Passagen-Werk—a fate 
that is catastrophically blocked by an uncritical tendency convicted repeatedly by 
the former as “undialectical.” And yet Adorno obstinately persists in clinging to 
the canon of a philosophically overdetermined demand he endearingly calls “my 
Arcades orthodoxy.” The threatening destruction of the aura of this orthodoxy 
reaches a crisis in Adorno’s ruthless metacritique of Benjamin’s alleged undialec-
tical treatment of aesthetic autonomy in a draft of the Kunstwerk essay, marking 
a critical wound in the correspondence which the following exposition tracks in 
the enigmatic changeover in the philosophical exigency of the said orthodoxy 
from prima philosophia to ultima philosophia. The lingering wound is registered in 
Adorno’s late philosophical work.
It is time not for first philosophy but last philosophy.
   - Adorno, Against Epistemology: A Metacritique3
 I. “My Arcades Orthodoxy”
The letter correspondence between Theodor W. Adorno and Walter Benjamin throughout the decade of the 1930’s gives us a rare op-
portunity to appreciate the collaborative philosophical project that the 
1 Paper presentation for the 2018 World Picture Conference, Corpus Christi Col-
lege, University of Cambridge, U.K., December 12-13, 2018. 
2 Luis A. Recoder holds a PhD in Philosophy from the New School for Social 
Research. His artworks are in the permanent collections of major museums 
around the world, including the Whitney Museum of American Art in New 
York and Museum Kunstpalast in Düsseldorf. Awards include The Rocke-
feller Foundation Bellagio Center Residency Fellowship and National En-
dowment for the Art U.S.-Japan Creative Artists Fellowship. He is currently 
a featured artist and research associate of RESET THE APPARATUS! A Sur-
vey of the Photographic and the Filmic in Contemporary Art hosted by the Uni-
versity of Applied Arts Vienna, Austria. Recoder lives and works in New 
York. 
3 Theodor W. Adorno, Against Epistemology: A Metacritique: Studies in Husserl 
and the Phenomenological Antinomies, trans. Willis Domingo (Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press, 1983), 40.
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former characterizes as “my Arcades orthodoxy,”4 and what I shall de-
velop throughout my exposition as ultima philosophia. Though the appeal 
to orthodoxy is not articulated as such until late into the correspondence, 
i.e., in a letter dated November 10, 1938 to be exact, it is fundamental-
ly at work as early as March 4, 1934, when the young Adorno enthusi-
astically exclaims: “Naturally I hardly have to tell you just how much 
my own downright egotistical interest in really immersing myself in 
your work on the Arcades is involved!”5 Benjamin’s follow-up letter a 
few days thereafter on March 9, 1934, emboldens the egotistical inter-
est of his young addressee’s nascent orthodoxy by confessing that “My 
work on the Arcades has begun to revive, and it is you yourself who 
have breathed life into the embers—which could never be livelier than I 
felt myself to be.”6 By the end of the year, in a letter dated November 6, 
1934, Adorno thoroughly recognizes the profundity of his fundamental 
contribution to the development of the Arcades project and declares the 
collaborative nature of his philosophical correspondence as emblemat-
ic of “our destined contribution to prima philosophia.”7 The metacritical 
indoctrination of Adorno’s Arcades orthodoxy ruthlessly works to facil-
itate precisely this destined contribution to prima philosophia—a shared 
philosophical endeavor that, as we shall see, undergoes a rather curious 
and enigmatic change in direction to ultima philosophia more or less mid-
way through the correspondence.
I will offer an interpretation on the significance in the changeover from 
prima philosophia to ultima philosophia in a moment. Regardless of what 
the respective philosophies entail, it is crucial to observe that the appeal 
of Adorno’s Arcades orthodoxy is emphatically philosophical. In a letter 
dated May 20, 1935, Adorno makes the following strong statement: “I 
4 Theodor W. Adorno and Walter Benjamin, The Complete Correspondence 1928-
1940, ed. Henri Lonitz, trans. Nicholas Walker (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1999), 284.
5 Ibid., 26.
6 Ibid., 29.
7 Ibid., 53.
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regard your work on the ‘Arcades’ as the centre [sic] not merely of your 
own philosophy, but as the decisive philosophical word which must find 
utterance today […]”8 The structure of Adorno’s Arcades orthodoxy thus 
presupposes a radiating philosophical core that concerns, on the one hand, 
the whole of Benjamin’s philosophy and, on the other hand, the whole of 
contemporary philosophy. It is this dual structure of the said orthodoxy 
that the correspondence issuing from Adorno’s destined contribution to 
prima philosophia rigorously observes. His egotistical interest in the Arcades 
project as the decisive philosophical word goes to the utter extremes in 
directing the faculty of his micrological apprenticeship to hyperbolically 
produce and reproduce ad infinitum the phantasmagoria of his esteemed 
interlocutor’s philosophical imago. In the same letter in which he first 
gives expression to their shared prima philosophia, Adorno demonstrates in 
heuristic fashion the mimetic technique of reproducibility through which 
he incessantly redeems the philosophical centerpiece of his unique ortho-
doxy: “I would not dare to offer you ‘advice’ in these matters—what I am 
attempting to do is simply to stand before you almost like a representative 
of your own intentions against a certain tyranny, which, as you yourself 
once did with [Karl] Kraus, only needs to be named as such in order to be 
banished.”9 The tyranny that only needs to be named as such in order to 
be banished is the name that Adorno tirelessly utters into the philosophical 
ear of his interlocutor: undialektisch. The conviction of Benjamin as com-
mitting undialectical tyranny against his own philosophical intentions is, I 
want to suggest, the decisive hinge which prompts an anxious and some-
what compulsive Adorno to salvage the aura of his endangered orthodoxy 
by casting the spell of prima philosophia at this precise moment in the course 
of their correspondence. It is, to turn Benjamin on his head if you will, 
Adorno’s rather belabored attempt to apply dialectical shock therapy to a 
certain paralysis in the exquisite dialectics at a standstill. 
The threatening “destruction of the aura” of Adorno’s Arcades or-
thodoxy is most forcefully registered in his grand critique of what will 
8 Ibid., 84.
9 Ibid., 54.
Berlin Journal of Critical Theory  |  Vol. 3, No. 2 (April, 2019)52
become Benjamin’s notorious essay on “The Work of Art in the Age of 
its Technological Reproducibility.” The crux of the controversy here con-
cerns the fate of aesthetic autonomy that, in my estimation, ratchets up 
the high philosophical stakes and which arguably accounts for the unex-
plained shift in the epistemic paradigm to ultima philosophia shortly after 
the critique of the Kunstwerk essay—nearly two years following the letter 
on “our destined contribution to prima philosophia.” The ruthless philo-
sophical compulsion governing Adorno’s Arcades orthodoxy is brutally 
unleashed in the letter of September 6, 1936, tenaciously persisting in the 
renewed conviction of his undialectical tyrant concerning an outstand-
ing categorical indebtedness that must be redeemed via the decisive 
philosophical word. A kind of philosophical ultimatum and last chance 
for philosophy is enigmatically enunciated in Adorno’s parenthetical re-
mark: “with respect to your ultima philosophia, the Arcades project.”10 
 II. The System in Ruins
The inheritance of prima philosophia or first philosophy stems from René 
Descartes and is the Latinate affixed to his major philosophical treatise of 
1641: Meditationes de Prima Philosophiae, or Meditations on First Philosophy. 
The opening paragraphs of the “First Meditation” lay the critical foun-
dation of prima philosophia in terms of a “general demolition” of the ba-
sic principles of one’s belief system: “to demolish everything completely 
and start again right from the foundations.”11 To demolish everything 
completely including the foundations as a propaedeutic to the Medita-
tions proper epitomizes the destructive character of prima philosophia as 
Descartes observes in the following cautionary thought: “Once the foun-
dations of a building are undermined, anything built on them collapses 
of its own accord.”12 The inheritance of Descartes’ general demolition 
10 Ibid., 147.
11 René Descartes, The Philosophical Writings of Descartes: Vol. II, trans. John Cot-
tingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1984), 12.
12 Ibid.
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is reawakened for early 20th century modern philosophy by Edmund 
Husserl, who in his 1929 Sorbonne lectures Cartesian Meditations: An In-
troduction to Phenomenology, opens with the fundamental thesis claiming 
“Descartes’ Meditations as the prototype of philosophical reflection,” and fur-
ther defined as “the prototype for any beginning philosopher’s necessary 
meditations, the meditations out of which alone a philosophy can grow 
originally.”13 The Cartesian prototype of prima philosophia is ultimately 
productive for what Husserl, in the following section, characterizes as 
“The necessity of a radical new beginning of philosophy.”14 Now this necessity 
in Husserl’s account is motivated by the disturbing lack of necessity in 
his philosophical milieu, namely the withdrawal of the “driving forces” 
and “original vitality” motivating the radical spirit of the Meditations. “In 
this unhappy present,” Husserl asks, “is not our situation similar to the 
one encountered by Descartes in his youth? If so, then is not this a fitting 
time to renew his radicalness, the radicalness of the beginning philos-
opher: to subject to a Cartesian overthrow the immense philosophical 
literature with its medley of great traditions, of comparatively serious 
new beginnings, of stylish literary activity (which counts on ‘making an 
effect’ but not on being studied), and to begin with new meditationes de 
prima philosophia?”15 Certainly we can find in this Cartesian prototype of 
Husserl’s prima philosophia—with its accent on the overthrow of the great 
philosophical traditions—the epistemic paragon of a destructive impulse 
guiding Adorno’s prototype for venturing a radical new beginning for 
philosophy with his esteemed interlocutor.
By the time he publishes his Studies in Husserl and the Phenomenological 
Antinomies in 1956—studies developed during his correspondence in the 
mid 1930’s while at Merton College in Oxford—it becomes utterly clear 
that somewhere along the way Adorno abandons the prototype of prima 
13 Edmund Husserl, Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology, 
trans. Dorion Cairns (The Hague, the Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977), 
1-2 (original emphasis).
14 Ibid., 4 (original emphasis).
15 Ibid., 5.
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philosophia for ultima philosophia, as declared in the penultimate sentence 
of his introduction: “It is time not for first philosophy but last philoso-
phy.”16 According to an illuminating passage from the revised 1938 ver-
sion of chapter four in the Studies in Husserl, the abandonment of prima 
philosophia is curiously already at work in Husserlian phenomenology. 
Under a title heading that thematically persists in the perseverance of 
Adorno’s Arcades orthodoxy, “The System in Ruins,” the major metacri-
tique against epistemology delivers a short and characteristically com-
pressed sketch on the rise and fall of prima philosophia from Descartes to 
Husserl: 
However much Husserl remained concerned with prima 
philosophia, he did demand its objective liquidation. Only thus 
can his relation to Descartes be understood. In Descartes, 
bourgeois thought strives, though not yet fully autonomously, 
to reproduce out of itself the Christian cosmos. At its incep-
tion, the bourgeois spirit squats in the ruins of the feudal. With 
phenomenology bourgeois thought turns to its end in dissoci-
ated, fragmentary determinations posited one after the other 
and resigns itself to the mere reproduction of what is. / Hus-
serl’s doctrine of ideas is the system in ruins, just as the first 
systems were clumsily heaped up out of the wreckage of the 
erstwhile ordo.17
The metaphysical ambitions of the bourgeois spirit locates the radicali-
ty of its autonomous epistemological origins in the Cartesian prototype 
of prima philosophia only to terminate in a catastrophic foreclosure in the 
“system in ruins” of Husserlian phenomenology. In Adorno’s compressed 
philosophico-historical sketch on the aporetic apparatus of prima philoso-
phia to indefinitely authorize the legitimacy of ever-new beginnings, the 
end of radical bourgeois thought from Descartes to Husserl terminates 
16 Adorno, Against Epistemology: A Metacritique: Studies in Husserl and the Phe-
nomenological Antinomies, 40.
17 Ibid., 212.
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not so much in ultima philosophia as in the fatal abdication of philosophy in 
toto in its incapacity to move beyond “the mere reproduction of what is.” 
It is thus Adorno’s last philosophy—here as “metacritique” and not quite 
yet “negative dialectics”—that remains emphatically concerned with pri-
ma philosophia but only insofar as the afterlife of its destructive inheritance 
has paradoxically liquidated the liquidating philosophy altogether. “Hus-
serl’s philosophy,” Adorno states in his preface, “is the occasion and not 
the point of this book.”18 The occasion here is the anxious concern with 
the dregs of prima philosophia to turn the hinge of its “dialectics in spite of 
itself” toward the salvaging gaze of ultima philosophia. 
III. Destruction and Preservation of the Aura
The hyperbolic conviction of tyranny concerning Benjamin’s undialec-
tical remainder meticulously documented by Adorno throughout the 
correspondence emerges in stark relief in his microanalysis of the Kunst-
werk essay in the decisive letter of March 18, 1936. The daring advice 
offered here is the categorical demand to produce “more dialectics.”19 The 
catastrophic moment for Adorno is the alleged undialectical treatment 
in Benjamin’s account of aesthetic autonomy in the age of technologi-
cal reproducibility. To briefly recall the relevant passage in the second 
version of the Kunstwerk essay, Benjamin observes that the “doctrine of 
l’art pour l’art” emerged as a reactionary movement that “gave rise to a 
negative theology, in the form of an idea of ‘pure’ art, which rejects not 
only any social function but any definition in terms of a representational 
content.”20 The reactionary doctrine of aesthetic autonomy is here de-
18 Ibid., 1.
19 Adorno and Benjamin, The Complete Correspondence 1928-1940, 131 (original 
emphasis).
20 Walter Benjamin, “The Work of Art in the Age of Its Technological Repro-
ducibility: Second Version,” in The Work of Art in the Age of Its Technological 
Reproducibility, and Other Writings on Media, ed. Michael W. Jennings, Brig-
id Doherty, and Thomas Y. Levin, trans. Edmund Jephcott, Rodney Living-
stone, Howard Eiland, and Others (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of 
Harvard University Press, 2008), 24.
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fined in negative terms and diagnosed as a symptom of the thorough-
going technological destruction of an emphatically bourgeois tradition 
grounded precisely in the overvaluation of authenticity and hence aura 
of the unique artwork. Benjamin’s thesis on the specifically filmic de-
struction of the aura therefore doubles as a thesis on the specifically film-
ic destruction of aesthetic autonomy. (Which, by the way is the filmic 
counterpart and elaboration of the earlier thesis on the specifically pho-
tographic destruction of the aura in the 1931 essay “Little History of Pho-
tography.”) My claim is that Benjamin’s equation of the destruction of 
aura with the destruction of tradition is the primary source of Adorno’s 
dissatisfaction with the Kunstwerk essay and, moreover, the turning point 
which prompts the escalation in the philosophical exigency from prima 
philosophia to ultima philosophia.   
Now Adorno, in his letter, brings to Benjamin’s attention that the op-
erating mythical concept of aesthetic autonomy in the Kunstwerk essay 
does violence to its “original intention” in carrying out a general dem-
olition described as “the dialectical self-dissolution of myth, which is 
viewed here as the disenchantment of art.”21 To shed light on the matter, 
Adorno outlines the basic dialectical model of aesthetic autonomy from 
his own experience as an artist: “Dialectical though your essay is, it is less 
than this in the case of the autonomous work of art itself; for it neglects 
a fundamental experience which daily becomes increasingly evident to 
me in my musical work, that precisely the uttermost consistency in the 
pursuit of the technical laws of autonomous art actually transforms this 
art itself, and, instead of turning it into a fetish or taboo, brings it that 
much closer to a state of freedom, to something that can be consciously 
produced and made.”22 For as much as the mythical element intrudes in 
any (and perhaps all) aspiring autonomous artworks the decisive factor 
in Adorno’s early aesthetic theory sketched in this letter is in its capacity 
to put into play the dialectical self-dissolution of the mythical element. 
And by “myth” here Adorno assumes for the most part the inheritance of 
21 Adorno and Benjamin, The Complete Correspondence 1928-1940, 127-128.
22 Ibid., 128-129.
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the archaic bourgeois mythos intruding in the innermost cells of autono-
mous artworks. Aesthetic autonomy at its most dialectical is the medium 
par excellence through which the mythical force of tradition delegates 
and hence authorizes the counterforce for its own determinate negation, 
that is, its destruction and preservation. The source, or rather resource, 
of domination in Adorno’s bourgeois mythos is key to his overall con-
ception of aesthetic autonomy, succinctly formulated in his 1930 essay 
“Reaction and Progress”: “It is only in the subordination to the work’s 
technical dictates that the author, by allowing himself to be dominated 
by it, learns to dominate it himself.”23 The mediating agency of “artistic 
extremism,” Adorno observes elsewhere, “receives its legitimacy from 
the tradition it negates.”24 Hence, the “destruction of the aura” is imma-
nent to the artistic extremism of aesthetic autonomy insofar as it is not at 
all a means to the reckless destruction of the tradition but a critical pre-
lude to its transformed preservation. It is this critical prelude that seems 
to be missing from Benjamin’s Kunstwerk essay and why Adorno is driv-
en to up the ante on prima philosophia.   
The philosophical iteration of the dialectical formula for tradition elab-
orated in Adorno’s concept of aesthetic autonomy lies at the core of his 
coming ultima philosophia, Negative Dialectics. In a section titled “Tradition 
and Knowledge” in the introduction to Negative Dialectics, Adorno poses 
the following fundamental question: “how a thinking obliged to relin-
quish tradition might preserve and transform tradition.”25 Schematized 
in this question, prima philosophia is modern philosophy’s obligatory de-
struction of tradition, while its unprecedented restitutio in integrum pre-
serves the “system in ruins” for their transformation to ultima philosophia. 
The achievement of this transformation is emblazoned in the philosoph-
23 Theodor W. Adorno, “Reaction and Progress,” Night Music: Essays on Mu-
sic 1928-1962, ed. Rolf Tiedemann, trans. Wieland Hoban (London: Seagull 
Books, 2017), 223.
24 Theodor W. Adorno, “Arnold Schoenberg, 1871-1951,” in Prisms, trans. Sam-
uel and Shierry Webber (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1986), 155.
25 Theodor W. Adorno, Negative Dialectics, trans. E. B. Ashton (New York: Con-
tinuum, 1973), 54-55.
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ical task summated at the end of the “Meditations on Metaphysics” in 
Negative Dialectics: “metaphysics migrates into micrology.”26 The Ador-
no-Benjamin correspondence corresponds in faithfully carrying out the 
first philosophical move in the destructive continuum of prima philosophia 
via the destruction of the aura; where the correspondence parts compa-
ny lies in their respective micrological differences whether or not to en-
gage the second philosophical move within the operating terms of their 
proto-Hegelian speculative philosophy of history as the master key for 
preserving a transformed tradition in the sense of ultima philosophia. In 
Adorno’s intermittent negation of his Arcades orthodoxy, in which his 
undialectical tyrant is repeatedly convicted, the ruthless discipline and 
ritual of tarrying with the latter’s negative is incessantly produced so as 
to rekindle for himself and his interlocutor the auratic grandeur of their 
authentic philosophical correspondence. Adorno’s anxious concern to 
consolidate a philosophical canon for his Arcades orthodoxy is rigorous-
ly steadfast throughout the correspondence despite the occasional hint 
of defeatism perhaps most pronounced in the lament over the failure of 
succession disclosed in a letter dated November 27, 1937: “The fact that 
we have no ‘heirs’ rather fits in with the general catastrophic situation.”27 
* * *
In closing, it might be worth noting that what we have been characteriz-
ing as the Arcades orthodoxy is by no means exclusive to Adorno but a 
philosophical sentiment also shared by his wife Gretel—whom Benjamin 
addresses as “Felezitas” in his amicable correspondence to the Adornos—
and perhaps even Max Horkheimer. In the critical letter of November 10, 
1938, in which he gives expression to “my Arcades orthodoxy,” Adorno 
explains that on this particular occasion he is speaking not only for him-
self but also on behalf of Horkheimer and other unnamed members of 
the Institute for Social Research. Amidst a tour de force tirade against his 
undialectical tyrant concerning a recent manuscript on Baudelaire, Ador-
26 Ibid., 407 (translation modified).
27 Adorno and Benjamin, The Complete Correspondence 1928-1940, 230.
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no neutralizes the theoretical rancor with the following word of conso-
lation, again speaking on behalf of the Institute: “You may be confident 
that we are prepared to make your most extreme theoretical experiments 
our own. But we are equally confident on our part that you will actual-
ly carry out these experiments.” The confirmation and commandment 
expressed here recites the anxious liturgy of the Arcades orthodoxy and 
hopeful future philosophical organon of the Institute, an incantation not 
without cult value as if addressed to the fading fata morgana of a meta-
physical messiah a few lines thereafter: “We would exhort you to offer us 
some access to the Holy of Holies.”28   
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“Constructing a new storey beneath historical 
materialism”: Georg Simmel and the 
foundations of a “relational” critical theory
Davide Ruggieri1
Abstract: Relational sociology (RS) and historical materialism are often consid-
ered as opposite paradigms: on the one hand, RS represents an ontological at-
tempt to “steer” inquiries into the social realm under the relational approach, i.e. 
the relation is the very sociological matter; on the other hand, Marx and histori-
cal materialism are often reduced to methodological holism, referring relations 
to the economic. First, I argue in this paper for going beyond this dualism and 
reconciling RS (namely addressing Georg Simmel as the first systematic theo-
rist) and historical materialism within the frame of Critical Theory, according to 
the recent address given by Axel Honneth and Rahel Jaeggi. The Critical Theory 
must answer the question of ‘social life’ as relation, focusing on the particular 
and the individual, disentangling the tie between the rationalization aspect and 
the vital sphere, as well as the interlacement between ‘the informalization of eco-
nomic and economization of the informal’ (Honneth).
Secondly, I aim to lead Simmel’s relational theory back to his Lebenssoziologie. 
In his last writings, he focused on the question dealing the origin of ‘forms’ with-
in the social life under the categories of Wechselwirkung and Vergesellschaftung. 
The intellectualization of modern life (since Simmel’s reflections in ‘Philosophy 
of Money’) is the mechanism to objectify and ‘monetize’ (the money as a pure 
mean) any aspect of life, even in the moral and the political sphere. Beyond the 
inexorable mechanism of modern intellectualization, Simmel also denoted the 
inner ‘vital’ character of any social relation. He put the basis for a Lebenssoziologie: 
despite Lash’s interpretation and reduction to the monistic-informational model 
and Jaeggi’s immanentism, this paper furnishes, finally, a ‘relational and tran-
scendental (emergentist)’ interpretation of Simmel’s sociology. 
1 Davide Ruggieri, PhD, is Research Fellow at the Department of Political 
and Social Sciences, University of Bologna. His main academic and scientific 
interests deal with the relation between culture and individualization with-
in the social processes, particularly focusing on Georg Simmel’s sociology, 
Critical Theory, and the Relational Sociology. Research and archive deliver-
ables abroad in the Universities of Mainz, Frankfurt am Main, Bielefeld, and 
Munich. He is the author of Il conflitto della società moderna (Lecce, 2010) and 
La sociologia relazionale di Georg Simmel (Milan, 2016) as well as many scientif-
ic articles on the research interests mentioned above. 
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1. Forms of social life
Relational sociology has been recently experiencing an increase of interest within the international sociological debate.2 In this frame, 
the name of the sociologist Georg Simmel frequently recurs3, because he 
represents a ‘relational turn’ into social sciences.4 At the same time, over 
the past decade many scholars tackled the question dealing with a pos-
sible foundation of a Lebenssoziologie5, that is sketching a sociology of life 
tout court.
The topics that will be discussed in the following pages are quite sen-
sitive and risky, since they aim at engaging and tackling the actual debate 
on the Lebenssoziologie and the reflections on the modern ‘forms of social 
life’ according to the recent studies and researches of Axel Honneth and 
Rahel Jaeggi, who represent a stimulating interlocutor in the actual Crit-
2 On this topic: Jan Fuhse and Sophie Mützel (edts), Relationale Soziologie. 
Zur kulturellen Wende der Netzwerkforschung, Wiesbaden: VS Springer, 2010; 
Christian Powell and François Dépelteau (edts), Conceptualizing Relational So-
ciology. Ontological and Theoretical Issues and Applying Relational Sociology. Re-
lations, Networks, and Society, Houndmills-Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2013; François Dépelteau (edt), The Palgrave Handbook of Relational Sociology, 
Houndmills-Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 2018.
3 Natalia Cantò-Mila, “Georg Simmel’s Concept of Forms of Association as an 
Analytical Tool for Relational Sociology”, in F. Dépelteau (edt), The Palgrave 
Handbook of Relational Sociology, op. cit., 217-230; Christian Papilloud, “Georg 
Simmel and Relational Sociology”, in F. Dépelteau (edt), The Palgrave Hand-
book of Relational Sociology, op. cit., pp. 201-216.
4 Davide Ruggieri, “Georg Simmel and the «Relational Turn». Contributions 
to the foundation of the Lebenssoziologie since Simmel”, Simmel Studies, 21 (1), 
217, pp. 43-71.
5 On this issue: Scott Lash, “Lebenssoziologie. Georg Simmel and the Infor-
mation Age”, Theory, Culture & Society, vol. 22(3), 2005, pp. 1–23; Scott Lash, 
“Life (vitalism)”, Theory, Culture & Society, vol. 23(2–3), 2006, pp. 323–349; 
Robert Seyfert, “Zum historischen Verhältnis von Lebensphilosophie und 
Soziologie und das Programm einer Lebenssoziologie”, in Karl-Siegbert 
Rehberg (edt)  and Deutsche Gesellschaft für Soziologie (DGS), Die Natur 
der Gesellschaft: Verhandlungen des 33. Kongresses der Deutschen Gesellschaft fu ̈r 
Soziologie in Kassel 2006, Frankfurt am Main: Campus Verlag, 2008, pp. 4684-
4694.
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ical Theory scenario. The primary difficulties depend on the definition of 
the subject of a so-named ‘Lebenssoziologie’ – this is a lucky expression 
first used in 2005 by Scott Lash in a paper titled ‘Lebenssoziologie. Georg 
Simmel and the Information Age’. 
The theoretical coordinates of this paper refer to the ‘relational’ so-
ciological perspective. The shared motto among the many relational the-
ories is that the first subject into the sociological inquiry is ‘the social 
relation’: I argue for a sui generis entity (social relation) emerging from 
the interaction amongst individuals, that is to be assumed beyond the 
reductive methodological dualism between individualism and holism. 
My focus is particularly on the ‘relational theory of society’6 of Pierpaolo 
Donati, who already in the 80s insisted to argue for a ‘relational sociol-
ogy’7, basically reassessing Talcott Parsons’ functional social theory and 
his AGIL scheme. Simmel is commonly acknowledged from relational 
sociologists as one of the first and most prominent author in the history 
of sociology toward the foundation of the relation sociology stricto sensu: 
the reason is that he primarily addressed the ‘social forms’ under the 
category of social relations. Wechselwirkung and Vergsesellschaftung are 
both shibboleths for the detection and the fixation of social forms within 
human interactions. In Soziologie (1908) he writes:
“A society exists where several individuals enter into interac-
tion [Wechselwirkung]. This interaction always originates from 
specific impulses within or for the sake of specific purposes. 
Erotic, religious, or purely social impulses, purposes of de-
fense from attack, the play of commerce, the need for assis-
tance from instruction, and countless other purposes bring it 
about that human beings enter into fellowship—correlating 
their affairs with one another in activity for one another, with 
one another, against one another, activity that both affects 
6 Pierpaolo Donati, Relational Sociology. A new Paradigm for the social Sciences, 
London: Routledge 2011; Pierpaolo Donati, “Manifesto for a critical realist 
relational sociology”, International Revue of Sociology, 25, 2015, pp. 86-109.
7 Pierpaolo Donati, Introduzione alla sociologia relazionale, Milano: Franco Ange-
li, 1983.
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them and feels the effects of them. These interactions indicate 
precisely that the individuals bearing these motivating drives 
and purposes become a unity, indeed a ‘society.’ “
And further: 
“Not until such interrelations are generated on account of 
certain motives and interests does society emerge. So then it 
remains that the concern of social science in the widest sense 
is the history and laws of such a developing comprehensive 
picture. Because this is broken up among the individual social 
sciences, left to sociology is the specific task of considering the 
abstracted forms that do not so much generate social interac-
tion but rather are social interaction. Society in a sense that so-
ciology can use is, then, either the overall abstract concept for 
these forms, the genus of which they are species, or the actual 
momentary summation of the same.”8.
Relations in social life can assume many ‘forms’ and realise their own 
purposes. The human society consists of all those ‘forms’, which cannot 
embrace the totality, but represents the instance of being the ‘whole’ and 
the final interpretation of the world. 
One of the most difficult tasks for the sociology today is defining 
what a ‘form’ of social life must represent. In the history of sociology, 
Georg Simmel has given to the epistemological and ontological question 
on the social ‘forms’ a wide speculative prospect. The first chapter of 
Ueber soziale Differenzierung (1890) and the former essay Das Problem der 
Sociologie (1894) (that became the first chapter of Soziologie, published 
in 1908, in a completely renewed style and argumentation) come to my 
mind at this point. The epistemological question is how a ‘form’ becomes 
a form under a sociological meaning: more precisely, Simmel aims at 
pursuing a sociological epistemology [Erkenntnistheorie der Sozialwissen-
schaft]9. He does not follow a Kantian or Neo-kantian model of a subjec-
8 Georg Simmel, Sociology: Inquiries into the construction of social forms, Leiden: 
Brill, 2009, p. 22 and 26; cfr. Georg Simmel, Soziologie. Untersuchungen über 
die Formen der Vergesellschaftung, GSG 11, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, pp. 
17-18 and p. 24 (my underlinings). 
9 Georg Simmel, Über sociale Differenzierung. Sociologische und psychologische 
Untersuchungen, in Aufsätze 1887-1890. Über sociale Differenzierung. Sociologi-
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tive a priori synthesis; he provides an objective a priori synthesis of social 
materials (that is individual impulses, means, goals and values). Within 
social interactions there’s not a dialectical mediation among individu-
als: the Wechselwirkung – this is his well-known key-concept – generates 
‘forms’ of association (it is what Simmel will name afterwards ‘Verge-
sellschaftung’) which keep on living even if individuals do not imme-
diately fill them, or – better – they keep on living in spite of individuals. 
This conflictual configuration of the modern society between the indi-
vidual and the society is given, thanks to the increasing differentiation 
and subsequently through the ‘money paradigm’, that is Simmel’s meta-
physics of ‘money’, conceived as the universal, all-pervading and neu-
tral ‘medium’ in the social as well as cultural transactions. Beyond the 
relativistic interpretation of some aspects emerging from The Philosophy 
of money book, the sociological theory in Simmel’s work responds to a 
coherent program10: he would have to construct a social science (namely, 
the “science of human social existence”11) focusing on its primary subject 
that occurs in the form of relation. This relation fits to the four-patterned 
relational scheme given by Donati.: I summarized and schematized Sim-
mel’s idea of “social relation” (form of social life) as it follows (Figure 1): 
 
 
  G (goals/interests) 
 
A (means)        I  (integration models) 
 
      
L (values/vital impulses) 
Figure 1 
	
sche und psychologische Untersuchungen. Die Probleme der Geschichtsphilosophie 
(1892), GSG 2, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1989, pp. 115-139.
10 Gregor Fitzi, The Challenge of Modernity: Simmel’s sociological Theory, Oxon: 
Routledge, 2018; Olli Pyythinen, The Simmelian Legacy. A Science of Relations, 
Houndmills- Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018
11 Georg Simmel, Sociology Inquiries into the construction of social forms, op. cit., p. 
27.
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Georg Simmel was the first sociologist to argue for a wide ‘theory of 
the forms of social life’, particularly anchored to the L pattern.12 It is may-
be convenient to recall Max Horkheimer’s original conviction to engage 
Simmel’s thought toward the construction of the Critical Theory.13 In 
Simmel’s writings, this debt is clearly tangible in the concept of ‘instru-
mental reason’, for instance, and in many topics very close to Simmel’s 
Kuturpessimismus14: the “tragedy of culture” issue and the irreconcilable 
dialectics between subjective and objective culture in the modernity are 
probably the most concrete heritage in Horkheimer’s social theory. 
One of the purposes of this section is thus to encourage the removal 
of any ideological resistance to Simmel and rediscover Horkeimer’s orig-
inal motto, which I consider a return to the origins of the Critical Theory 
in order to construct a ‘Critical theory of the forms of social life’. The 
debt to Simmel is surely undeniable among the Frankfurt School philos-
ophers of the first generation. However, this influence remained unsaid 
owing to the many forms of resistance on Simmel’s portrait in the aca-
demic and scientific debate. By virtue of his ambivalence principle and 
his unsystematic theory, Simmel had rightly predicted his destiny in the 
lucky figure of plural ‘money heritage’. From the very beginning, on the 
one hand Simmel was considered a war-monger, nationalist, right-wing 
12 Donati alleges: “I began this approach to social life with reference to natural 
rights by commenting on the thought of Toennies […] and then locating it 
in the L of AGIL, interpreting it in a relational manner”, P. Donati, Relational 
Sociology. A new Paradigm for the social Sciences, op. cit., p. 56.
13 During my investigations in the Archivzentrum der Goethe-Universität Frank-
furt am Main, an unpublished letter exchange with Hans Simmel testifies 
Max Horkheimer’s intellectual debt to Simmel: within this correspondence, 
Horkheimer claimed in a letter sent to the American Consulate to let earn a 
VISA to Hans Simmel, who lived in Stuttgart and took care Horkheimer’s 
parents: ‘[Georg Simmel] was a great German Philosopher whose ideas 
had a considerable influence” on his philosophical development’, Brief Max 
Horkheimers an dem amerikanischen Konsul 18.11.38: MHA I 23.101.
14 Sergio Belardinelli, “Kulturpessimismus” gestern und heute”, in Geschichte und 
Gegenwart, 3, 1992, pp. 159-171; see also Klaus Lichtblau, Kulturkrise und So-
ziologie um die Jahrhundertwende: zur Genealogie der Kultursoziologie in Deutsch-
land, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1996.
67Georg Simmel and the foundations of a “relational” critical theory
thinker (a bourgeois society defender), also due to the stigmatisation of 
Ernst Bloch or Lukàcs’ assessment in Die Zerstörung der Vernunft; on the 
other hand, owing to Simmel’s anti-conformist and anti-academic style, 
he was simultaneously considered as a typical Jewish left-wing thinker, 
as Aby Warburg did.15
In Soziologische Exkurse. Nach Vorträge und Diskussionen (1956) – a col-
lection of conferences and manuscripts between 1953 and 1954 – Adorno 
and Horkheimer actually acknowledged Simmel’s pivotal role in regard 
to the definition of society, the (contrasting) relationship between soci-
ety and individuals, as well as the social processes of differentiation and 
individualisation into modernity.16 This was probably (and finally) the 
first step towards the definitive ‘thaw’ in regard to Simmel’s case. Once 
Habermas defined him as a ‘creative although not a systematic think-
er’.17 However, we have to listen to the views of Axel Honneth, who in 
recent times significantly and definitively mentions Simmel without re-
serves. In the essay Organisierte Selbstverwirklichung: Paradoxien der In-
dividualisierung18, he acknowledges Simmel’s intuitions on the modern 
‘individualization’ quite stimulating, more precisely in the analysis on 
the paradoxical results of capitalism and the reversibility of inner life and 
economic life. Rahel Jaeggi, who embodies a worthy intellectual position 
within the fourth generation of the Critical Theory tradition, provides 
15 Aby Warburg was very skeptical to Simmel’s thought: when his brother Max 
suggested a chair for him in Hamburg in 1915, Aby considered, beyond Sim-
mel’s virtuosity, his eclecticism and relativism very dangerous and injurious 
for the academic milieu, so his opinion was very negative: Georg Simmel, 
Briefe 1912-1918. Jugendbriefe, GSG 23, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2008, 
pp. 937-938.
16 Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, Soziologische Exkurse. Nach Vor-
träge und Diskussionen, Frankfurt am Main: Europäische Verlagsanstalt, 1956.
17 Jürgen Habermas and Matthieu Deflem, “Georg Simmel on Philosophy and 
Culture: Postscript to a Collection of Essays”, in Critical Inquiry, 22(3), 1996, 
p. 405.
18 Axel Honneth, “Organisierte Selbstverwirklichung: Paradoxien der Indivi-
dualisierung”, in A.Honneth (edt), Befreiung aus der Mündigkeit: Paradoxien 
des gegenwärtigen Kapitalismus, Frankfurt am Main: Campus Verlag, 2002: 
141-158
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nowadays a theory on the forms of social life. Her mentions to Simmel 
seem to be limitative19 because of the only use of some aesthetical impuls-
es (the fashion issue above all). Simmel’s sociological theory stands actu-
ally for the epistemological foundation of the science of forms of social 
relations as emerging subjects from the interactions among individuals, 
and fashion is only a particular ‘fascinating’ instance. I consider indeed 
this “Simmel’s abstinence” to be a trace of a possible integration and dia-
logue to construct a wide Critical Theory in the sign of the inquiry on the 
‘forms of social life’ considered under the lens of the ‘relation’. Kenneth 
Fish recently advanced the convincing hypothesis that relational sociolo-
gy and historical materialism may fit each other20. 
The social relation is in fact the primary subject for the sociology, ac-
cording to Simmel’s theory (as well as Marx). Simmel indeed enlarged 
the question on social relations (or social forms) such as ‘forms of social 
lives’ - I particularly mean his investigations into the metropolitan life, 
the social and cultural styles, the fashion as identity, the coquetry, and 
any form of social play and exchange in a multicultural social world: in 
other words, Simmel focused on the forms in which structural contin-
gency and everyday practices determine new conduct of life as relational 
junction. 
In the famous excursus to the first Chapter of Simmel’s Soziologie 
(1908), How is the society possible?, the terms Leben and Lebensprozess are 
very frequent, but the very crucial essay to this theme surely is Grund-
fragen der Soziologie. Individuum und Gesellschaft (1917). We find in this 
volume an uncountable recurrence of the terms dealing with ‘social life’. 
Simmel talks about a proper ‘life of the society’ [das Leben der Gesellschaft], 
which concretizes in some specific ‘forms’. The society is an ‘event’ [Ges-
chehen] – ‘the destiny and the form’ - in which we live and experience [er-
19 Rahel Jaeggi, Critique of Forms of Life, Cambridge-London: The Belknap Press 
of Harvard University Press, 2018, pp. 44-50.
20 Kenneth Fish, “Relational Sociology and Historical Materialism. Three con-
versation starters”, in C.Powell and F.Dépelteau (edts), Conceptualizing Rela-
tional Sociology. Ontological and Theoretical Issues, op. cit., pp. 27-44.
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leben] the being connected to other people21. The form is literally a ‘con-
nection’ [Verbindung], introduced by a subject who operates in the sense 
(and with the purpose) of connecting22. 
“The idea of society, for purposes of scientific treatment, cov-
ers two strictly differentiated meanings. It is first the complex 
of interacting individuals, the socially formed human matter, 
as that constitutes the entire historical reality. Then, howev-
er, ‘society’ is also the sum of individual forms of relationship 
by which individuals are able to become a society in the first 
sense. […] Social science in a second sense has forces, relation-
ships, and forms as its subject matter, through which people 
socialize, things that, viewed separately, constitute ‘society’ 
in the strict sense—which obviously is not altered by circum-
stance, so that the content of social interaction, the specific 
modifications of its substantive purpose and interest, is distin-
guished often or always from its particular form”23. 
In Simmel’s masterpiece Soziologie we find trace of a social ontology 
based on the concept of relation (as a ‘form’ of the social life) as well as a 
sociological epistemology, since the former attempts in the first chapter 
of Ueber sociale Differenzierung (1890). The main subject is the ‘relation’ in-
tended as interaction or reciprocity: Simmel draws the question dealing 
with the ‘forms’ of social interaction, even if he does not furnish in this 
21 Georg Simmel, “Grundfragen der Soziologie”, in Der Krieg und die geistigen 
Entscheidungen. Grundfragen der Soziologie. Vom Wesen des historischen Verste-
hens. Der Konflikt der modernen Kultur. Lebensanschauung, GSG 16: Frankfurt 
am Main: Suhrkamp, 1999, pp. 69-70.
22 ‘The form, which is always a connection, is only given by a connecting sub-
ject’ [Die Form, die immer eine Verbindung ist, nur von einem verbindenden Sub-
jekt hinzugefügt wird]: Georg Simmel, “Grundfragen der Soziologie”, GSG 16, 
op. cit., 66.
23 Georg Simmel, Sociology: Inquiries into the construction of social forms, op. cit., 
p. 26 (cfr. Georg Simmel, Soziologie, op. cit., p. 23). Simmel often uses such 
terms as ‘Beziehung’, ‘Wechselbeziehung’, ‘Wechselwirkung’, ‘Relation’ 
without furnishing any epistemological or ontological difference among 
them, but it’s not the case to further discuss here this question.
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book already any systematic and foundational theory of forms of ‘so-
cial life’. It must be expected the ‘vitalist’ turn that he experienced since 
he found in Bergson and Nietzsche a good basis to argue for a ‘vitalist 
social theory’24. In Grundfragen der Soziologie: Individuum und Gesellschaft 
(1917) and in his last contribution Lebensanschauung. Vier Kapitel (1918) 
Simmel gives an impulse to the interpretation of social facts under the 
semantics of ‘social life’. Thus, he lands to the well-known dialectics of 
‘more-life’ and ‘more-than-life’. In both the mentioned books, he con-
siders the ‘forms’ as the necessary mediation (an abstraction) in the im-
manent process called ‘life’ (intended as ‘continuous self-overcoming’): 
the social and the cultural forms are then the medium for the common 
human co-existence, the objectification of inner subjective Spirit as the 
necessary ‘stage’ for self-knowledge25. 
In her recent studies, Rahel Jeaggi furnishes this assertion to define 
the ‘forms of life:’ they refer to “[…] a culturally informed ‘order of hu-
man co-existence’ that encompasses an ‘ensemble of practices and ori-
entations’ as well as their institutional manifestations and materializa-
tions”.26 For Jaeggi forms of life are ‘inert bundles of social practices’. In 
any form of social life, she finds a trace of ‘practices and orientations’ due 
to four fundamental conditions, which I consider similar to a priori:
a) Intentionality 
b) Interpretability 
c) Normativity 
d) Finalism27
24 Scott Lash, Lebenssoziologie, op. cit.
25 In the essay Der Fragmentcharakter des Lebens (1916), Simmel sustains: “I think 
of the ‘stuff’ of experience always as being formed into definite or indefinite 
conglomerations from one or other basic standpoint or world-vision. […] 
‘World’, I argue, is a formal concept; yet like all general forms it often ends 
up being reduced to its most recurrent, significant or historically prominent 
specifications, with the consequence that none of its many other instantia-
tions seems to belong to it any longer”, Georg Simmel, “The Fragmentary 
Character of Life”, Theory, Culture & Society, 29(7/8), 2012, pp. 242-243.
26 Rahel Jaeggi, “Towards an Immanent Critique of Forms of Life”, Raisons poli-
tiques, 1/57, 2015, pp. 13-29 (p. 16).
27 Ibidem, p. 17.
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According to Jaeggi, an “immanent critique” stands due to “prob-
lems, crisis and conflicts” within the forms of life: “the moment of crisis 
forces reflection and/or adjustments of practices that were previously 
ignored”28, then recurring to the problem-solving scheme within a prag-
matist frame. 
This conflictual idea was already formulated in Simmel’s ‘tragic’ the-
ory of modern culture and society: already in the essay Der Begriff und 
die Tragödie der Kultur (1911) he focused on the tragic result of the dia-
lectics between life (as subjective issue) and its forms (as an objective 
sphere, that is, all that concerns the accomplishment of life itself). It is 
also peculiar the way Jaeggi uses the term ‘bundle’, when Simmel often 
adopted the metaphor of the ‘web’ [Stoff] to define the sphere of society 
and culture. 
 “Those forms that compose the mind’s proper activity, those 
mental powers that shape the world’s materials, nevertheless 
subsist in the first instance utterly in life. They are the necessi-
ties that a particular course of life with a particular character 
in a given milieu of the world trains and exercises for itself in 
the same manner as it does its particular limbs and species 
functions. Life streams through these forms like a river surg-
ing forth through the waves of its current”29.
Simmel furnishes a wider idea of sociology as inquiry on the forms of so-
cial life, and this idea is efficaciously sustained in Grundfragen der Soziol-
ogie (1917), that represents the last and most meaningful attempt of Sim-
mel to ground a social theory on the basis of a vital conception of cultural 
and social relations. It is also peculiar that Simmel does not renounce to 
the conflict dimension in social and cultural issues. In the first lines of the 
fourth chapter, Individuum und Gesellschaft in Lebensanschauungen des 18. 
und 19. Jahrhunderts (Beispiel der Philosophischen Soziologie), Simmel hits 
home when he says:
28 Ibidem, p. 18.
29 Georg Simmel, “The Fragmentary Character of Life”, op. cit., p. 239.
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“The really problem of society is the relation between its forces 
and forms and the individual’s own life. The question is not 
whether society exists only in the individuals or also outside 
of them. For even if we attribute «life», properly speaking, 
only to individuals, and identify the life of society with that 
of its individual members, we must still admit the existence 
of conflict between the two. One reason for this conflict is the 
fact that, in the individuals themselves, social elements fuse 
into the particular phenomenon called «society». «Society» 
develops its own vehicles and organs by whose claims and 
commands the individual is confronted as by an alien party. A 
second reason results from another aspect of the inherency of 
society in the individual”30.
The society (as the ensemble of social relations) is a ‘sui generis’ entity, 
which ‘emerges’ among individual reciprocal interactions and it exists 
thanks to and beyond individuals: it applies also for its forms31. The con-
flictual aspect of the society (i.e. the fact that it exists in, through and out-
side individuals) also refers to the inner vital aspect of society: what we 
call the ‘social life’ is a primary question, that Simmel had already stated, 
circa one hundred years ago.
In Simmel’s essay Der Fragmentcharakter des Lebens (1916) he sustained 
that: 
“[…] the forms or functions that life, for its own sake, has pro-
duced from its own vitality has now become so autonomous 
and definite that conversely life serves them and arranges its 
contents into them; and the success of this arrangement serves 
30 Georg Simmel, “Individual and society in eighteenth- and nineteenth centu-
ry. Views of life (an example of philosophical Sociology)”, in The Sociology of 
Georg Simmel, edited by K.Wolff, Glencoe: The Free Press, p. 58 (cfr. Georg 
Simmel, “Grundfragen der Soziologie”, GSG 16, op. cit., p. 122).
31 Davide Ruggieri, “Emergenza, riduzione, relazione: il paradigma della so-
ciologia relazionale e il dualismo tra struttura e cultura”, Studi di Sociologia, 
3, 2016, pp. 279-294.
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just as much as an ultimate realisation of value and meaning as 
did previously the introduction of these forms into the econo-
my of life”32.
2. Lebenssoziologie or ‘Constructing a new storey 
beneath historical materialism’
In the preface of Philosophie des Geldes, Simmel adopts the following for-
mula in order to clarify his analytical field and methodology into the social 
sciences inquiries: “constructing a new storey beneath historical materi-
alism”. The sociological inquiries must treat ‘social forms’ (that is, social 
relations) beyond any ‘structural’ view – at least according Marx’s view. 
In the construction of Simmel’s theory of value within the description of 
modern culture under the sign of ‘money’, the confrontation with Marx 
is constant. Simmel simply reduces the question of the relation between 
structure and culture with the reciprocity of both of them. Simmel sustains:
“Methodologically, this basic intention can be expressed in 
the following manner. The attempt is made to construct a new 
storey beneath historical materialism such that the explanatory 
value of the incorporation of economic life into the causes of 
intellectual culture is preserved, while these economic forms 
themselves are recognized as the result of more profound val-
uations and currents of psychological or even metaphysical 
preconditions”33.
Simmel’s stimulating statement surely looks at the typical Marxist ques-
tion dealing with the relation between structure and superstructure, as 
32 Georg Simmel, “Der Fragmentcharakter des Lebens”, in Aufsätze und Abhand-
lungen 1909-1918. Band II, GSG 13. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2000, p. 
253.
33 Georg Simmel, Philosophy of Money, London: Routledge, 2004, p. 54. Simmel 
seems to address ante litteram a ‘culturalist’ solution to the question dealing 
the relationship between the economic life of society and the cultural do-
main: Nancy Fraser and Axel Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition. A politi-
cal-philosophical Exchange, London-New York: Verso, 2003.  
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well as (translated in present sociological language) dealing the conflict 
between structure and culture. Marx defined the latter in correspondence 
to ‘forms of social consciousness’.34 The historical materialism derives the 
forms of social consciousness as a variable ‘depending’ on the economic 
base. The relation between both of them cannot be reciprocal, as instead 
Simmel sustained. Lukàcs saw in Simmel’s theory such a possible (tragic) 
extreme result of historical materialism.
“Deepening of historical materialism in fact exists in the sub-
sumption of its results under a Lebensphilosophie framework, 
that in this case appears as the insoluble opposition between 
subjectivity and cultural forms, between soul and mind. This 
opposition is, according to Simmel, the peculiar tragedy of cul-
ture”35.
Simmel demonstrated in the second part of Philosophy of money the ‘mon-
etisation’ of the modern society under the category of the ‘style of life’: it 
represents the best sample of the monetisation of individual existences 
(the individual social life) due to the extreme require for reciprocity coef-
ficient. The loss of personality is directly proportional to the increase of 
that modern search for a style of life, depending on multiple factors and 
variables, due to the ‘differentiation’ (Differenzierung) principle. 
The problem of the ‘style’ in Simmel primarily consists in the fact that 
the modern individuals must accept to get their life ‘formalised’. The 
style (as a form) of life becomes substance.36 It depends on the modern 
34 See the preface to Karl Marx, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, 
Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1977.
35 György Lukács, Die Zerstörung der Vernunft, Berlin: Aufbau Verlag, 1954, p. 
397.
36 Elizabeth Goodstein, “Style as Substance: Georg Simmel’s Phenomenology 
of Culture”, Cultural Critique, 52, 2002, pp. 209-234. On this issue, Emden 
recently alleged that the often cited ‘economisation’ of society is at the same 
time its ‘financialization’, i.e. the monetary economy, according to Simmel, 
has once again become a cultural phenomenon: Christian J. Emden, “Die 
Normativität des Kapitals. Zur politischen Aktualität von Georg Simmels 
Philosophie des Geldes”, Zeitschrift für Kulturphilosophie, 1-2, 2015: 179.
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fragmentation of social life: individuals experience social life through 
uncountable and exchangeable ‘worlds’ and values. The more the soci-
ety differentiates – getting more and more complex and contingent –, 
the more this variable will increase individual disposition to experience 
‘multiple lives’. The search for a style as symmetry, unity and totality is 
the balancing effect of this fragmentation and dissemination. In the pref-
ace of his Philosophy of Money (1900), Simmel inquires the style, such as 
“a person, a landscape, a mood”, “[…] finding in each of life’s details the 
totality of its meaning”.37 
For Simmel, the loss of shared and binding understandings of hu-
man purposes is the sign of an advanced civilisation process that must be 
philosophically analysed as an aspect of what he christened as modern 
Geldkultur38. In the first part of his Philosophy of Money (the ‘analytical’ 
one), Simmel demonstrates how the money symbolically embodies the 
universal interdependence of the human community in an increasingly 
complex frame of reference (modernity process), basically due to the so-
cial differentiation, the division of labour and the functional differentia-
tion.39 In the second part (the ‘synthetic’ one) he concerns to show how 
the political, social, and psychological developments associated with the 
monetary economy have shaped human existence in modern culture. He 
tries, in other words, to investigate on the spiritual (geistige) effects on in-
dividual lives, that is ‘“its effects upon the inner world - upon the vitality 
of individuals, upon the linking of their fates, upon culture in general’40.
“The lack of something definite at the centre of the soul im-
pels us to search for momentary satisfaction in evernew stim-
ulations, sensations and external activities. Thus, it is that we 
37 Georg Simmel, Philosophy of money, op. cit., p. 55.
38 Georg Simmel, Philosophie des Geldes, GSG 6. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 
1989, p. 336.
39 Hans-Peter Müller, “Individualisierung, Individualismus und Individuali-
tät”, in H-P.Müller e T.Reitz (edts), Simmel-Handbuch. Begriffe, Hauptwerke, 
Aktualität, Suhrkamp: Frankfurt am Main, 2018, pp. 296-303 (p. 296).
40 Georg Simmel, The Philosophy of Money, op. cit., p. 52.
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become entangled in the instability and helplessness that man-
ifests itself as the tumult of the metropolis, as the mania for 
travelling, as the wild pursuit of competition and as the typ-
ically modern disloyalty with regard to taste, style, opinions 
and personal relationships. The significance of money for this 
kind of life follows quite logically from the premises that all 
the discussions in this book have identified”.41
And further:
“The more the life of society becomes dominated by monetary 
relationships, the more the relativistic character of existence 
finds its expression in conscious life, since money is nothing 
other than a special form of the embodied relativity of eco-
nomic goods that signifies their value”.42
Within the recent Critical Theory scenario, Rahel Jaeggi also insists on 
the metaphor of the ‘monetization’ of individual life and then she in-
vestigates on ‘the social ontology of economic’43 that is considering the 
economic as a set of social and economic practices. She intends a set of 
sequences toward the self, the others and the outside world, in a repeti-
tive or habitual manner, not necessarily concerned in social relations, but 
under a socially-shared meaning. In a ‘relational’ perspective it should 
treated indeed as the question of practices, first of all, under the social 
relations and the reciprocity paradigm they got born and ‘live’.
This perspective is given by Simmel, as he formulised an ethical archi-
tecture in his writing Das individuelle Gesetzt: the purpose of this writing 
was to ‘individualize’ a vital (not abstract) categorical imperative and root 
it in ‘the stream of life’ – the ethical duty can only be subsumed by the 
41 Ibidem, p. 490.
42 Ibidem, p. 518.
43 Rahel Jaeggi “A Wide Concept of Economy: Economy as a Social Practice 
and the Critique of Capitalism”, in P.Deutscher and C.Lafont (edts), Critical 
Theory in Critical Times Transforming the Global Political and Economic Order, 
New York: Columbia University Press, 2017, pp 160-182 (p. 163).
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totality of life, which contains an internal ‘normativity’.44 Despite of the 
Kantian ‘intellectualised’ model of a pure and universal duty (which is 
substantially indifferent to life), Simmel conceived an ‘objective’ criterion 
on individual life, since life itself is always ‘individual’ – then the norma-
tivity of an ethical life must be only ‘individual’. For Simmel, ‘objectivity’ 
stands for to the development of vital conditions and contents of individu-
al life (by doing that, Simmel remarks the difference – and the false co-be-
longing – between ‘subjectivity’ and ‘individuality’). In this sense, we must 
consider Simmel as the first sociologist who argued for a ‘relational’ and 
‘reflexive’ self as the basis for a new order of social and moral life. The indi-
vidual responsibility principle is given with the ‘totality’ of individual acts, 
as decisive practices in the construction of its whole life, that is to recognise 
individual form of social life such as Rahel Jaeggi sustains. 
The first paradoxical case of that conflict between the individual and 
the society stands in the 18th century. For Simmel, the quest for liberty and 
equality coincides with the impossibility of their satisfaction. This first 
paradox is revealed in the socio-political experience of the French Revo-
lution, where the ‘antinomy’ between liberty and equality is insuperable.
“Die Unzulänglichkeit der gesellschaftlich gültigen Lebens-
formen im 18. Jahrhundert im Verhältnis zu den materiellen 
und geistigen Produktivkräften der Zeit kam den Individuen 
als eine unerträgliche Bindung ihrer Energien zum Bewusst-
sein: so die Vorrechte der oberen Stände, wie die despotische 
Kontrolle von Handel und Wandel, die immer noch mächti-
gen Reste der Zunftverfassungen wie der unduldsame Zwang 
des Kirchentums, die Fronpflichten der bäuerlichen Bevölker-
ung wie die politische Bevormundung im Staatsleben und die 
Einengungen der Stadtverfassungen”.45
44 Monica Lee and Daniel Silver, “Simmel’s Law of the Individual and the Eth-
ics of the Relational Self”, Theory, Culture&Society, 29 (7/8), 2012, pp- 124-145; 
see also M Amat, “Simmel’s Law of the Individual: A Relational Idea of Cul-
ture”, Simmel Studies, 21 (2), 2017, pp. 41-72.
45 Georg Simmel, Der Krieg und die geistigen Entscheidungen. Grundfragen der So-
Berlin Journal of Critical Theory  |  Vol. 3, No. 2 (April, 2019)78
This unachievable satisfaction for individuals to obtain liberty and 
equality at the same time is the main plot of the modern society. Jaeggi 
recognizes that Simmel had first argued about the ambivalence principle 
at the basis of the modern society46, which has its grammar norms in 
the ‘money paradigm’, so that the price of liberty directly depends on 
the elevated level of ‘social’ indifference47, i.e. liberty coincides with ‘in-
dependence’, and not with any metaphysical or moral precept. Simmel 
denoted the progressive proliferation of the pure mean (the money) in 
the social practices and the generation of what I call the ‘second order 
forms’ of social life. 
Simmel basically recognised in fact two kinds, or orders, of social 
forms: the first order (Formen der Vergesellschaftung) deals with the main 
subjects treated in Soziologie (1908), that is ‘superiority and subordina-
tion, division of labour, formation of parties, inner solidarity coupled 
with exclusiveness toward the outside, and innumerable similar features 
in the State, in a religious community, in a band of conspirators, in an 
economic association, in an art of school, in the family’48; the second or-
der (Geselligkeit) is yet those models emerging as the pure and simple 
ziologie. Vom Wesen des historischen Verstehens. Der Konflikt der modernen Kul-
tur. Lebensanschauung, GSG 16, op.cit., p. 128 (my underlinings).
46 Rahel Jaeggi, “Was (wenn überhaupt etwas) ist falsch am Kapitalismus?  Drei 
Wege der Kapitalismuskritik”, in R.Jaeggi and D.Loick (edts), Nach Marx. 
Philosophie, Kritik, Praxis, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2013, pp. 321-349. 
See also Birgitta Nedelmann, Ambivalenz als Interaktionsform und Interakrtions-
norm, in O.H.Luthe and R.E.Wiedenmann (eds), Ambivalenz, Opladen: Leske 
and Budrick, 1997, pp. 149-163. 
47 “The increasing objectification of our culture, whose phenomena consist 
more and more of impersonal elements and less and less absorb the subjec-
tive totality of the individual (most simply shown by the contrast between 
handicraft and factory work), also involves sociological structures. There-
fore, groups into which earlier man entered in his totality and individuality 
and which, for this reason, required reciprocal knowledge far beyond the im-
mediate, objective content of the relationship these groups are now based ex-
clusively on this objective content, which is neatly factored out of the whole 
relation”, Georg Simmel, The Sociology of Georg Simmel, op. cit., p.  318.
48 Ibidem, p. XXXIV and p. 22.
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play-forms of sociability49, that is ‘fashion, sociability, coquetry, adven-
ture’ etc.: for Simmel, all these forms are basically detectable in the lin-
guistic dimension as “talk” (Gespräch).50 These last play-forms establish 
as a model to comprehend the reality, although they were born from 
ludic and contingent needs. This extreme superficiality, this ‘vane and 
reified schematism’ has become the primary social realm. The individ-
uals nowadays mediate their worlds through these schemes, and this is 
sure a pernicious production of a false conscience of relations. ‘False’ is 
not to intend as an inversion of relationships between false and true, but 
as the distance degree to the reality. The massive use of fine technologies 
implements that natural destiny of social relations. It is quite paradig-
matic if we think of the conversations (the linguistic dimension) on social 
networks based on the false facts or spoof stories, which is but a frivo-
lous and superficial social exchange. This seductive form of reciprocity 
is now legitimate and self-reproductive. But the question in this case is, 
what do we exchange in these new forms of social life if not only the 
‘form’? We lose the content, we have lost the meaning and the purpos-
es, then our social existences assume the form of the media themselves 
(such as Instagram, Facebook, Twitter etc,). The stake is our personality, 
as Simmel attempted to demonstrate since the last chapter of Philosophy 
of money. The more the modern society requires from us a ‘singular’ style 
of life, the more we lose our personality, since both of them are inverse-
ly proportional entities. The involvement in these superficial play-forms 
requires the greatest sacrifice of what we keep innermost and personal, 
and the bigger the social circle we belong is, the deeper our loss will be. 
49 Ibidem, p. 43.
50 Georg Simmel, Soziologie der Geselligkeit (1910), in Aufsätze und Abhandlungen 
1909-1918, Band I, GSG 12, Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 2001, pp. 177-193.
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3. ‘Dem Leben die Transzendenz immanent ist’ (Simmel): a 
‘transcendent-immanent’ critique of social life
Jaeggi tackles (and criticizes) the question dealing the ‘ethical abstinence’ 
in the modern liberal political scheme, such as sustained by Habermas.51 
She aims at analysing forms of social life through an ‘immanent’ perspec-
tive, arguing that “[…] forms of life, in order to be an appropriate object 
of critique, must not only be malleable and created by human activity, 
they must also be structured by norms we can recognize and draw upon 
in our possible criticism”.52 This is a reasonable statement that fits to the 
idea of ‘individual law’, mentioned before, and claiming that the inner 
norm of any social life is given by the whole process considered as a ‘vital 
and relational process’. 
It could probably be useful once again to follow some of Horkheimer’s 
valuable reflections on this issue. Herbert Schnädelbach had already 
pointed out the necessity to read Horkheimer’s Critical Theory under the 
lens of the ‘Morals’ and the question of ‘individual life’. He remarked how 
Max Horkheimer attempted to root Materialism to the eudemonistic and 
individual (then emotive) topic, so that the background of Horkheimer’s 
Critical Theory was probably a ‘Gefühlsethik’ in the meaning originally 
accorded by Kant with the concept of moralischen Gefühl53. In Zur Kritik 
der instrumentellen Vernunft (1947) Horkheimer once claimed:
51 Rahel Jaeggi, “Towards an Immanent Critique of Forms of Life”, op. cit., p. 
14; see also Rahel Jaeggi, Critique of Forms of life, op. cit., pp. 14-16.
52 Rahel Jaeggi, “Towards an Immanent Critique of Forms of Life”, op. cit., p. 19.
53 “Die materialistische Moralphilosophie ist nicht deonotologisch, sondern eu-
dämoniustisch; nicht universalistisch, sondern individualistisch und situations-
bezogen; nicht rationalistisch – also irrationalistisch? […] So gerät Horkhei-
mer nicht zufällig in die Nähe der beiden wichtigsten und einflussreichsten 
normentheoretischen Positionen seiner Zeit: des Emotivismus in der Me-
taethik und des Dezisionismus”, Herbert Schnädelbach, “Max Horkheimer 
und die Moralphilosophie des deutschen Idealismus”, in A.Schmidt and 
N.Altwicker (edts), Max Horkheimer heute: Werk und Wirkung, Frankfurt am 
Main: Fischer, 1986: pp. 62-63.
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“Georg Simmel hat die Lehre vom Vermögen des Lebens ent-
wickelt, sich selbst zu transzendieren. Jedoch bezeichnet de Be-
griff des Lebens, der allen diesen Philosophen zugrunde liegt, 
ein Reich der Natur. Selbst wenn der Geist, wie in Simmels 
metaphysischer Theorie, als die höchste Stufe des Lebens be-
stimmt wird, wird das philosophische Problem noch zuguns-
ten eines vertieferten Naturalismums entschieden, gegen den 
Simmels Philosophie zugleich ein beständiger Protest ist”.54     
The exclusive attention in Habermas’ theory to the question of ethics and 
normativism has naturally produced that ‘romanticizing of individual 
life’, that is an analytic neutralisation toward any form of individual life 
and all its properties, substantially keeping the black box of ‘Life-world’ 
as Jaeggi rightly sustains.55 This under-evaluation of individual issues is 
given by the primacy of the (universal) ‘objectivism’ of the rational dis-
course (what Habermas conceives as ‘discursive rational process’). The 
search for norms in order to be recognised in a democratic and communi-
cative frame – in Simmel’s words, could be expressed as the ‘intellectual-
isation’ of common life - is also the neutralisation of individual instances.
The focus point could be addressed neither on individuals, nor on 
norms, rather on social relations. Within an ‘emergentist’ frame we 
should, thus, consider ‘social relations’, and then the forms of social life, 
as those forms of relations, arising from the reciprocity of intentional in-
dividual actions. Jaeggi furnishes a good definition of social practices as 
a ‘intentionally partial and not planned’ set of actions56, and they have 
54 Max Horkheimer “Zur Kritik der instrumentellen Vernunft” [1947], in Ge-
sammelte Schriften, Bd. 6. Frankfurt am Main: Fischer 2008, p. 173.
55 Rahel Jaeggi, “A Wide Concept of Economy”, op. cit.; cfr. Jürgen Habermas, 
Theory of Communicative Action, 2 voll., Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987.
56 Rahel Jaeggi, “A wide Concept of economy”, op. cit. In Critique of Forms of Life 
Jaeggi alleges: “Cultural models and shared values […] concern questions of 
the conduct of life that transcend the individual and find expression in estab-
lished social practices and institutions. Thus, forms of life are not individual 
options but transpersonal forms of expression that possess public relevance”, 
In this regard, see also Nancy Fraser and Rahel Jaeggi, Capitalism. A Conversa-
tion in Critical Theory, edited by B.Milstein, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2018. 
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‘emergent’ properties in this regard. 
In the first chapter ‘Life as Transcendence’ of Simmel’s final work The 
View of Life (1918), we find a clear attempt to extend the ‘formal’ principle 
of sociological inquiries also to the forms of social and cultural life within 
a frame of a ‘vitalist metaphysics’ (or vital theory). Every human activity 
has boundaries that can be stepped over, and the life process itself con-
tains an essential feature of ‘transcendence,’ in which it continually pro-
duces ‘forms’ which it then moves beyond. Life is reduced to a couple of 
principles: 1) it is ‘more-life’ [Mehr-Leben], that is a stream of events and 
capacities that enable ‘forms’ to produce objective culture that transcends 
it; 2) due to this last statement, it is also ‘more-than-life’ [Mehr-als-Leben], 
those great objective social and cultural forms, that come to stand in ir-
reconcilable opposition to the creative forces that have produced them 
in the first place.57 These are two complementary aspects of life within a 
dialectical scheme which is open and tragic (‘paradoxical’, according to 
Honneth’s words), since it never ends and does not have any resolving 
synthesis. For Honneth, conflicts are an ineliminable feature of all forms 
of human sociality: he recently argues for an Urkonflikt explaining the 
arising of the societal structure. Honneth explicitly sustains that Criti-
cal Theory, in this regard, must look at Hegel, Dewey and Simmel, as a 
possible alternative to the Roussaeu-Kantian, Freudian and Marxian views. 
   “[…] Social conflict is inevitable in all societies simply be-
cause the norms accepted by their members will again and 
again give rise to new moral claims that cannot be satisfied 
under existing conditions and whose frustration will therefore 
result in social conflicts. Here, the explanatory burden rests on 
the thought that the interpretation of socially valid norms is an 
essentially unfinished process, in which one-sided interpreta-
tions and resistance to them take turns with each other”.58
57 Georg Simmel, Lebensanschauung, in GSG 16, op. cit., p. 222.
58 Axel Honneth, “Is there an emancipatory interest? An attempt to answer crit-
ical theory’s most fundamental question”, European Journal of Philosophy, 25, 
2017: 908-920 (913).
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The critique of ‘forms of life’, as Jaeggi conceives, ‘[…] it begins precisely 
where problems, crises, and conflicts arise, even if they are not overtly 
manifest. This is why the critique is not conducted from an authoritarian 
external perspective, but from an immanent perspective’.59
Simmel argues for a theory of “forms of social life” in relation to the 
frame of an “immanent transcendence”, strictly connected to the process 
of life: since the plot of society as well as culture is given by the dialectics 
of “more-life” – the immanent side of life - and “more-than-life” – the 
transcendent one – , the forms of social life are the result of an immanent 
synthesis in order to realize transcendent forms (and purposes). In Sim-
mel’s theory forms refer to objects both material and immaterial, which 
are generated by life: forms are, thus, always “more-than-life” for Simmel.
The concept of ‘immanent transcendence’ was thematised by Patrice 
Haynes to define some peculiar aspects of Adorno’s philosophy60. Sim-
mel has defined the question of life beginning to clarify the substance of 
human being. We are “limits” [Grenzen] – humankind is addressed as 
“Begrenztwesen” –  since we need to find ‘limits’ in our chaotic lives and 
order in our multiple worlds.61 Our concrete and immediate life – writes 
Simmel – lies on a boundary between two limits, superior and inferi-
or. Life itself becomes something abstract that overwhelms any limits. 
Thus, the ‘immanent transcendence’ of life consists of the unitary act of 
limit-experiencing essence [Begrentzwesen] and overwhelming the limits 
[Überschreiten der Grenzen].62 On this theme, Jaeggi rightly sustains that 
we must consider forms of social life under a ‘procedural’ scheme since 
the social life is always a ‘process’.63 But it is also necessary to maintain 
a transcendental analytical level in the inquiry on any social transaction.
The transcendent level is only a ‘logical’, ‘rational’ and ‘abstract’ side 
59 Rahel Jaeggi, “Towards an Immanent Critique of Forms of Life”, op. cit. p. 
26; Rahel Jaeggi, Critique of forms of life, op. cit., chapter 6.
60 Patrice Haynes, Immanent Transcendence: Reconfiguring Materialism in Conti-
nental Philosophy, London-New York: Bloomsbury, 2012.
61 Georg Simmel, Lebensanschauung, GSG 16, op. cit., p.  212.
62 Ibidem, p. 215.
63 Rahel Jaeggi, “Towards an Immanent Critique of Forms of Life”, op. cit., p. 26.
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of life considered as part of the process. Simmel is of the view that, in a 
way similar to how we experience time in the forms of past, future and 
present – even if we live only ‘one’ temporal dimension –, the forms of 
our lives are the necessary mediations in order to organise our recip-
rocal social existence. Thus, following Simmel’s ‘vital theory’, the first 
form of this necessary (self)transcendence of life is the self-consciousness, 
that is our primary medium to comprehend our actions and interactions 
with others. This form permits us to build a wide ‘reflexive’ social theory, 
since we must first consider this issue in the interaction among individ-
uals. Self-consciousness is the first form of objectification, more precisely 
‘the objectification of the Self’, becoming an object although it keeps on 
being a subject. In this consideration, Simmel probably refers directly to 
Hegel, and we finally rediscover the ‘ancient roots’ of Critical Theory.
Since for Simmel, any single moment in life (considered as an abstract 
content, that is a specific ‘form’) is relative to the whole process, he stat-
ed that the transcendental moment is indeed within the immanence of 
life itself: ‘Dem Leben die Transzendenz immanent ist’. Jaeggi furnishes 
an immanent critique of forms due her approach into terms of ‘prob-
lem-solving’. Thus, she considers life such as ‘a process of accumulated 
experiences’, explicitly referring to Dewey and pragmatism. Jaeggi sus-
tains:
“Thus, the critique of forms of life that I develop can rightfully 
claim to be immanent and transformative at the same time. It 
is immanent because it takes its starting point by referring to 
immanent crises and the erosion of social practices and institu-
tions. It is transformative because the evaluation of processes 
of problem-solving allows for a transcendence of context – and 
initiates change”64.
Escaping from a metaphysical foundation of the social theory, the final 
purpose of my thesis is considering ‘social life’ in Simmel’s terms: the 
social life depends on an intimate reciprocity among individuals as well 
64 Ibidem, p. 28.
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as on the double character of immanence and transcendence. Due to this 
last idea of ‘immanent transcendence’, the forms of social lives are con-
sidered procedurally, but also under the constitutive transcendental is-
sues and under the very emergent character of the ‘relation’, which is the 
motor and the achievement of human co-existence. Life needs a form; but 
the form is always an excess for life. This paradoxical and tragic outcome 
of sociality and culture in Simmel could be (again and again) the new 
begin for a critique of the forms of social life.   
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Conscience. Communicative and 
Strategic Actions
Morhaf Al Achkar1
Abstract: In the theory of communicative action, Habermas distinguished be-
tween communicative actions, oriented toward understanding, and strategic 
actions, oriented toward consequences. The distinction is essential in clarifying 
communicative rationality as a better framework for social action. Hegel em-
ployed what can be viewed as parallel distinctions when exploring actions and 
judgments. He elaborated existential aspects related to self-certainty and inter-
subjective recognition; both concepts are salient for Habermas. Bringing in Hegel 
enriches the conversation around the notions of acting, knowing, and being. This 
paper explores Hegel’s explication of morality to add insights into the contradic-
tions in every social action that can only be transcended within a communicative 
rationality framework.
Introduction
The distinction between strategic action and communicative action is a core component of Habermas’s theory of communicative action. 
Analytically, participants in social action rely on their intuitive compe-
tency in distinguishing an act with an orientation to understanding from 
an act with an orientation to success. Empirically, and since every social 
actor is moved by a mix of interest- and value-based motives, the distinc-
tion is not always as clear as it is in the limit cases. Hegel’s explication of 
the moral view of the world at the stage of “Conscience: The ‘beautiful 
soul,’ evil and its forgiveness” provides fruitful insights into the existen-
tial aspects of this distinction.
1 Morhaf Al Achkar is an assistant professor at the School of Medicine at the 
University of Washington. He completed his medical school at the Univer-
sity of Aleppo, Syria. He completed his PhD in Inquiry Methodology in So-
cial Sciences from the School of Education at Indiana University, USA. He 
currently teaches clinical medicine and research methodology to residents 
and students at the University of Washington. He is also a researcher with 
focus in patient experience with illness, medical education, and qualitative 
research methodology. 
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In this reflective piece, I will first explicate Habermas’s position on 
the distinction between communicative and strategic actions. Then, I will 
explore Hegel’s critique of Kant’s moral theory, the notions of conviction 
and acknowledgment, and the dialectics of acting and judging self-con-
sciousnesses. Each summary section will be followed by an intermediary 
reflection, and the essay will end with a synthetic reflection.
Habermas: The Theory of Communicative Action
Habermas, in explicating the theory of communicative action, masterful-
ly handled the tension between the positions of the philosopher and that 
of the social scientist. He describes
The more I sought to satisfy the explicative claims of the phi-
losopher, the further I moved from the interests of the sociol-
ogist, who has to ask what purpose such conceptual analysis 
should serve. I was having difficulty finding the right level of 
presentation for what I wanted to say; and, as we have known 
since Hegel and Marx, problems of presentation are not extrin-
sic to substantive problems.2
With this tension in mind, and contrary to many of his counterparts who 
engaged with one or the other, Habermas successfully couched his theo-
ry with equal footing between social science and philosophy in a position 
that “holds that an adequate theory of society must integrate methods 
and problematics previously assigned exclusively to either philosophy or 
empirical social science.”3 In what follows, I will present sketches of the 
distinction between communicative and strategic actions as Habermas 
elaborated in his more recent works. I will also, to add clarity to these 
notions, explicate Habermas’s related theory on meaning and validity.
2 Jürgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action: Reason and the Ratio-
nalization of Society, trans. Thomas McCarthy, vol. 1 (Boston: Beacon Press, 
1984), xxxix (first published 1981).
3 Habermas, Theory of Communicative Action, vol. 1, vii.
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Communicative action and strategic action
Habermas clarifies his conception of communicative rationality in his 
essay “Some Further Clarification of the Concept of Communicative 
Rationality.”4 Habermas distinguishes three main modes of language 
use: the noncommunicative use, such as intentional and propositional 
sentences, which are used only mentally as monological action planning 
or pure representation;5 the communicative use of language, whether in 
a weak communicative sense with an orientation toward reaching un-
derstanding, such as engaging in normatively nonembedded expression 
of will, or in a strong communicative sense with an orientation toward 
agreement, such as in completely illocutionary acts that embed expres-
sive, normative, and constative aspects; and the strategic use of language 
with an orientation toward consequences in the pattern of perlocutions. 
In this discussion, I will not focus on the noncommunicative use of lan-
guage and will instead detail only the two forms of language used in the 
context of social actions.6
4 Jürgen Habermas, On the Pragmatics of Communication, ed. Maeve Cooke 
(Boston: MIT Press,1998).
5 Examples of noncommunicative use of language are linguistic expressions 
used monologically such as propositions (e.g., “It is true that Hamilton was 
the secretary of treasury when Washington was the president”) and inten-
tional sentences (e.g., “I will go to work tomorrow”) uttered for the purpose 
of representation or mentally rehearsed plan of action.
6 Here, Habermas refers to Austin’s distinction between locution, illocution, 
and perlocution. The term “locutionary” refers to the content of a propo-
sitional sentence (p) or a nominalized propositional sentence (that p). The 
speaker expresses the state of affairs and says something through locution-
ary acts. Additionally, the speaker performs an action in saying something 
through an illocutionary act. Habermas (Theory of Communicative Action, 
vol. 1) explains, “The illocutionary role establishes the mode of a sentence 
(‘Mp’) employed as a statement, promise, command, avowal, or the like” 
(Theory of Communicative Action, vol. 1, 289). The mode is expressed in the 
first person present by means of performative verbs, so the action meaning 
can be understood such that someone can add “hereby” to the illocutionary 
component of the verb: “I hereby command you (confess to you, promise 
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Habermas takes Weber’s definition of social actions as, “actions where-
by actors, in pursuing their personal plans of action, are also guided by 
the expected action of others.”7 Habermas distinguishes between com-
municative and strategic actions by saying
We will speak of communicative action where actors coordinate 
their plans of action with one another by way of linguistic pro-
cesses of reaching understanding, that is, in such a way that 
they draw on the illocutionary binding and bonding powers 
(Bindungskräfte) of speech acts for this coordination.8
On the other hand, with regard to the other in a strategic action,
This potential for communicative rationality remains unex-
ploited, even where the interactions are linguistically mediat-
ed. Because the participants in strategic action coordinate their 
plans of action with one another by way of a reciprocal exer-
tion of influence, language is used not communicatively, in the 
sense elucidated, but with an orientation toward consequences.9
Habermas also distinguishes communicative action “in a weak sense,” for 
actions where reaching understanding applies to both the facts and to 
the actor-related reasons for one-sided expressions of will but not to the 
normative reasons for selecting the goals. On the other hand, he uses 
the notion of communicative action “in a strong sense” for actions where 
reaching understanding applies also to normative reasons for selecting 
the goals themselves. Unlike his previous position, where orientation to 
success was a sufficient and necessary condition for an act to be deemed 
you, etc.).” Finally, the speaker produces an effect upon the hearer through 
perlocutionary acts. The three acts, locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocu-
tionary, can be characterized using the catchphrase “To say something, to 
act in saying something, to bring about something through acting in saying 
something” (Theory of Communicative Action, vol. 1, 289).
7 Habermas, Pragmatics of Communication, 326.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
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strategic, in his modified conception, Habermas accepted that it can still 
be considered a communicative use of language, albeit “weak,” when 
the actor has an orientation toward success, provided that “the illocu-
tionary aims dominate the ‘perlocutionary’ effects that in certain circum-
stances may be striven for as well.”10 Here, “perlocutionary” has a dis-
tinct use and refers to “the effects of speech acts that, if need be, can also 
be brought about causally by nonlinguistic actions.”11 Habermas further 
distinguishes perlocutionary effects as belonging to one of three classes 
of effects.
The first class of perlocutionary effects is grammatically regulated and 
results from the content of the successful illocutionary act. In this class, 
the illocutionary aim rules the perlocutionary one. The second class of 
perlocutionary effects is, in contrast, not grammatically regulated but, 
like the first class, results from the content of the successful illocution-
ary act. The third class of perlocutionary effects is achieved only in an 
inconspicuous manner when it comes to the addressee. The success of 
the strategic action in achieving this third kind of effect remains hidden 
from the other party, although it still depends on the manifest success of 
the illocutionary act. For example, a hearer understands and accepts the 
illocutionary act of a request to give money to Y. The hearer gives money 
to Y (perlocutionary effect1). This action gives joy to Y’s wife (perlocu-
tionary effect2). The speaker who requested the money achieves a wish 
she had to set up Y for theft of the money, an intention she kept hidden 
from the hearer (perlocutionary effect3).
In strategic actions, language functions according to perlocution pat-
terns. Linguistic communication is only subordinated to the conditions 
of purposive rational action.
Strategic interactions are determined by the decisions of actors 
in an attitude toward success who reciprocally observe one an-
other. They confront one another under conditions of double 
10 Habermas, Pragmatics of Communication, 329.
11 Ibid.
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contingency as opponents who, in the interest of their personal 
plans of action, exert influence on one another. . . . They sus-
pend the performative attitudes of participants in communi-
cation insofar as they take on the participating speaker and 
hearer roles from the perspective of third persons.12
The relevance of illocutionary aims comes from their role as conditions 
for the intended perlocutionary effects and, thus, are not the unreserved 
pursuit of the interlocutors, as in communicative actions.
Participants in strategic actions cannot assume truthfulness, and thus 
all their speech acts lose their illocutionary bonding and binding power. 
In addition to losing the shared normative context and the associated 
claims to normative rightness (as also occurs in weak communicative ac-
tion), Habermas asserts,
Even the claims to truth and truthfulness raised with nonreg-
ulative speech acts are no longer aimed directly at the rational 
motivation of the hearer but at getting the addressee to draw 
his conclusions from what the speaker indirectly gives him to 
understand.13
Here, presuppositions of communicative action are suspended, but 
the interlocutors continue to use them indirectly to allow or make the 
other understand what they believe or want. The decisions of strategi-
cally acting subjects are based on beliefs they hold to be true without 
transforming into truth claims those truth values that guide them indi-
vidually from the point of view of their goals and personal preferences. 
Thus, these points of view do not receive the intersubjective recognition 
because they never get raised publicly with claims to discursive vindi-
cation.
Types of interaction, Habermas asserts, can be differentiated into com-
municative or strategic according to the mechanism for linking up Alter’s 
12 Habermas, Pragmatics of Communication, 332.
13 Ibid.
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plan of action with Ego’s.14 We can speak of strategic action or commu-
nicative action, depending on whether the actions were coordinated by 
exerting influence or by reaching understanding, respectively. Similarly, 
these two mechanisms are distinguished from the perspectives of the partic-
ipants in a mutually exclusive fashion. Alter or Ego cannot participate in 
the processes of reaching understanding with the dual intention of caus-
ally exerting influence on the other and at the same time reach an agree-
ment about something. This is because an agreement cannot, from the 
perspective of the participants, be imposed externally, whether through 
intervention in the action or by influencing the propositional attitude of 
the other.15
A child develops the competency to act communicatively and to have 
relationships to the world in the form of subject–subject (as in commu-
nicative action) or subject–object (as in instrumental action) through so-
cializing and taking the position of the other. Habermas traces the dis-
tinction between these two attitudes back to our learning to anticipate 
a possible “no” from another person and internalizing that person’s 
position, saying “no” to our own action impetuses. When it comes to 
interacting with objects in a person–object relationship, the “no” is un-
derstood as a consequence of an undesired action. This “no” is different 
from the one carrying normative validity stemming from identification 
with Alter Ego or with a generalized other. We intuitively distinguish 
between communicating with another person and acting instrumentally 
to produce an effect on that person. Strategic action is only a special case 
of instrumental action.
Clearly, in any action taken from an actual interaction, there would be 
a mix of empirical and rational motives, and participants can more or less 
tell the difference. Language use will thus represent a mix of strategic 
and communicative actions. Habermas asserts
14 Habermas, Pragmatics of Communication.
15 Jürgen Habermas, “Toward a Critique of the Theory of Meaning,” in On 
the Pragmatics of Communication, edited by Maeve Cooke (Boston, MA: MIT 
Press, 1998), 298–9.
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Generally, alter is moved to link up his actions with ego’s ac-
tions by a complicated mix of empirical and rational motives. 
Because communicative action demands an orientation to va-
lidity claims, it points from the start to the possibility that par-
ticipants will distinguish more or less sharply between having 
an influence upon one another and reaching an understanding 
with one another. Thus, as we shall see, a generalized “will-
ingness to accept” can develop along two lines: empirical ties 
forged by inducement and intimidation, on the one hand, and 
rational trust motivated by agreement based on reasons, on 
the other hand.16
Participants in interactions master the competency to distinguish, 
when they come to an agreement with an other, whether the person has 
intimidated and inducted them or they were only rationally motivated.
Meaning and validity
Habermas followed the formal pragmatic approach to meaning. This ap-
proach “begins with the question of what it means to understand an utter-
ance—that is, a sentence employed communicatively.”17 Habermas trac-
es understanding an utterance back to the knowledge of the conditions 
under which the hearer may accept the utterance as valid. He asserts, 
“We understand a speech act when we know what makes it acceptable.”18 From 
the speaker’s standpoint, the conditions for acceptability are the same 
as the conditions for the illocutionary success of her act. Acceptability is 
defined in the performative attitude of the participants in the communi-
cation and not in an objectivistic sense from the observers’ perspective. 
A speech act, in the context of communicative action, can be contested or 
rejected by an addressee under at least one of the three aspects:
16 Jürgen Habermas, The Theory of Communication Action: Lifeworld and System: 
A Critique of Functionalist Reason, tran. Thomas McCarthy, vol. 2 (Boston: 
Beacon Press, 1987), 74.
17 Habermas, Pragmatics of Communication, 131.
18 Habermas, Pragmatics of Communication, 132.
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The aspect of the rightness that the speaker claims for her ac-
tion in relation to a normative context (or, indirectly, for these 
norms themselves); the aspect of the truthfulness that the 
speaker claims for the expression of subjective experiences to 
which she has privileged access; and finally, the aspect of the 
truth that the speaker, with her utterance, claims for a state-
ment (or for the existential presuppositions of the context of a 
nominalized proposition).19
A speech act has met its acceptability conditions when it satisfies the 
conditions necessary for the hearer to take a “yes” position on the valid-
ity claim raised by the speaker. These conditions have to be satisfied not 
one-sidedly, whether in relation to the speaker or the hearer, but have 
to be sufficient for the intersubjective recognition of the linguistic claims 
that, depending on the class of the speech act, ground an agreement with 
specified content related to obligations relevant to the interaction’s con-
sequences. This standpoint provides an explanation of the mechanism 
relevant to how speech acts coordinate actions. Assuming the expres-
sions employed in the speech act are grammatically well formed and that 
there is satisfaction of the general contextual conditions typical for a cer-
tain type of speech act, Habermas asserts,
A hearer understands the meaning of an utterance when . . . he 
knows those essential conditions under which he could be moti-
vated by a speaker to an affirmative response. These acceptabil-
ity conditions in the narrower sense relate to the meaning of the 
illocutionary role that [a speaker] in the standard case express-
es with the help of a performative action predicate.20
The yes or no response of a hearer to the validity claim, however, has 
a nuanced meaning to Habermas, building on the notion of “assent.” 
For Habermas, “under the presuppositions of communicative action, a 
hearer can reject the utterance of a speaker only by denying its validity. 
19 Habermas, Pragmatics of Communication, 141–2.
20 Habermas, Pragmatics of Communication, 132.
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Assent means then that the negation of the invalidity of the utterance is 
affirmed.”21 To explicate this notion further, take, for example, an asser-
tion p, a command q, and an avowal r. Affirming p implies negating “it is 
untrue that p.” Similarly, affirming q implies negating the sentence “It is 
not right that N,” assuming N is the norm invoked in uttering q. Finally, 
affirming r implies the rejection of the sentence “It is insincere that r.” 
This is particularly relevant in understanding the binding and bonding 
force of the illocutionary act. Habermas asserts,
The binding effect of illocutionary forces comes about, ironical-
ly, through the fact that participants can say “no” to speech-act 
offers. The critical character of this saying “no” distinguishes 
taking a position in this way from a reaction based solely on 
caprice. A hearer can be “bound” by speech-act offers because 
he is not permitted arbitrarily to refuse them but only to say 
“no” to them, that is, to reject them for reasons.22
This nuanced notion of negating the negative becomes particularly rel-
evant also when distinguishing communicative and strategic actions. 
Even with limit cases, the person can never come to a certainty about 
the truth, rightness, and truthfulness of an act. The best someone can 
claim is the negation of the untruth, un-rightness, and untruthfulness. 
Similarly, in affirming that an act is a strategic one, the best someone can 
say is that the claim “It is not insincere that r” is negated. The certainty of 
judgements about all empirical cases lies between these two limits and is 
open for vindication.
First Reflection
The distinction between communicative action and strategic action, 
whether in day-to-day interactions or in research and the social sciences, 
is particularly important. The reader may recall that Habermas charac-
terizes strategic action as the social actions in which at least one actor is 
21 Habermas, Theory of Communicative Action, vol. 2, 73.
22 Habermas, Theory of Communicative Action, vol. 2, 74.
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attempting to influence another person or with the person’s conditions 
for a perlocutionary end in mind. The strategic actor uses language only 
as a tool, unlike communicative action, where language is a medium for 
reaching understanding and agreement. She suspends her commitments 
to truthfulness and, potentially, to normative rightness and truth as she 
acts unilaterally toward her own ends. Habermas drew the distinction 
between communicative action and strategic action from the perspec-
tives of the participants who rely on the intuitive competence of interloc-
utors. There exists in every empirical situation, however, a tension when 
characterizing an act as strategic. This tension results from the essence 
of strategic action; that is, the suspension of the conditions of commu-
nicative rationality and using language that parasitically relies on the 
language game of communicative action while unilaterally acting as if 
the rules of this game (i.e., commitment to intelligibility, truth, rightness, 
and truthfulness) do not apply.
This tension especially imposes itself on the other person. In the ab-
sence of an I/you dialogue, Ego is pushed to the third-person participant 
position, which is not unproblematic. In the limit cases, the act is either 
communicative or strategic. If the act is communicative, Ego could, howev-
er, engage in a reflective communicative conversation with Alter about 
the latter’s communicative action, and she could get a truthful response 
that explicates Alter’s orientation: that she was truthful, rightfully hold-
ing a norm, and raising an objective truth claim. This dialogue and reflec-
tion can be unreliable if Alter is truly acting strategically. Just as we cannot 
trust the reliability of the truthful answer about truthfulness, Ego cannot 
ask Alter, who is acting strategically and thus being untruthful, whether 
she is truthful or not and trust that the answer is true. In the absence of a 
dialogue and authentic reflection, Ego may find herself left to a unilateral 
judgment, albeit a one-sided one that, even if it claims a privileged posi-
tion, is meaningless if left unacknowledged. It is an impasse unless Alter 
comes to reflect on her act and makes a confession.
Clearly, Habermas does not say that it is possible to make a distinction 
between communicative and strategic action with certainty. The possi-
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bility of distinction between communicative and strategic action ought 
to be understood analytically as it relates to an ideal speech situation. 
Although these situations cannot be achieved, they need to be accepted 
if the possibility of acting communicatively is to be understood. This is 
the same argument that can be raised when we think of interlocutors in a 
social interaction attaining identical meaning, although we can never be 
certain that two people understand an utterance in an identical way. For 
Habermas, the distinction between communicative and strategic action 
must be understood as a necessary idealization. We cannot claim that 
one can know whether an other is acting strategically or not even though 
we know the difference between strategic acts and communicative acts. 
We know the difference analytically, yet we can never be certain in any 
empirical sense.23
As participants in a lifeworld and in any empirical act, we accept that it 
is problematic to claim a distinction between a communicative and stra-
tegic action from Ego’s or Alter’s position alone. It takes critical dialogue 
and reflection on the part of both participants to judge an action as such, 
and it is not sufficient to rely on the position of one without the other. 
The two analytical schemas provide a powerful framework for interpret-
ing social actions within the horizons of the actions’ possible meanings. 
Here appears the critical aspect of the theory when brought to the sphere 
of social science and methodology: as social scientists, we ought to avoid 
describing an action as strategic without the participant’s confession. We 
could, however, engage the participant in a conversation about previ-
ous actions and, through a dialogue, move her position to recognizing 
her truth orientation, but we cannot unilaterally make claims to certainty 
about that orientation. We can clearly make inferences about the per-
son’s objective claims by explicating possible reasons for the claims to 
truth she raised. We can also make stipulations about the norms she is 
claiming entitlement to. We can further judge her explicitly claimed au-
thenticity and the explicit claims to truthfulness as they take on an objec-
tive existence in language (i.e., only after they are asserted explicitly). We 
23 This paragraph is reconstructed from a conversation with Phil Carspecken.
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cannot, however, make inferences about her subjective claims without 
her insight, ideally insight that is cultivated through critical reflection 
and dialogue with the other. We also cannot judge the norms she is com-
mitted to without her explicitly asserting her commitments. To further 
explore actions that can be judged as strategic, communicative, or a com-
bination of both more deeply, participants or researchers could find in-
sights in Hegel’s moral dialectic in “Conscience: The ‘beautiful soul,’ evil 
and its forgiveness.”
Hegel: The Beautiful Soul, Evil, and Its Forgiveness
In Phenomenology of Spirit, under the title “Conscience. The ‘beautiful 
soul,’ evil and its forgiveness,” Hegel criticizes Kant’s moral worldview, 
saying that it “gets bogged down in insoluble contradictions, continu-
ally contraposing a nature whose laws are independent to a will and 
a pure duty which are then condemned to remain ineffectual.”24 Hegel 
transcended these contradictions dialectically, and that will be the focus 
of this section. But before we get to Hegel, it will be useful to bring in a 
rough sketch of Kant’s moral theory as he constructed its argument in 
Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals.25
Kant, as we know, developed the arguments for the synthetic a pri-
ori principle of causality. The law of causality, however, applies only 
to the phenomenal world, meaning the world as far as it is knowable. 
Contrasted with causality in the phenomenal world, autonomy and free-
dom come to be the uncaused cause in the noumenal world, the world 
of things in themselves, including the moral agency of the person. We 
belong to both the world of sense, and thus follow the laws of nature, 
and to the world of understanding, and thus are autonomous and free. 
And because we are autonomous and free, we can act morally. To Kant, 
24 Jean Hyppolite, Genesis and Structure of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, 
tran. Samuel Cherniak and John Heckman (Evanston, IL: Northwestern 
University Press, 1987), 492 (first published 1946).
25 Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, tran. and ed. Mary 
Gregor and Jens Timmerman (Cambridge University Press, 1998).
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acting morally means to follow specific prescriptions. For him, to be mor-
ally good, it is not enough for an act to “conform with the moral law, but 
it must also be done for its sake.”26 Kant distinguishes motives that can be 
represented completely by reason alone a priori, and thus count as moral, 
from merely empirical motives that follow the person’s preferences and 
express her interests in pursuing her own ends, such as happiness.
Kant’s project was an attempt to construct a supreme principle of mo-
rality. This principle, the categorical imperative, is unlike hypothetical im-
peratives, which state what one ought to do if desiring a specific end. 
Categorical imperatives, instead, provide the form of every moral act. 
This is so because, for Kant
an action from duty has its moral worth not in the purpose that 
is to be attained by it, but in the maxim according to which it 
is resolved upon, and thus it does not depend on the actuality 
of the object of the action, but merely on the principle of willing 
according to which . . . the action is done.27
Kant arrives, in his explorations into the metaphysics of morals, at a sin-
gle categorical imperative: “Act only according to that maxim through which 
you can at the same time will that it become a universal law.”28 After Kant de-
velops the notion of human beings as ends in themselves and not merely 
as means, the categorical imperative took the formula, “So act that you 
use humanity, in your own person as well as in the person of any other, 
always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means.”29 Kant 
also developed the notion of autonomy such that every rational being is 
viewed as “a will universally legislating through all its maxims.”30 I will 
not go into detail to explicate a critique or defense of Kant’s moral theory; 
I will just follow through on what Hegel had to say while developing his 
26 Kant, Groundwork, 6.
27 Kant, Groundwork, 15.
28 Kant, Groundwork, 34.
29 Kant, Groundwork, 41.
30 Kant, Groundwork, 44.
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own position regarding a moral worldview.
In what follows, I present three dialectical movements Hegel present-
ed in “Conscience. The ‘beautiful soul,’ evil and its forgiveness,” starting 
with (a) exposing the antinomies of Kant’s moral theory to explicate the 
moral view of conscience. Then I will move to (b) the doubts experienced 
by the self from conscience and by recognizing others, and then the aboli-
tion of doubt through recognition in language. Finally, I will explicate (c) 
conscience in action through presenting contradictions and hypocrisy, 
unmasking the hypocrisy, and attaining reconciliation through forgive-
ness.
Kant’s antinomies, and conscience
Hegel starts by calling out the contradictions in Kant’s moral theory as it 
becomes a worldview.31 It seems antimonial, Hegel asserts, to think of a 
moral consciousness that is free and yet not be able to think of that being 
in itself. It is also contradictory to assume duty lying beyond the self and 
yet expecting the self to be moral. To Hegel, attributing moral validity 
to the non-moral consciousness and moral responsibility to the will of 
a contingent knower both seem inconsistent with truth. Instead, at this 
stage of development of a moral worldview, conscience rejected these 
ideas, reabsorbed the outside transcendent into itself, and took itself as 
a valid moral being. Conscience takes reality as truth and its immediate 
particular existence as an actual, and at the same time pure, duty.
Before moving to explicate the essence of conscience, Hegel reminds us 
of the two previous stages of development of the moral worldview. First, 
there is the legal person who exists merely through being, acknowledged 
by others as being right. Second, there is the free self that is the product of 
culture. Moral self-consciousness oscillates between the two. And then 
conscience appears as a self-assured immediacy and authentic existence. 
Here, self-consciousness attains its truth and supersedes the division be-
tween the in-itself (for Kant, noumena) and the self. It transcends the 
31 G. W. F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, tran. A. V. Miller (Oxford University 
Press, 1977), 632–8. 
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breach between pure ends and nature. In this unity, consciousness does 
not rely on arbitrary standards for its decision. It is, rather, immediately 
moral as it acts.
A moral action is an objective reality for consciousness as a knowing 
and acting consciousness. Consciousness knows it as such inwardly and 
immediately in a concrete manner. When acting, consciousness does not 
dissect the case and examine the circumstances as a diversity of duties. If 
it examines the multiplicity of duties, then it will either not act in order 
to avoid violating some duties, or it will act and thus violate at least a 
few. Instead,
in the simple moral action of conscience, duties are lumped 
together in such a way that all these single entities are straight-
way demolished, and the sifting of them in the steadfast certain-
ty of conscience to ascertain what our duty is, simply does not 
take place.32
Conscience renounces the thoughts of duty and reality as contradictory. 
Here is the paradox that is transcended by conscience: the person acts 
morally when she is aware of performing pure duty and nothing but 
pure duty. However, because pure duty is a mere abstraction of thought, 
and thus nothingness, the person only acts morally when she does not 
act at all. When the person acts, she is aware of a social body (an “oth-
er”), of the reality that exists already, and of the realities she desires to 
produce. She also has specific purposes and is fulfilling a specific, rather 
than universal and pure, duty. In acting, conscience brings unity out of 
this apparent contradiction. And here, the contradiction of pure duty and 
particular act is resolved.
Doubts, then recognition through language
Hegel pushes the dialectical movement forward to bring out the doubt 
endured by the conscience regarding whether other consciences truly en-
32 Hegel, Phenomenology, 386.
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dorse her determination.33 First, conscience must consider the different 
duties that come in concrete cases, although no one has authority for 
them. Conscience itself determines what would override this, and in this 
process, its own inclinations and impulses play a role. Here, conscience 
relies on self-certainty as the pure immediate truth in which it is immedi-
ately certain of itself. The content here counts as a duty and as a moral es-
sentiality. However, once the duty is fulfilled as specific, and thus attains 
a specific content, it becomes removed from the knowing of the acting 
conscience and the identity with it.
As it attains being, the action becomes a specific action and loses the 
element of self-consciousness, and it may not be acknowledged by the 
other as duty. Here, conscience oscillates again between its self-certain-
ty and self-doubt derived from the reaction of others. It is true that the 
conscientious person trusts in her own integrity since she knows it im-
mediately. As an other, and being free of the specificity of duty, just like 
everyone else, she cannot tell if others are being morally good or bad 
when they act. To protect herself, she comes to believe others are but the 
products of morally bad consciousness. Thus, for others,
What conscience place before them, they themselves know 
how to “displace” or dissemble; it is something expressing 
only the self of another, not their own self: not only do they 
know themselves to be free from it, but they must dispose of it 
in their own consciousness, nullify it by judging and explain-
ing it in order to preserve their own self.34
Thus, to others, when it is no longer recognized as duty, acts are viewed, 
just like any ordinary reality, as an expression of personal preference and 
the fulfillment of the person’s desires and pleasure. It is only a moral act 
when it is known as the self-expression of conscientious individuality. 
This being known as such is what is acknowledged by others. What is 
acknowledged is only the person’s expressed self-consciousness in utter-
33 Hegel, Phenomenology, 643–4, 648–58.
34 Hegel, Phenomenology, 395.
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ance and not the effect of the action. It is in language that social objectiv-
ity, or what Hegel calls “Spirit,” exists. In language, self-consciousness 
exists for an other and is immediately present and universal. Through 
language, Ego recognizes the ego status of another person, “which as 
pure ‘I’=‘I’ becomes objective to itself” and the two transcend their sepa-
rate individuality through recognizing one another.35
With conscience, the content of the language is “the self that knows it-
self as essential being. This alone is what is declared, and this declaration 
is the true actuality of the act, and the validating of the action.”36 Con-
science announces its conviction of duty, and with that announcement, 
the action is duty. The action counts as duty only when the conviction is 
declared as such. What matters is only that others are assured that con-
science is assured of doing duty. Here, to question a man whether his act 
is duty is a meaningless demand because
the self’s immediate knowing that is certain of itself is law and 
duty. Its intention, through being its own intention, is what is 
right; all that is required is that it should know this, and should 
state its conviction that its knowing and willing are right.37
If a person asserts that she is acting conscientiously, then she is.
Acting conscience, hypocrisy, and reconciliation
Hegel considers conscience in a specific act. Here, he points to two an-
titheses: first is the one between the doer’s individuality and the uni-
versal, and the second is between the individuality of the doer and the 
individuality of another consciousness. The first antithesis, between the 
individuality of the doer and the universal,38 comes from the fact that 
pure duty is a universal, while the specific individuality is exempt from 
35 Hegel, Phenomenology, 395.
36 Hegel, Phenomenology, 396.
37 Hegel, Phenomenology, 397.
38 The separation here is between the sense of self of the individual and the 
doctrine or rule-set or fixed method (conversation with Phil Carspecken).
109Conscience. Communicative and Strategic Actions
the universal. It is consciousness of the actor that provides this empty 
duty with specific content. She gets the content from herself as a partic-
ular self, specifically from its natural individuality. With this individual 
consciousness, in the purpose of the action, she is aware of her particular 
self. Thus, there appears to this consciousness the antithesis of duty as a 
universality and its reflection out of universality into this particular self.
In addition to this antithesis taking place in the inner being of con-
science between the particular and the universal, there is also an external 
antithesis that exists between the particular individuality and another 
individual. There is a disparity between what the person is in himself 
and what is first expressed for an other. Consciousness holds firmly to 
duty and declares its action to conform with duty; however, because of 
the disparity between the universal and the inner being of the particular 
individuality, and as consciousness merely declares its action to conform 
with itself at the same time as being duty, it is judged from the position 
of universal consciousness to be hypocrisy.
The acting conscience is hypocrisy and, thus, a bad conscience;39 as a 
result, this hypocrisy must be unmasked. Resolving this disparity is not 
a fait accompli, because hypocrisy, Hegel explains, “demonstrates its re-
spect for duty and virtue just by making a show of them, and using them 
as a mask to hide itself from its own consciousness, no less than from 
others.”40 Yet, acknowledging hypocrisy by the self does not in and of 
itself imply a correspondence or identity between the self as known and 
the self in itself, or one can say between the me and the I. This hypocrisy 
39 Hegel uses words like “evil,” “wicked,” “base,” “vile,” and similar terms 
denoting extreme moral statuses. I chose to replace these words with 
less strong ones to maintain a voice the modern reader can relate to. The 
religious connotation in many of these words is clear. Also, there is clear 
reference to limit cases of being unable to access a good act or the desire 
to do harm to others in clear contrast with the state of being recognized as 
universally right. It may not be far from what Hegel is alluding to thinking 
of the existential conditions of our human agency as pushing away the pos-
sibility of being extremely bad and striving for, yet not attaining, the status 
of being absolutely moral.
40 Hegel, Phenomenology, 401.
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uses what is its essence only as a mere being for another and implies its 
disregard and contempt for that essence, exposing to others only its lack 
of any meaningful or substantial being. This is the essence of hypocrisy, 
that is, to let itself be used only as a show and as an external instrument 
while lacking any importance in its own self.
The identity and correspondence between the self as known and the 
self in itself do not occur from the one-sided unrecognized persistence of 
the bad consciousness or from being judged by the universal conscious-
ness, the other. They do not occur even through having the doer assert a 
bad attitude and announce her acceptance of being bad and in antithesis 
of the universal duty if this assertion does not yet correspond with what 
the other knows or acknowledges of her. She confesses that she is wrong 
because the hypocrisy would be abolished as she unmasks herself for the 
other. In her confession, she would admit to being bad by making clear 
that she is acting in opposition to her acknowledged universal, and she 
is truly acting in accordance with her own conscience’s inner law. This 
inner law of conscience is only the law of the single individuality and ca-
price, and that is what makes it peculiar to the acting person and specif-
ically to her internally as opposed to being a universally acknowledged 
law. When someone acts based on her own law as opposed to others’ 
laws, she is saying she considers her law the right one and theirs the 
wrong one. But because the universal is only an element of the existence 
of actual conscience, the actual conscience does not continue to oppose 
this universal in its willing and knowing; on the contrary, language an-
nounces the action to be an acknowledged duty.
The judgment and unmasking do not abolish hypocrisy, either. When 
the other consciousness denounces the hypocrisy of the acting conscience 
as bad and doing wrong, she is following her own law in this judgment, 
just like the judged bad conscience was appealing to her own law. The 
law referred to by the judging consciousness comes in direct opposition 
to the law the judged consciousness was following when she acted; thus, 
it is only another particular law and has no superiority over the first. As 
Hegel puts it,
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It passes off such judging, not as another manner of being 
wicked, but as the correct consciousness of the action, setting 
itself up in this unreality and conceit of knowing well and bet-
ter above the deeds it discredits, and wanting its words with-
out deed to be taken for a superior kind of reality.41
On the contrary, as a particular law itself, it stands on the same foot-
ing with the law of the acting consciousness and gives it legitimacy. The 
judgment comes to show that the genuine and true duty that should be 
acknowledged as universal is not acknowledged. However, it does the 
very opposite because it only appeals to its particular law, and with that, 
she licenses the other and gives her the right to act in a way that appeals 
to her own law as well.
Hegel points to another aspect of this judgment and explores the po-
sition of the other consciousness. The judging consciousness is aware of 
the universal (i.e., what is common between the two as beings) in her re-
lationship to the bad consciousness; however, since she does not behave 
as the actual doer did, she is not entangled in the contradiction between 
the universality and the individuality every actor is trapped in. The 
judging consciousness remains in the universality of abstract thoughts 
and behaves only like a consciousness that apprehends. Her first action 
is that of mere judgment. In this judgment, however, she places herself 
alongside the first acting consciousness, and through this similarity, 
she comes to view herself in the other consciousness. While the judging 
consciousness does not act and remains only in the passive attitude of 
apprehension, she is also in her own contradiction with herself as con-
sciousness who determines for herself and as the absolute will of duty. It 
manages to stay pure because she does not act. Thus, it is hypocrisy, be-
cause she does not act, and instead, wants its judgment to be considered 
an actual deed; and instead of proving her moral correctness by acting, 
she does so by making judgments and uttering sentiments. The nature 
of the judging consciousness is the same as that of the doer—both make 
41 Hegel, Phenomenology, 405.
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duty a matter of language and uttered words, the doer through having 
a selfish purpose for her actions, and the judge through not acting at all, 
although she recognizes that acting is essential in any duty because duty 
without an act is merely an uttered meaninglessness.
However, judging is not exclusively a negative abstract but can also be 
looked upon as a positive act of thought, with positive content. Looking 
at judgment as a positive act of the apprehending consciousness makes 
the identity with the judged acting consciousness clearer. Here, we have 
the first acting consciousness announcing its specific action to be a duty, 
while the judging consciousness denies this because duty is universal 
in its form and, as such, lacks any specific content, although any con-
tent can count as a duty. In a sense, any concrete action, with its many 
facets, contains a universal aspect that can be taken as a duty and also 
contains particular aspects that constitute the interests and the share of 
the acting individual. The consciousness that judges does not accept the 
universal aspect of the duty nor the position of the consciousness that 
acts, although she recognizes that the acting one knows this as her duty 
and that is truly the status and condition of her reality. The judging con-
sciousness, instead, looks only at the action itself and explains it to be 
the result of the intentions of the actor that are based purely on selfish 
motives. The judging consciousness omits the fact that every action can 
be looked at from the viewpoint of its conformity to duty, just as it can be 
looked at from the viewpoint of its conformity with the particularity of 
the doer, that is, her motives and intentions.
The judging consciousness takes what she can see of the act, which is 
the outer existence, and interprets the inner aspect of the act to be only 
that. For example, if the action brings fame to the actor, the inner aspect 
is judged to be purely a desire for fame. If the action raises the status of 
the actor, its inner aspect is judged to be ambition. If the action brings to 
the doer happiness or joy, those two become what drives the doer. This 
judgment applies to every action since
No action can escape such judgement, for duty for duty’s sake, 
this pure purpose, is an unreality; it becomes a reality in the 
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deed of an individuality, and the action is thereby charged 
with the aspect of particularity. No man is a hero to his valet; 
not, however, because the man is not a hero, but because the 
valet—is a valet, whose dealings are with the man, not as a 
hero, but as one who eats, drinks, and wears clothes, in gener-
al, with his individual wants and fancies.42
No action can escape the judgment of the moral valet toward the agent, 
where the judging consciousness brings the universal aspects of the deed 
to oppose the personal aspect of the individuality.
The judging consciousness, as she judges, is truly the bad one. She di-
vides the action into its universal aspect and its particular aspect—mean-
ing into the sides that are in conformity with duty and the sides that are 
in conformity with the person’s selfish motives—and she fixedly holds to 
the distinction between these two sides. She is even worse morally than 
her counterpart and rather hypocritical herself since she makes these 
judgments while presenting herself not as a bad person who is merely 
judging out of spite but as the correct consciousness who knows the ac-
tion better and takes a position higher than the deed, claiming a reality 
to her judgment and a status to her words without deeds that are above 
the act of the doer. The acting consciousness, on the other hand, comes 
to perceive the judging consciousness as the same as herself and not as 
an alien consciousness that is disparate from her. She sees the other as 
acting in accord with her own disposition and nature and, thus, iden-
tical to herself. As she perceives this identity, she acknowledges it and 
confesses this realization (i.e., the identity) to the other, expecting equal 
recognition and confession. She does not make the confession out of a 
feeling of humiliation and does not throw herself away in relation to the 
other because of low regard for herself; her utterance of the confession 
about the perceived identity is not a unilateral act. Rather, she does so 
only because she realizes this identity with the other. As she makes the 
confession and gives utterance to this identity, she gives it an objective 
42 Hegel, Phenomenology, 404.
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reality in language. When she confesses, she expects the other to contrib-
ute her part to this objective existence and utter a similar recognition of 
the common identity.
However, when the acting consciousness who sees herself as bad ac-
knowledges this and makes the confession to the other by saying, “I am 
bad!” she does not receive what she expects. She does not get a similar, 
reciprocal confession from her identical other. The judging conscious-
ness has something completely different in mind. In judging, she has a 
notion quite contrary to identity; rather, she repels the community of 
nature and rejects continuity with the other and, thus, actualizes the po-
sition of the hard heart.
And here, the situation completely reverses! As the confessing con-
sciousness perceives the repulsion, she judges the other as wrong. For 
her, the other has refused to allow her inner self to come into an objec-
tive existence in language and has instead kept to herself while denying 
throwing herself away for the other person. At the same time, the hard 
heart observes in herself only the self-knowledge and, in the opposition 
to the other, holds only thought, without allowing herself to have conti-
nuity with the other who, as she made the confession, gave up her sep-
arateness and transcended her particularity, positing herself as a univer-
sal into a continuity with the other. The hard heart, however, keeps for 
and within herself her uncommunicative being and continues confront-
ing the confessing consciousness with the same uncommunicative being 
despite the fact that the confessing one has thrown her uncommunicative 
being away. In so doing, the hard heart does not realize the contradiction 
and continues to produce the disparity, thus preventing the other from 
returning from the deed into an existence in language and into an identi-
ty in the communicative acknowledged continuity.
Now, the beautiful soul, the one that clings to an image of itself as 
self-certain without actualizing herself in a deed, has no objective ex-
istence because she does not have the capacity to give up her idealized 
knowledge of herself, nor can she have access to an image of her unity 
in or achieve a state of identity with the other. The identity of beautiful 
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soul, instead, only comes in a negative form, without recognition from 
the other and without continuity with the other. Hegel beautifully de-
scribes her, saying,
The “beautiful soul,” lacking an actual existence, entangled 
in the contradiction between its pure self and the necessity of 
that self to externalize itself and change itself into an actual 
existence, and dwelling in the immediacy of this firmly held 
antithesis—an immediacy which alone in the middle term rec-
onciling the antithesis, which has been intensified to its pure 
abstraction, and is pure being or empty nothingness—this 
“beautiful soul,” then, being conscious of this contradiction in 
its unreconciled immediacy, is disordered to the point of mad-
ness, wastes itself in yearning and pines away in consump-
tion.43
She gives away her being-for-self as she confesses but gets nothing in 
return except the uncommunicative lack of acknowledgment of the unity 
of her mere being.
The true (i.e., the existent and the self-conscious) equalization of the 
two sides, the beautiful soul and the hard heart, is necessitated and con-
tained in this surrender. The hard heart goes through the exact same 
movement the beautiful soul went through. The self in that act is only 
a moment of the whole, as is the knowledge on which the judgment is 
based that distinguishes and separates the universal and the individual 
aspects of the action. The bad consciousness, as it confesses, posits itself 
as it sees itself in the other, but when she does not receive the recognition, 
she surrenders “its one-sided, unacknowledged existence of its particu-
lar being-for-self,” and so the other similarly surrenders her unrecog-
nized judgment.44
The beautiful soul also gives up the thought that divides the two be-
cause she has already seen herself in the other. She has already super-
43 Hegel, Phenomenology, 406–7.
44 Hegel, Phenomenology, 407.
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seded her particular consciousness and displayed herself as a universal, 
and thus, she returns into herself from her actual external existences as 
a universal consciousness that recognizes herself. This forgiveness is not 
limited to the self but extends to the other, and in this forgiveness, the 
consciousness renounces her unreal essential being that she puts on the 
same level with the other in the action and acknowledges that the action, 
that which was characterized as bad, is truly good. It even gives up the 
subjectively determined judgment as the other also gives up her subjec-
tive characterization of the act. For Hegel, “The word of reconciliation is 
the objectively existent Spirit, which beholds the pure knowledge of itself 
qua absolutely self-contained and exclusive individuality—a reciprocal 
recognition which is Absolute Spirit.”45
Second Reflection
Here, I will reconstruct a few of the main arguments presented in the 
section on Hegel with an eye to reconciliation and synthesis with Haber-
mas’s theory of communicative action. I will first reflect on Hegel’s expli-
cation of the contradictions of Kant’s moral theory. Then I will elaborate 
on the act of judging. I will end with some thoughts on language and its 
special place for Hegel.
Hegel writes his section on morality with reference to Kant’s critical 
philosophy in general and moral theory specifically. He starts with the 
insight that the person acts with awareness of performing pure duty, but 
quickly discovers that such an action for duty alone is not possible. There 
is no duty for duty’s sake. For Hegel, duty can only become real and ac-
tualized in a deed that is particular. Kant’s idea that the person acts with 
accordance to universal law, Hegel described, led to a contradiction. 
Thinking of duty as a universal contradicting with individuality led to 
the impossibility for the person to be morally good if the person acts, or 
led to the person not acting at all. Solutions of the kind of projecting pure 
duty into a holy being or secularizing duty in the notion of the general 
will of the group left duty far beyond the individual. This externalization 
45 Hegel, Phenomenology, 408.
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of duty made the person, before conviction, be recognized as moral only 
through an act of grace from an other (e.g., a transcendent god). Instead 
of these externalizations and contradictions, conscience comes to the 
scene of acts of conviction and is, thus, immediately moral.
Rather than contemplating acting for duty and going through calcu-
lations and reasoning, conscience simply acts out of her own conviction. 
With conviction, knowledge takes the form of an immediate knowing, 
feeling, and being—an immediacy that is internal to the self-certainty of 
the individual. Conviction unites individuality with universality in an 
actual act not by reasoning and thinking about duty but by being and act-
ing with self-certainty. In conviction, there is no longer an actualization 
of consciousness that can be separate from duty nor one that considers 
duty and individuality as contradictory. Instead, the self feels and knows 
itself in her existence and actualizes duty in particular acts. Conviction 
is pure knowing, the person’s own knowing. It is internal to the singular 
person who is the only one with privileged access to knowing and the 
experience. Conviction is not a state of existence prior to an action. Con-
viction is the form of being experienced as acting, the self-certain pure 
doing and pure knowing as if it contains an element of “mine.” The indi-
viduality of consciousness that acts is taken up as part of the universality 
of self-certainty.
The universality of pure duty, for Hegel, should not be understood as 
some fixed rules or doctrines that prescribe what duty is nor as a method 
people can apply to judge their actions. It is true that this divide between 
the universal and the actual has been the characteristic of previous forms 
of being, which Hegel highlights in the phenomenology. For conscience, 
however, the universal is experienced in a different manner. The uni-
versal here is identical to self-knowledge and self-certainty. Knowledge 
is not about knowing something but is knowing in the form of being. 
The person announces that she is acting of conviction, and thus, she is 
conscientious when the other is ensured that she is ensured of her acting 
conscientiously. Her moral act is thus recognized as such by others.
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When conscience acts with conviction, the self enters into existence as 
self. The self-assured self-consciousness exists as self-assured for others. 
The immediate action is not what is acknowledged. What the other ac-
knowledges is not the determinate aspect of the action nor the action’s 
intrinsic being. What the other acknowledges is the self-knowing self 
as self-knowing. The element that lasts in the action is that of the self 
through acknowledgment. The element of lasting being cannot be the 
effect, because the effect cannot endure as a lasting being the way the 
subject endures when recognized in action. The effect acquires no per-
manence. Only self-consciousness that is acknowledged obtains lasting 
existence.
Hegel examines two contradictions: one internally between the indi-
viduality and the universal, and one externally between the individu-
ality of the person and other individual consciousnesses. The first con-
tradiction is what convictions allow the person to transcend only to fall 
into the second if the self-certain self, assured of its conviction, is not 
acknowledged as such by another self-consciousness. The other self-con-
sciousness, however, has the existential reason of preserving herself for 
not acknowledging the conviction of the other and for calling out her 
hypocrisy.
Let’s look closely at judging. Because conviction is a state that is ac-
cessible only to the person herself while she is acting, after the act, the 
action attains an objective being on its own and separates from the per-
son’s conviction. The action thus becomes an object of appraisal to the 
person herself and to every other. As an action, it carries the contradic-
tion between what the person does for duty and what she does for her 
own pleasure and interest. Here, we have two options: the person can 
either not act and thus preserve her purity, or act and thus fall into this 
contradiction. “Beautiful soul” clings to an image of herself that is pure. 
She does not act and, rather, progressively withdraws from acting into a 
contemplative mode. She becomes to herself, and herself alone, a divine 
worship and pure self-certainty. On the other hand, conscience acts and 
thus becomes bad conscience.
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Now the action is put to appraisal. The contradictions between the 
multiple duties among which the person needs to choose, on the one 
side, and the person’s desires and inclinations, on the other, come to be 
clear to herself and to any other person. The person raises a claim to 
acting of conviction and thus being moral. Yet, she knows that the con-
tent of the act is determined, at least to an extent, by the caprice of her 
individual existence and conditions. She realizes her hypocrisy. The oth-
er self-consciousness, having access and insight to her own inclinations, 
desires, and contradictions, knows that the other must be entangled in 
similar contradictions when she acts. Thus, to preserve herself, she judg-
es the other as acting for mere empirical motives.
According to Hegel, the motive for judging is preserving one’s own 
self. Alter judges Ego’s action and explains it as coming from empirical 
motives rather than from moral motives and, thus, nullifies Ego’s claim 
to unconditional valid moral action. With this judgment, Alter preserves 
herself. It is as if the moral action of the other is actually a threat to the 
self of the other. Here, we again see remnants of the master and slave 
dialectics, where the two self-consciousnesses fight to the death to attain 
the other’s recognition, the giving of which to the other means the anni-
hilation of the self. Hegel gives the reason why, at this stage of dialectics, 
it is still a threat to the person to acknowledge the moral reasoning of the 
other.
By asserting that her law is the right one and the other’s the wrong 
one, she is preserving herself from the other judging her as wrong. The 
judging consciousness further protects her position by attacking the oth-
er’s doing/knowing/being and exposing her contradiction as a sign of 
hypocrisy and lower moral status. She also allows the acting person no 
opportunity to judge her simply because she, as the judge, does not act 
but only utters judgments. Yet, the judging consciousness does not ac-
knowledge that the same rules apply to her. The judging consciousness 
is on the same footing of hypocrisy as the one she is judging for two rea-
sons. First, according to Hegel, at this stage of the dialectic, the judging 
consciousness wants her judgment to be considered at the same level 
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as the deed she judges, which is wrong; acting is not at the same level 
as talking about acting. Second, she judges the other based on her own 
laws, an act that only validates the acting person’s right to act on her own 
law as well and thus cancels the grounds for judgment. Both of these 
points are denied by the judging consciousness, although they are clear 
to the one being judged.
Clearly, for Hegel, judgment is viewed dialectically first as a state-
ment, not a deed, and then it comes to be considered as a deed in itself. 
At first appearance, the person who judges seems to not be acting. But 
that is only a moment in the dialectical movement. She soon realizes that 
her judgment is an act and has an effect on the other even though it takes 
place only in language. Her judgment is an act by virtue of its suscep-
tibility to being judged. Here is how language appears to be the space 
that constitutes acting and judging. Language, notably, has a special 
place in Hegel’s dialectic. Language is the existence of “Spirit,” or what 
we can call the social objectivity (using Hyppolite’s terms), culture, and 
self-moving collectivity. Language is the unfolding mind of society that 
is active and moves yet can be objectified.
In language, self-consciousness is present immediately, and at the 
same time, it is universal. Language expresses the self and yet is ex-
pressed by the self. Language preserves the self’s universality and ex-
presses its particularity. Everything in language is universal. We cannot 
come to the particular in language (as Hegel outlined very early in the 
phenomenology of sense-certainty), yet the subject does express her par-
ticularity in language. Here, in language, the self that separated from 
others comes to see itself in the other and finds in the other her equal, ac-
tualizing the “I”= “I.” With this recognition, the self gains objectivity, as 
opposed to only universal existence as being. This objectivity preserves 
the particularity of the self while it comes to be a unity with the other 
person that is recognizing and as they come to form a we/us and realize 
their self-consciousness. Self-consciousness preserves itself and is pre-
served by others in language. This perceiving of the self by the other is 
self-existence and becoming a self.
121Conscience. Communicative and Strategic Actions
We see language and recognition repetitively come with conscience. 
First, conscience announces that she is acting from conviction. This an-
nouncement and the recognition of her announcement are what makes 
her act morally. Second, conscience becomes aware of her hypocrisy and 
confesses. Recognizing that confession would allow the self to form a 
unity while maintaining individuality. Both the announcement and the 
confession are made in language. Judging the self as acting for person-
al desires and inclinations (rather than being moral) and refusing to ac-
knowledge the confession also take place in language.
Here, at this stage of the dialectic, we see in language that the mas-
ter–slave dialectic relation structure (i.e., the fight between two self-con-
sciousnesses risking their lives to attain the other’s recognition) is po-
tentially resolved in recognition or continued in a new medium without 
annihilating the opponents when denying recognition. Language is 
the medium for recognition and for denying recognition. Language is, 
therefore, the existence of the spirit, the group, the we/us, the coalesced 
self-consciousnesses that preserves the self of the individual. Thus, lan-
guage resolves contradictions between persons. For Hegel, our actions 
claim the validity of our essence as universality. Actions resolve in lan-
guage the existential contradictions of pre-linguistics. When we speak, 
our individuality determines what we say. What we say also speaks of 
our individuality and who we are. What we say and who we are have 
meaning only when acknowledged by possible hearers. And this is how 
the spoken “I” gains a universal existence while maintaining a link to 
the individual “I.” This is also how pure duty, the universal that here 
also takes the form of the experience of one’s true being and knowing, 
becomes actualized with acknowledged speech.
Final Reflection
Habermas distinguished between communicative actions, oriented to-
ward understanding, and strategic actions, oriented toward consequenc-
es. The aim of this paper has been to explore some of the themes present-
ed by Hegel’s explication of morality in order to add to the conversation 
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on this distinction and to elaborate on related concepts. Hegel employed 
what can be viewed as parallel distinctions when exploring actions and 
judgments. There is also elaboration on self-certainty and intersubjective 
recognition; both concepts are salient for Habermas. Language as a me-
dium of asserting oneself and as the medium for recognition are notions 
that are present for both. Bringing in Hegel enriches the conversation 
around the existential aspects of acting, knowing, and being.
To put it simply, for both Habermas and Hegel, it takes two conscious-
ness for any social action; that is, for knowing things in the world, acting 
normatively, and expressing oneself authentically—or in other words, 
for an act of conviction that brings together knowing and being. For 
Habermas, a single consciousness cannot bring about resolutions: one 
person cannot by herself come to know, cannot act normatively, cannot 
express an authentic self. It is the same thing for Hegel, who shows that it 
takes two self-consciousnesses to resolve the paradoxes of our existence. 
The other self-consciousness is a necessary condition, yet, as we found, 
it is not sufficient by itself. It also takes the language being employed 
by the two communicatively. The ideal situation is where Alter and Ego 
are confronting one another as hearer and speaker of a language they 
understand. They conscientiously act with conviction; they communica-
tively act, which means they actualize their particularity and the univer-
sal. They assert their knowing and doing to one another; in other words, 
they raise criticizable universalized validity claims to truth, rightness, 
and truthfulness that are vindicated for one another. The other is en-
sured that they are self-certain, or essentially, they comprehend the act, 
accept the validity claims, and take it that the acting person is credible to 
vindicate these claims discursively when necessary. When errors occur 
or irrationality ensues, they are confessed, and the other acknowledges 
the confession to allow a unity to form again.
Many of the Hegelian notions can be relevant for enriching those of 
Habermas. The concept of conviction is not unrelated to the notion of rais-
ing universal validity claims in illocutionary acts that are binding and 
bonding. The subject acts with conviction if she actualizes her self-certain-
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ty in the act. She knows as she acts. She raises claims to a rightness that is 
universal. She announces her self-certainty of her authentic and truthful 
self and asserts that her knowing is true universally, as far as she knows. 
Acknowledging this conviction of an other is not a mere passive use of 
words. Acknowledging a conviction can also be viewed as a parallel act 
of conviction. This can be translated to Habermas’s language by referring 
to an agreement that is reached by achieving mutual understanding and 
accepting the validity conditions of the act’s truth, truthfulness, and right-
ness. When Alter is moved by reason to link up her commitments to those 
of Ego, the rationally motivated agreement between the two comes to be 
binding and bonding to both. Alter makes judgments and take positions. 
Her position has consequences for her acts and her whole being. That is 
also why, according to Hegel, Alter could come to perceive Ego’s commu-
nicative act as a threat at first and, thus, attempts to explain it away. I will 
elaborate this point after explicating the notion of judgment.
Alter’s judgments, looked at from the perspective of the participants, 
are also acts. Let’s take first three speech acts and their corresponding 
affirmative responses from a hearer. A speaker makes a request with, 
“You are requested to stop smoking,” and a hearer, judging the request 
as normatively authorized, responds, “Yes, I shall comply.” A speaker 
makes a confession with, “I confess to you that I find your action loath-
some,” and a hearer, judging the confession as truthful, responds, “Yes, 
I believe you do.” A speaker makes a prediction with, “I can predict that 
the vacation will be spoiled by rain,” and a hearer acknowledges its truth 
by saying, “Yes, we’ll have to take that into account.” The announced 
judgments, the acknowledgment of the normative rightness of the first 
claim, truthfulness of the second, and truth of the third, become speech 
acts themselves. Similarly, a negative judgment is also an act. Let’s now 
take the hearer’s negative responses to the request “Please bring me a 
glass of water,” criticizing its normative rightness with, “No, you cannot 
treat me like one of your employees,” or its truthfulness with, “No, you 
only want to put me in a bad light in front of other participants,” or its 
truth with, “No, the next water tap is so far away that I could not get back 
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before the end of the session.” In her announced judgments, the hearer 
is also performing an act. Judging is acting. Any judgment can be raised 
with a claim that can be thematized as “I hereby judge your act/utterance 
as truthful/untruthful, right/not right, true/untrue.” This judgment, as an 
action, can itself be judged by a hearer as adequate or inadequate, sincere 
or insincere, and its truth grounds as true or untrue.46 
Hegel, however, did not always see judging at the same level as acting. 
He criticized the judging consciousness for wanting her judgment to be 
considered at the same level as the deed, thus being hypocritical, implying 
that judging is a mere utterance of words and not a true action. He, howev-
er, quickly comes to assert that because the acting consciousness heard the 
judgment of the judging consciousness, she treated her as an equal, imply-
ing that a person who acts and a person who judges do similar things and, 
thus, stand on equal footing. He also raises claims to the equality of the 
two sides by announcing that the essence of acting morally and the essence 
of judging are nothing but asserting the conviction and the judgment, re-
spectively, via words. Further clarification might be called for to find out if 
reconciling the two positions is possible. I will not dive into how, from the 
perspective of consciousness as an object-knower and then as actor, judg-
ing can be thought of as a moment in a dialectical movement, thus taking 
on different meanings at different stages. This is true and relevant to the 
multiple positions of knowing, but I would like here to invite Habermas’s 
distinction between the illocutionary act and the perlocutionary effect to 
shed some light on this matter. Inviting Habermas’s speech act explica-
tions allows us to move back to the distinction between communicative 
action and strategic action, to which we will bring some Hegelian insights.
It is well known by now that Habermas distinguished between the 
content of the speech act (locution), the mode of the speech act (illocu-
tion), and the speech act effect (perlocution). Austin’s catchphrase “to say 
something (locution–p, or that p), to act in saying something (illocution–
Mp), and to bring about something through acting in saying something 
46 The examples are from Habermas, Theory of Communicative Action, vol. 1, 
296, 306. 
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(perlocution)” is still relevant. In his more recent work, Habermas further 
clarified the concepts of perlocutionary effects and distinguished three 
types: effect1 results grammatically from the content of a successful illo-
cutionary act (e.g., executed command, kept promise, realized declared 
intention, etc.); effect2 is grammatically nonregulated and only contin-
gently appears as a consequence of the speech act, yet it occurs only as 
the result of the illocutionary success (e.g., a piece of news frightening a 
hearer, resistance encountered after an announcement, etc.); effect3 can 
only be achieved in an inconspicuous manner when it comes to the hear-
er and from whom its success remains latent (e.g., an unannounced yet 
intended promotion achieved for an agent as a result of her persuading a 
customer to buy a product, etc.). This distinction is relevant to Habermas 
as he defines communicative action as that in which interlocutors pursue 
their illocutionary actions without reservations. It is also relevant to dis-
tinguishing strategic actions in which language use acquires the pattern 
of perlocution, meaning that it follows the actors’ unilateral orientation 
to consequences. Strategic actions, however, are only possible if actors 
feed parasitically on a common linguistic competency learned in the con-
text of communicative actions.
This brings us again to the issue of acting and judging. When Ego 
acts, she asserts that she is acting with conviction. An Alter Ego can take 
the participant position, and with a performative attitude, acknowledge 
the assertion and accept the moral act as right and normatively autho-
rized. When she does that, she also acknowledges the person as being 
authentic, truthful, and self-certain. She can also maintain the same per-
formative attitude and judge the act as wrong or coming from personal 
motives. Such negative judgment can then be offered to Ego, who can 
accept it, and thus reflect on her authenticity and truthfulness; adapt her 
normative commitments, acknowledge the contradiction, and amend 
it; or deny the judgment and give reasons to support her claim for the 
moral rightness and truthfulness of her act. Ego is also entitled to take 
a critical attitude regarding Alter’s judgment. Ego can question the va-
lidity of the judgment, a critique that Alter then comes to defend her 
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(judging) position against. As mentioned above, because the act is that 
of conviction, Ego and Alter both know that when they acknowledge as 
valid the acceptability conditions of the other’s act, they are both obliged 
to accept the offered claim as true, right, and truthful and oblige its con-
sequences. This obligation demands of them both to sometimes change 
commitments and modify convictions and, thus, leave the position of 
self-certainty and potentially change as a subject. With an orientation to-
ward understanding, the discourse continues until the two succeed in 
arriving at mutual understanding and agreement.
However, Alter Ego, rather than taking the performative attitude of a 
second person, could take the perspective of the third person and stra-
tegically judge the act. Alter comes with the end in mind of preserving 
herself. She knows that acknowledging the normative rightness of the 
other’s act demands she question and change her own commitments. 
Recognizing the truth claim of the other’s demands means changing 
her epistemic position. Recognizing the truthfulness of the other puts 
in question Alter Ego’s own truthfulness and sincerity simply as a mere 
other finite being. Thus, instead of having a dialogue with an orientation 
to understanding, she comes with an orientation to success (i.e., achiev-
ing her ends of preserving herself). She explains the moral act of Ego as 
coming from empirical motives. She judges Ego as inauthentic and her 
acts as morally wrong. She denies Ego the acknowledgment of her assert-
ed authenticity by playing the role of the valet toward the moral agent. 
No direct mutual understanding or agreement can be achieved with this 
attitude of preserving oneself even at the cost of injuring the other. To 
avoid such judgment that questions her convictions as a self, meaning 
her commitment to truth, rightness, and authenticity, Ego can simply 
resort to not acting, because anytime she acts, she is vulnerable to similar 
judgment from every other. The only time she is not judged is when she 
does not act. Or Ego can choose to act. When acting, Ego can quickly re-
alize that Alter is also hypocritical for playing the role of the judge, which 
was only normatively authorized in a communicative action framework. 
This is so because, in a communicative rationality framework, which is 
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the grounds for judging, the judge is demanded to surrender her cri-
tique to similar vindication. Holding a stiff-necked position takes the li-
cense for judging out of the hands of the judge. Ego can choose to call out 
Alter’s hypocrisy and invite her to return to the communicative action 
grounds. It could happen, however, that Ego stays oblivious to Alter’s 
act, and Alter herself may not know that she is acting from spite. Alter’s 
motives could remain concealed from the other and even from herself. 
Here, learning from Hegel, Ego still has the option of acting communica-
tively and forgiving the other.
Instead of continuing to act communicatively, Ego can also move to a 
strategic framework of action. In actuality, in every empirical act, there is 
a degree of this and a degree of that. There are also degrees of Ego or Al-
ter being in the dark about what the other or the self is doing. This being 
in the dark, whether taking the form of being a victim of the other’s latent 
strategic act or simply being unaware of one’s own motives, is also part 
of the condition of our existence. We will never know for certain if a spe-
cific act was communicative or strategic. Humans develop the intuitive 
competency to act communicatively. They also develop the competency 
to call out hypocrisy, both in themselves and in an other when they are 
treated strategically. Just as they have the competency to seek being un-
conditionally moral, they also have the competency for what Hegel calls 
being “evil.” But whether acting or judging, the person always does that 
with and to an other.
For Habermas, we come to know how to form subject–object relations 
and subject–subject relations through internalizing the “no” that others 
raise to our speech acts. This does not mean only the “no” we receive as 
a consequence of our empirical acts in an external world. Yes, there is 
that, which is how we learn to form relationships in the objective world, 
raising and testing truth claims. This is also how we understand simple 
imperatives. More importantly, it is, rather, the normative “no” that we 
learn to take in as we interact with social others and learn to take the po-
sition of a generalized other. Internalizing the position of an other who 
says no to our claims is what makes possible not only anticipating the re-
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action of another person in a social interaction but also reflecting on our 
own commitments in internal dialogue-like reflections with this internal-
ized other. Hegel presents us with something similar in the dialectic of 
moral conscience. When the subject acts with conviction, she is enacting 
the universal in her particular act. She is only moral when her conviction 
is recognized by an other. Furthermore, in dialogue with an other, she 
calls out the hypocrisy in her own act and comes to criticize the critique 
by calling out the other’s hypocrisy. Even later, when the confession is 
not acknowledged, she attains a unity with the other indirectly through 
forgiveness. This movement, however, is not merely an existential rela-
tionship between subjects. Acting, judging, and recognizing can only be 
attained in the medium of language.
Language has a special place for both Hegel and Habermas. It is the 
existence of Spirit and the objectivity of self-consciousnesses. We cannot 
exist outside language, although we are not simply determined by lan-
guage. We are shaped by language, and we shape language. Language 
comes to provide resolutions to the existential intrapersonal conflicts by 
taking the conflict outside the mere subject, not to project it into a tran-
scendent but to leave it between self-consciousnesses as they oscillate be-
tween the dependent and acknowledging roles. Language also comes to 
provide resolution of existentially contradictory interpersonal relational 
structures of a kind similar to the master–slave struggle. Here and there, 
however, while language does not resolve the existential divide once and 
for all, it provides ways out. It is for the person to genuinely take up the 
path provided by language and participate in its original form, that is 
communicatively, or choose to use language only as another tool for the 
person’s own ends, only to fall back into the many antinomies within the 
self and with others.
But even those who use language strategically cannot exist outside 
language. Language resists its use as a mere tool. The hypocrisy, using 
the communicative structure of language for latent interest, is called out 
and unmasked in language. Unmasking this hypocrisy is not a matter 
of calling the person “wicked” or “evil,” but is an act of forgiveness that 
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brings a unity for the self and the other. This forgiveness and the love 
that is attained thereafter, however, are only accessible to those who act, 
those who fall in hypocrisy.
Bibliography
Habermas, Jürgen, The Theory of Communicative Action: Reason and the Ra-
tionalization of Society, translated by Thomas McCarthy (Vol. 1). Bos-
ton: Beacon Press. First published 1981.
— The Theory of Communicative Action: Lifeworld and System: A Critique of 
Functionalist Reason, translated by Thomas McCarthy (Vol. 2). Boston: 
Beacon Press. First published 1981.
— On the Pragmatics of Communication, edited by Maeve Cooke. Boston: 
MIT Press.
Hegel, G. W. F., Phenomenology of Spirit, translated by A. V. Miller. Oxford 
University Press. First published 1952.
Hyppolite, Jean, Genesis and Structure of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spir-
it, translated by Samuel Cherniak and John Heckman. Evanston, IL: 
Northwestern University Press. First published 1946.
Kant, Immanuel, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, translated and 
edited by Mary Gregor and Jens Timmermann. Cambridge University 
Press.
Acknowledgment
I acknowledge professor Phil Carspecken who advised the PhD disserta-
tion and was instrumental in coaching the writing of this piece. I also ac-
knowledge Dr. Gregory Sadler who enriched the piece with his reviews 
and recommendations. 
www.bjct.de
enomoi
The lively voice of Critical Theory
Berlin Journal of Critical Theory (BJCT) is a peer-reviewed journal which is 
published in both electronic and print formats by Xenomoi Verlag in Berlin. 
The goal is to focus on the critical theory of the first generation of the Frank-
furt School and to extend their theories to our age. Unfortunately, it seems 
that most of the concerns and theories of the first generation of the Frankfurt 
School are neglected in its second and third generations.
We believe that the theories of the first generation of the Frankfurt School 
are still capable of explaining many social, cultural, and political problems 
of our time. However, in some cases, we need to revise those theories. For 
example, the culture industry in our time can also work with a different 
mechanism from that described by Adorno and Horkheimer. In our age, the 
majorities can access the media and even respond to the messages which 
they receive – this is something which was not possible in Adorno and Hork-
heimer’s time. But this doesn’t mean that the culture industry's domination 
is over. Thus, we may need to revise the theory of the culture industry to 
explain the new forms of cultural domination in our age.
Therefore, we are planning to link the theories of the first generation of the 
Frankfurt school to the problems of our age. This means that we are looking 
for original and high-quality articles in the field of critical theory. To reach 
our goals, we gathered some of the leading scholars of critical theory in our 
editorial board to select the best articles for this journal.
ISSN: 2567-4056 (online) – 2567-4048 (print)
